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Klaus Didrich
Die Integration von Verifikation und Test in Übersetzungssysteme -
Konzept und Fallstudie
(Integration of Verification and Testing into Compilation Systems - Concept and Case Study)
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird die Architektur für einen Compiler vorgestellt, der die
Korrektheit der übersetzten Quellen als Teil des Ubersetzungsvorgangs überprüfen
kann. Dabei soll es möglich sein, verschiedene Methoden , wie etwa formaler Test
und formaler Beweis, einzusetzen, um die Korrektheit nachzuweisen.
Ein vollautomatischer Nachweis ist sehr aufwendig und häufig auch gar nicht
möglich. Es ist also nicht praktikabel, aus Spezifikation und Programm die Kor
rektheit automatisch abzuleiten. Wir erweitern daher die Sprache um Korrekt
heitsnachweise ( justifications ), die der Benutzer in den Quelltext einfügen muß
(„literate justification 11 ). Je nach gewählter Methode muß der Benutzer den Kor
rektheitsnachweis mehr oder weniger genau ausführen. Durch die Einführung der
Korrektheitsnachweise muß der Übersetzer Beweise nur noch überprüfen anstatt
sie automatisch abzuleiten.
Die Überprüfung der Korrektheitsnachweise kann in den Übersetzer integriert
werden oder an ein externes Werkzeug delegiert werden. Ein externes Werkzeug
erlaubt die Einbindung bereits existierender Werkzeuge, aber auch eine Neuent
wicklung eigener Werkzeuge ist möglich. Wir zeigen am Beispiel eines taktischen
Theorembeweisers, daß eine Eigenentwicklung nicht unbedingt aufwendiger ist
als die Anpassung eines vorhandenen Werkzeugs.
Um Tests während der Übersetzung durchführen zu können, muß ein Inter
preter zur Verfügung stehen. Die Ausführung ungetesteten Codes birgt allerdings
auch Sicherheitsprobleme. Wir diskutieren verschiedene Möglichkeiten, mit die
sem Problem umzugehen.
Der Korrektheit einer Übersetzungseinheit entspricht in der Semantik die
Konsistenz einer algebraischen Spezifikation. Wir betrachten zwei Beweismetho
den: zum einen durch Konstruktion eines Modells und zum andern durch Nach
weis einer korrektheitserhaltenden Relation. Die Beweisverpflichtungen ergeben
sich zunächst aus der Beweismethode, außerdem werden Beweisverpflichtungen
eingeführt, um die Korrektheit von zusammengesetzten (modularen) Program
men zuzusichern.
Die in dieser Arbeit beschriebene Architektur ist prototypisch implementiert
worden. Dazu wurde das OPAL-System um Elemente zur Spezifikation und zur
Beschreibung von Korektheitsnachweisen erweitert. In der Arbeit werden einige
kurze Beispiele vorgeführt. Der OPAL/J-Prototyp ist seit Version 2.3e Teil der
OPAL-Distribution.

Klaus Didrich
Integration of Verification and Testing into Compilation Systems -
Concept and Case Study
Abstract
In this thesis we present a compiler architecture that enables the compiler
to check the correctness of the source code as part of the compilation process. It
allows to perform these correctness checks with different methods, in particular
formal testing and formal proof.
A fully automated check is very expensive and often impossible. Hence, it is
not feasible to check correctness automatically with the help of specification and
implementation. We extend the programming language by (correctness) justifi
cations that the user must insert into the source code (“ literate justification ”).
Depending on the chosen justification method the user must work out the jus
tification in more or less detail. The introduction of justifications changes the
compiler’s task from deriving a correctness proof by itself to checking a correct
ness proof provided by the user.
The correctness check for justifications can be integrated into the compiler or
delegated to an external tool. An external tool allows the integration of existing
tools but the development of specialized tools is also possible. The example de
velopment of a specialized tactical theorem-prover shows that the development
of a specialized tool is not necessarily more expensive than the adaptation of an
existing tool.
For test execution during the compilation an interpreter must be available.
The execution of untested code causes security risks. We discuss different possi
bilities to deal with this problem.
The correctness of a compilation unit corresponds to the consistency of an
algebraic specification. We study two proof methods: either by construction of a
model or by establishing a correctness-preserving relation. The proof obligations
result from the proof method, in addition proof obligations are introduced to
ensure the correctness of modular programs.
The compiler architecture described in this thesis has been prototypically
implemented. The Opal system has been extended with language elements to
denote specifications and (correctness) justifications. The thesis presents some
short examples. The Opal/J prototype is part of the Opal distribution since
version 2.3e
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing interest in proving programs correct, or at
least partially correct. As software is increasingly used in safety-critical environ
ments and the security of software programs becomes more and more important,
developers are eager to produce correct programs and obtain a certificate of the
correctness and “harmlessness” of their software.
Producing correct software is not just a matter of pride for the engineer. United
States and European Union law [EEC85] states that the manufacturer of faulty
software is liable for damage caused by death, personal injury or damage to
private property [KS91, Giin93]. It is therefore worthwhile putting extra effort
into the development of correct programs in order to reduce the risk of later
liabilities.
Actually, the demand for correctness checks is not really new. Experience shows
that it is easier to have errors detected automatically than to find them by de
bugging. It is not surprising, then, that programming languages are increasingly
including features that enable the compiler to check certain correctness aspects
at compile time. Two of the most important features are strong typing and in
terfaces.
Both features are taken for granted in modern programming languages and it is
easily forgotten that typing and interfaces were not available in the early pro
gramming languages. Fortran 77 and Cobol have only a predefined set of
types, the user having to code other types by using the predefined ones. C does
have types, but it allows typing rules to be circumvented. Interfaces are not avail
able in the first definition of Pascal, which provides textual inclusion as the only
means to simulate interfaces.
Typing and the use of interfaces are the most common correctness checks found
in programming languages. Other checks are dynamically checked assertions (e. g.
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in Eiffel), the check for malicious operations performed by the Java byte-code
verifier and the check for correctly declared exceptions in Java.
It seems quite natural to extend the responsibility of the compiler by including
correctness checks for specifications in the compilation process. This is discussed
in Chapter 2.
1.1 Motivation
The motivation for this thesis is a strong dissatisfaction with the gap between
the potential (functional) programming languages offer for developing correct
software and the capabilities of the available tools. Functional programming lan
guages in particular provide a combination of features that make them a good
starting point for the development of correct software.
• The link between functional languages and algebraic specifications is close
enough to enable much of the algebraic framework developed for handling
 such specifications to be reused. This was shown in the Korso project
([BDDG93] and [PBDD95]). We are thus able to reason about programs
and specifications within a single framework.
• As regards the practical aspects, compilers for functional programming lan
guages have long emerged from their academic roots and now produce code
that is fast enough to be used in practice.
• Some functional programming languages already provide limited support
for algebraic properties. ML uses an ad hoc syntax to mark types that
have an equality function associated, Haskell extending this idea by
type classes that allow the user to associate a type with arbitrary func
tions. Opal supports the implementation of abstract data types by a non-
isomorphic implementation. In the Korso project, syntactic support for al
gebraic properties was added to Opal. A sequent calculus for Opal [DF94]
has been developed that makes formal proofs of the properties of Opal pro
grams possible.
 These advantages influenced the decision to focus our work on functional pro
gramming languages. Because some of the work required to develop a prototype
has already been done, it is easier (not easy!) to arrive at a usable environment
for the development of correct software. In principle, however, the approach pre
sented here does not depend on the paradigm of the underlying programming
language.
Syntactic support for algebraic properties is a first step, but having only syntactic
support may turn out to be harmful. From the user’s point of view, algebraic
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properties belong to the language, so successful termination of the compiler is
easily misinterpreted as an indication of the program’s correctness. However,
the compiler does not check these properties. Violation of unchecked algebraic
properties often leads to especially nasty errors, which are typically detected
after hours of debugging. We need both, algebraic properties and correctness
checks.
On the other hand, if users are aware that algebraic properties are essentially
treated as structured comments, they will probably not synchronize the specifi
cation and the code. This effect is known from the development of documentation.
If another programmer discovers that specification and source code do not match,
it will be difficult to decide whether the specification has not been updated or
whether the code is wrong (or whether both of them need to be corrected). Again,
we see that algebraic properties without correctness checks are dangerous.
The idea of adding support for algebraic properties was further pursued in the
development of Extended ML and Opal 2 a, but so far both languages lack tool
support. Extended ML is a restricted subset of ML that has been augmented
to include algebraic properties and a verification semantics 1 . Opal and Opal 2 a
have no verification semantics, but both offer support for formulating algebraic
properties.
Correctness is often viewed on the level of individual functions, but it is also
important for programming in the large. Functional programming languages sup
port programming in the large by polymorphism, by parameterized structures
and by separation of interface and implementation. Example derivations carried
out in the KORSO project show that a richer set of algebraic relations is help
ful in developing correct programs. Correctness for programming in the large is
discussed in Chapter 4.
1.1.1 Examples
The lack of support for specification and verification is not merely a theoretical
deficiency without practical impact on everyday programming. On the contrary,
without specification and verification some expensive errors can occur.
We illustrate this situation with some small, but nevertheless typical, examples.
The syntax we use is similar to that of Opal 2a, which allows the formulation
of the problem (but does not provide a solution). We have added some syntactic
sugar to facilitate understanding.
1 Extended ML is presented in Section 9.1.2.
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1.1.1.1 Sorting a List
The first example (Program 1.1) shows the specification and implementation of
a single function using pre- and postconditions 2 . In this case, it is easy to spot
the mistake in the implementation.
Program 1.1 Sorting lists
fun sort: seq[nat] -» seq[nat]
SPC sort(S) = T
pre true
POST S permutation T AND ascending(T)
DEF sort(O) == 0 — empty sequence is sorted
DEF sort(a::R) == a::sort(R) [T]
This is the classical situation for correctness checks: given an implementation, a
precondition and a postcondition, check whether the implementation ensures the
postcondition, provided the precondition holds.
1.1.1.2 Instantiation of Sets
The second example involves a parameterized structure with a function parameter
that is expected to fulfil some properties. Program 1.2 shows the interface and
the implementation of a structure of sets, parameterized with an element sort a
and an ordering relation < on that sort.
The function parameter of the Set structure is required to be an (irreflexive)
total order. The requirement must be expressed as a comment without obligation.
The implementation of the incl function (not shown here) produces an ordered
sequence, the implementation of in utilizing this property to enhance efficiency.
Problems arise if the instantiation is not correct - see Program 1.3. The example
uses best-fit pattern-matching to shorten the definition of the ordering relation 3 .
The compiler does not check whether an instantiation fulfils the parameter prop
erties. The error in the instantiation of Set with [colour, <] passes unnoticed
but leads to some surprises when evaluating the in function. The intended or
der is red < green < blue, so let us assume that the representation of the set
{red, green, blue} is red::green::blue :: <>•
2 This example, like many others in the thesis, contains a mistake. This is intentional; we
need erroneous examples to illustrate how certain kinds of errors are detected or ignored. These
intentional mistakes are marked with [~t~| .
3 One might argue that ordering relations should be automatically generated anyway. But
this is not always desirable, nor does it affect the underlying problem.
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Program 1.2 Sets
SIGNATURE Set [ck, <]
sort a
FUN < : a x a —>■ bool
— requirement : ( a , <) is an
— parameter sort
— parameter function
( irreflexive ) total order
SORT set
FUN {} : set
FUN incl : a x set —> set
FUN in: a x set -» bool
LAW ALL x S. x inincl(x, S)
IMPLEMENTATION Set [a, <]
— implementation of set by (ordered) sequences
DATA set == abs(repr: seqfo;])
FUN in: a x set[a!, <] bool
def x inabs(O) == false
def x inabs(a::R) —— IF x < a then false
IF a < x then x in abs(R)
ELSE true
FI
Program 1.3 Instantiation of Sets
IMPLEMENTATION Colour
DATA colour == red green blue
fun < : colour x colour -» bool
DEF red < x == true [Y]
DEF green < red == false
DEF green < x == true [T]
DEF blue < x == false
IMPORT Set[colour, <] COMPLETELY
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red in abs(red::green::blue:: 0)
false — since red < red
green in abs(red::green::blue:: 0)
green in abs(green::blue :: 0) —since red < green
false — since green < green
Such an error is particularly nasty for several reasons. First, the error shows up in
the functions from the correctly implemented module Set, and not in the function
< on colours, the true cause of the error. Second, the error occurs only for a
few special cases , which might not even show up in every application. Third, the
programmer, who is unfamiliar with the implementation of the module Set, will
have a hard time realizing that all the errors in functions from Set have a single
cause, which, moreover, lies in the Colour module.
1.1.1.3 Implementation of Deques
The last example uses a feature of Opal that allows the implementation of a
 free type to be different from its declaration in the interface. Program 1.4 shows
how a data structure of “deques” can be implemented. Deques are semantically
equivalent to sequences, but allow (amortized) 0(1) access to the first and the last
element. The idea is well known (see, e. g., [Gri81]): the sequence is represented
 as a pair of sequences, the second of which is reversed (compare the definition of
asSeq in the example).
The function find? is available for all collection types in the Opal standard
 library. It takes a predicate and an aggregate as arguments and returns one
element of the aggregate that fulfils the predicate or nil otherwise.
This is also the case for the find? function on type deq, and yet it is not defined
correctly. Consider the following evaluations:
find?(Ax. true,abs(l::2:: 0, 0)) avail(l)
find?(Ax. true, abs(0,2::1:: 0)) avail(2)
Hence, find? returns two different results for representations of the same se
quence. It is not even a function. A correct implementation would have to convert
to type asSeq before using the find? function on sequences.
Errors like this are difficult to detect because the effect of the error shows up only
in special circumstances. After all, the explicitly written part of the specification
is fulfilled. Because the function property is basic to functional programming, it
is usually considered last as the underlying cause.
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Program 1.4 Deques
SIGNATURE Deque [a]
SORT a
TYPE deq == 0
:: (ft: a, rt: deq)
FUN asSeq: deq —>• seq
fun find? : (a —** bool) x deq —> optionja:]
spc find?(P,d) == r
pre true
post (avail?(r) =>• cont(r) ind and P(cont(r))) and
(nil?(r) =» ALL x. x in d => not(P(x)))
IMPLEMENTATION Deque [ct]
DATA deq == abstract (left: seq, right: seq)
DEF asSeq(d) == left(d) Hh revert (right (d))
DEF f ind?(P, d) ==
IF avail?(f ind?(P, left(d))) then f ind?(P, left(d))
else f ind?(P, right (d)) [~I~| FI
1.1.1.4 Discussion of the Mistakes
It should be noted that the second and third example show errors that are likely
to be expensive in software development.
• The involved functions are likely to pass initial tests and applications. The
error thus only becomes evident at a late stage in the development process.
• The distance between cause and effect is considerable. Inferring that the
wrong results of evaluating the in function are the result of the incorrect
implementation of the order on colours takes some time and requires knowl
edge of the structures involved.
Correctness properties like the ones presented are part of the language definition.
A compiler is not only expected to translate the input into a different output
language, it is also regarded as one of the principal tools for deciding whether a
piece of source code conforms to the language definition. In the cases presented
above, the compiler fails to issue an error message, although the programs are
incorrect. Of course, the necessary checks are not fully automatable, some user
support being needed. But complete lack of support for these checks is not ac-
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ceptable. The treatment of these examples using our approach is presented in
Chapter 7.
1.2 Justification of Correctness
The examples show that we expect formal specifications to already exist (and
that we do not have to deal with the problem of how to translate the user’s re
 quirements into a formal specification). A formal specification is only a necessary
condition for automated checking of correctness, though.
1.2.1 Kinds of Justification
We use the generic term “justification” for any method designed to increase the
user’s confidence in the correctness of the program. Instead of confining ourselves
to only one method, we want a tool that supports a wide range of justification
methods.
In particular, we wish to support formal testing and formal proof. These methods
are advocated by different communities to establish correctness. Both methods
have their advantages and disadvantages; we do not want to take sides in that
discussion.
Our aim is to enable the user to choose the appropriate justification method in
each case, and even change the justification method in the development process -
for example, from a simple test to a formal proof. The error in the sort function
(Program 1.1) will become evident during testing, whereas the error in the im
plementation of deques (Program 1.4) is likely to pass most tests, thus requiring
a formal proof.
For details, see Chapter 6.
1.2.2 Extent of Justification
Justification is an expensive activity. It is therefore desirable that the user be
able to decide to what extent the correctness of the software system should be
checked. Some typical choices are:•
• No justification. For backwards compatibility and for the development of
quick-and-dirty prototypes, it must be possible to develop software without
justifications.
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• Some users might want to check only certain “hot spots” that are critical
to system safety or security.
• Others might want to check only certain kinds of properties, for example,
definedness properties or instantiation conditions.
• And, of course, it must be possible to perform a full-fledged formal devel
opment.
1.2.3 Feasible Justification
A big problem here is the fact that algebraic properties are in general undecid-
able, and even the decidable properties cannot easily be proven automatically.
One possibility is to restrict either the programming language or the expressible
properties such that the resulting combination is automatically provable. Both
options are undesirable: weak properties make the resulting system unsuitable for
meaningful correctness checks, and restricting the expressiveness of the language
results in correct but uninteresting programs. As the examples in Section 1.1
show, correctness issues already exist in data-type implementation, an area we
will certainly need for developing software.
Our approach is not to restrict the language. Instead, we propose requiring the
user to add information that makes automated checking of the necessary justifi
cations feasible.
1.3 The Opal/J Case Study
Based on the existing Opal compiler, a prototypical implementation of a
correctness-aware compiler has been developed [Did99]. The compiler closely fol
lows the design presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Some compromises were unavoid
able because a few of the design decisions made for the standard Opal compiler
are too expensive to change. The development of the Opal/J prototype was a
considerable help in validating the design decisions and it also served for gather
ing experience in the development of language extensions for justification and an
accompanying development environment.
The justification component was implemented as a component of the Oasys tool 4 .
Oasys served as a testbed for the approach presented here. It was intended to
give a first approximation of the tool we have in mind. For proper software devel
opment, further improvements are necessary. The output is sometimes cryptic,
4 The Oasys tool allows compilation and interpretation of Opal programs to be interactively
controlled. Its modular design allows additional components to be added.
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efficiency could be improved and some syntactic peculiarities should be cleaned
up. Nevertheless, the prototype is functional (in two senses: it is written in a
functional programming language, and it works and is usable), and the examples
we present in this thesis are taken from concrete sources. Only the syntax has
been slightly changed to improve readability.
Below, we use the term “Opal/J” for the prototype and for the extension of the
 Opal language. The “J” is short for justification.
Figure 1.1 on the facing page shows a screen-shot of the Opal/J prototype during
preparation of the examples presented in Chapter 6. The screen-shot displays four
windows, three editor windows and one terminal window. The toolbars of the
editor windows have four extra buttons that support the extensions of Opal/J.
We begin our explanation of the contents with the upper left-hand window and
proceed clockwise.
The upper left-hand window shows the Opal unit SortList.sign that de
clares a function sort on sequences of natural numbers and includes a specifica
tion for this function. If we remove the syntactic sugar, the specification of the
sort function reads
ALL S. true => S permutation sort(S) AND ascending(sort(S))
PRE POST
The specification can be accessed via the name Spcjsort]. Experience has
shown that the simultaneous introduction of a definedness property is useful.
This definedness property is constructed from the precondition only and reads
all S. true ==> dfd sort(S). The definedness property can be accessed via the
name Dfd[sort],
The directive /$ PROOFCHECK $/ in the second line tells the Opal/J compiler
that a full-fledged formal development is desired and that the full set of proof
obligations is to be computed. If this directive were missing, Opal/J would
assume that no correctness checks should be performed, thus ensuring backwards
compatibility.
The upper right-hand window presents the corresponding implementation
unit SortList. impl. First, the function sort is defined (incorrectly). Then, some
 (pseudo) imports are necessary to make the justification extension known to the
compiler. These are followed by four justifications of the formula Lift[Spc[sort]]
using different methods. The lifted specification is in this case isomorphic to
 the original specification; see Section 3.3.5 for an explanation of why we cannot
normally use the original specification. All justifications are preceded by a proof
declaration that declares which properties are justified and which properties are
 assumed to hold during justification.
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Figure 1.1: The Opal/J Prototype Justifying the Unit SortList. impl
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The Justification spc_sort_l uses certification as a justification method. The
justification consists of a digital signature. Section 6.2 deals with certification as
a justification method.
The Justifications spc_sort_2a and spc_sort_2b attempt to justify the correct
 ness by means of formal testing. The parameters for a formal test are the function
to be tested, the test-case selector function and the test data. The test-case selec
tor function allGuards is a white-box test-case selector ensuring that all guards
of the if-branches of the defining equation are covered by at least one item of test
data. Justification spc_sort_2a contains only one item of test data, the empty
sequence, Justification spc_sort_2b also contains an ascending and a descending
sequence. The testing component is described in Section 6.3.
Finally, Justification spc_sort_3 contains a formal proof. The proof declara
tion lists several premises that are used during the proof: the defining equa
tion of sort (Def[sort]), free-type properties of sequences of natural numbers
(Freetype[seq[nat]j), and some definedness properties as well as properties about
permutations and ascending sequences of natural numbers. The formal proof is
composed of three proof strategies. The formal proof component is presented in
Section 6.4.
The lower right-hand window is the terminal window. It contains the output
of the call to the justification component. The first lines contain messages output
during the justification check. The time shown is not processor time but wall-
clock time. It thus took 6.89 seconds to perform parsing, context checking and
justification checking 0 . The justification check fails with several error messages
and one hint. We explain the error messages briefly here; they are explained in
more detail in the corresponding sections of Chapter 6.
• The first error message lists a proof obligation for which no proof declaration
could be found.
• The second error message states that the digital signature is valid but not
from a trusted authority.
• The third error concerns Justification spc_sort_2a: one test case (expressed
as a Boolean-valued lambda expression) is not covered by the supplied test
data.
• The fourth error lists a failed test. The test of Justification spc_sort_2b
fails for the third piece of input data (since we count from 0, the third piece
of input data is labelled “no. 2”).
5 The time was measured on an Intel-compatible processor, running at 600 MHz, equipped
with 128MB main memory.
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• The last error message tells us that the theorem-prover did not finish with
an empty list of subgoals. The message lists the targets of the remaining
subgoals.
• The hint draws attention to the fact that the theorem-prover might succeed
in another branch of the proof tree.
The lower left-hand window shows a file in which additional information is
stored to facilitate debugging. We see the tracing output of the proof attempt
of spc_sort_3. The atomic tactics performed are listed, and finally the resulting
proof state is given in full, followed by some statistics on the performance of the
theorem-prover.
The other examples (instantiation of sets, implementation of deques) are given
in Chapter 7.
1.4 Contents
In the following chapter, we motivate once again our decision to integrate veri
fication and testing into the compilation process, and discuss some conclusions.
Chapters 3 and 4 give the semantic foundations for a justification component.
Chapter 5 presents the design of a compiler architecture with integrated justifi
cation support. Chapter 6 focuses on the architecture of the justification com
ponent itself. Chapter 7 shows how the examples given in this introduction are
handled by the Opal/J compiler. Chapter 8 discusses security issues related to
our approach. Related work is presented in Chapter 9, and further topics are
listed in Chapter 10. The thesis concludes with a final discussion.
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Chapter 2
The Compiler as a Correctness
Checker
Justification of correctness - by formal proof or formal testing - is mostly per
formed by a separate tool in the development environment. This has several
disadvantages. Tools tend to evolve in different directions; even if the compiler
and a justification tool were developed for the same input language, we cannot
expect the input language to remain 100% compatible. A separate tool must re
analyze the code, whereas the compiler has already analyzed the input. Using
the compiler therefore promises to be more efficient than using a separate tool.
Finally, integration of the correctness check encourages a development style that
views correctness checks as an integral part of software development, whereas a
separate tool is often used for a “post-mortem justification” - if it is used at all.
Compilers have been enhanced with other correctness checks before. Section 2.1
explains why we think the integration of the justification correctness check into
the compilation process is a logical step in compiler development.
Formal proof and formal testing are tasks that are typically performed semi-
automatically using interactive tools. Fully automated support is not feasible,
so we have to find a way of integrating these interactive tasks into the non
interactive (batch) process of compiling. Our approach to making justification a
feasible task for the compiler is presented in Section 2.2, which introduces the
concept of “literate justification”.
Integration of the justification into the compilation process creates the technical
problem of having to execute tests before the tested function has been compiled.
To make this possible, we propose (in Section 2.3) the use of an interpreter during
the compilation process for the justification.
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2.1 Extending the Compiler
A compiler has two main tasks. First, it must translate correct source code into
the target language. Second, it must check that the source code adheres to the
language definition. If the input does not belong to the input language, the com
piler should stop compiling and issue appropriate error messages, which help the
user to understand the reason for the error.
In the past, compilers have not always done a good job as regards the second task.
Of course, unexpected behaviour sometimes results from misunderstandings. The
most (in) famous of these misunderstandings is the confusion of assignment and
equality. Some languages (e.g. C) use a single equals sign for the assignment
operator, which is easily confused with the equality operator. If, in addition,
assignment is treated as a function that returns a value interpretable as a Boolean
value, the compiler has no chance of detecting an error in a program fragment
like‘if (n = 1) then ... else ... fi’.
While this is a misunderstanding between the language designer and the pro
grammer, a compiler that fails to check correctness conditions can pose problems
that are really hard to detect. The example in Program 2.1 is taken from [Pag88].
Program 2.1 An Illegal Subroutine Call in Fortran 77
SUBROUTINE SILLY(N, M) CALL SILLY(10, 7) |7j
N = N + M WRITE(*,*) 10
END
It is illegal to call a subroutine with a constant actual parameter if the corre
sponding formal parameter is written to within the subroutine. “The effects of
committing such an error are system-dependent. [... ] some systems will actually
go ahead and over-write the constant with a new value, so that if you use the
constant 10 in some subsequent statement in the program you may get a value
of 17. Since this can have very puzzling effects and be hard to diagnose, it is
important to avoid doing this inadvertently.” [Pag88]
Formally, this is a compiler error, but Fortran 77 actually lacks the means to
denote whether the call to the subroutine is wrong or whether the subroutine
should be corrected. It is possible to write a compiler that is able to diagnose this
 kind of error, but this requires an additional analysis, which was obviously not
foreseen by all Fortran 77 compiler writers 1 .*
Fortran 90 has been extended by interfaces and the option of declaring formal parameters
to be IN, INOUT or OUT. The example can now be formulated such as to allow the compiler to
detect the error more easily.
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2.1.1 Typing and Interfaces
We have seen in the previous section that Fortran 77 contains no elements
allowing the compiler to check the correctness of the input. Typing and separately
compiled interfaces are two important techniques used to enable the compiler to
check for further correctness conditions.
Note that these techniques are not normally available in shell programming lan
guages. Shell programs are often short and have low algorithmic complexity. The
additional type checks and the management of interfaces involves too much effort
in these cases. If shell programming languages evolve into regular programming
languages, these concepts are introduced into the language. Perl is an example
of this.
Typing Types are known from mathematics, and it is perhaps not surprising
that most programming languages are typed languages. Early languages were
restricted to a small predefined set of types like numbers and strings (e. g. Basic)
or integer numbers and real numbers (Fortran 77). This forces the programmer
to express the problems in terms of the predefined types. But if the programmer
is allowed to define new types, a more problem-oriented use of types is possible.
Since this makes the type constraints tighter, the compiler can perform more
meaningful checks.
The flat model of types can be extended by subtyping, which is provided by some
functional languages (Obj, Isabelle), or the inheritance provided by object-
oriented languages. The most extensive type theory is Martin-Lof’s intuitionistic
type theory [ML84].
Interfaces Interfaces extend type checking to calls of subroutines in separately
compiled program parts. Without interfaces, external functions must be indepen
dently declared in the calling program unit. All program units are independently
compiled and linked together. The linker does check that a function with the
given name exists, because it must adapt these calls to the correct address, but
it does not check the (type-)correctness of the call. Thus, the language designer
must add a language element that enables the compiler to check the calls to
subroutines in other program units. To underline the importance of this kind of
check, we once again cite [Pag88]: “Errors, particularly mismatches of data type
or array bounds, are especially easy to make but hard to detect. Sometimes the
only indication is that the program produces the wrong answer. This shows how
important it is to check procedure interfaces.” We share this opinion but believe
it is the job of the compiler, not of the programmer.
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2.1.2 Static Program Analyses
Compilers did (and do) not check for all possible mistakes. Software engineers
however, had to cope with these errors, and were thus forced to introduce an
additional verification phase: static program analysis. This deals with errors that
can be detected from analysis of the source code without executing it. The cat
alogue of static analysis checks in Figure 2.1 is taken from [Som92] and gives an
overview of typical checks of this sort.
• Unreachable code • Parameter type mismatches
• Unconditional branches into loops • Parameter number mismatches
• Undeclared variables • Uncalled functions and procedures
• Variables used before initialization • Non-use of function results
• Variables declared and never used • Possible array bound violations
 • Variables written twice with no inter- • Misuse of pointers
vening assignment
Figure 2.1: Static Analysis Checks
There are different ways of dealing with these mistakes.
• Sometimes it suffices to add more analyses to the compiler, e. g. to detect
unreachable code.
• Or elements of the language are omitted, e. g. to inhibit branches into loops,
the whole concept of branches is eliminated.
• Or new concepts (and keywords) have to be introduced. Consider the dec
laration of variables. Some languages do not require the explicit declaration
of variables. But the danger of typographic errors accidentally introducing
new variables more than justifies this facility. The compiler cannot check
for this error unless declarations are added to the language.
Initially, separate tools were invented for such analyses, e. g. lint for C programs
or ftnchk for Fortran 77 code. These checks were later added to modern
compilers as well. Of course, without changes to the language, only the first two
options can be used. In some cases, the language definitions have been extended
to allow further checks.
To illustrate this, we look at how parameter type mismatches are handled in C.
Program 2.2 gives an example of a legal 2 C program in which a function strange
2 Note that the Fortran 77 program in Program 2.1 is illegal - though this is difficult to
check.
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is called with too many - and also wrongly typed - parameters. The language
explicitly allows the type conversions implicit in the call. C does not explicitly
require that the number of formal and actual parameters match, and it encour
ages a coding scheme that elegantly handles additional parameters - these are
effectively ignored. Hence, the program compiles without error messages and even
runs without problems 3 .
Program 2.2 A “Correct” Program with Parameter Type Mismatches
int main(){
int r;
r = strange(134514188, "foo", 8); [t]
printf ("result is 7,d\n", r);
return 0;
}
int strange(char *a, int b){
return strlen(a) + b;
}
ANSI C includes (explicit) function declarations (called “function prototypes”).
If we include the proper function prototype for strange, the compiler detects the
errors:
warning: passing arg 1 of ‘strange’ makes pointer from integer without a cast
warning: passing arg 2 of ‘strange’ makes integer from pointer without a cast
too many arguments to function ‘strange’
Note that the parameter type mismatches are only warnings, the C language
definition stating that integers may be converted into pointers and vice versa.
This kind of legacy burden is difficult to avoid 4 because language definitions
have to be changed compatibly so as not to break existing code. Newly defined
languages can start from scratch and avoid these pitfalls.
2.1.3 Correctness Context Conditions
The development, as presented in the previous sections, shows that it is quite
natural to demand increasingly sophisticated correctness checks of the compiler.
The designers of Euclid put it this way: “We see it as a (perhaps eccentric)
It may be necessary to adjust the first argument to the call of strange to avoid run-time
errors. The result is the meaningless value 134514173.
4 C++ still has the feature of undeclared functions, though marked as “anachronistic” [Str87].
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step along one of the main lines of current programming language development:
transferring more and more of the work of producing a correct program, and
verifying that it is consistent with its specification, from the programmer and the
verifier (human or mechanical) to the language and its compiler.” [PHL+77]
Program 2.3 shows that we still have a long way to go. It contains a recent
example: the Comparable interface of the Java 2 SDK. The documentation con
tains several requirements for the implementation that “the implementor must
ensure”. Java cannot express requirements formally, therefore the only way to
integrate requirements is a comment. Of course, the Java compiler does not check
comments for correctness.
Program 2.3 The Comparable Interface of the Java 2 SDK
public interface Comparable {
public int compárelo(Object o)
/** Compares this object with the specified object for order. Returns a
negative integer, zero, or a positive integer as this object is less than, equal
to, or greater than the specified object.
The implementor must ensure sgn(x.compárelo(y)) ==
-sgn(y.compárelo(x)) for all x and y. (This implies that x.compárelo(y)
must throw an exception iff y. compárelo(x) throws an exception.)
The implementor must also ensure that the relation is transitive:
(x.compárelo(y)>0 && y.compárelo(z)>0) implies x.compárelo(z)>0.
Finally, the implementer must ensure that x. compárelo (y)==0 implies that
sgn(x.compareTo(z)) == sgn(y.compárelo(z)), for all z.
It is strongly recommended, but not strictly required that
(x.compareTo(y)==0) == (x.equals(y) ). Generally speaking, any class
that implements the Comparable interface and violates this condition should
clearly indicate this fact. The recommended language is “Note: this class has
a natural ordering that is inconsistent with equals.”* */
}
While the checks from Figure 2.1 have been integrated into modern languages
and compilers, we are still left with the need to check for
• correct function implementations
• correct instantiations
• correct data-type implementations
Consequently, we add a new set of static analysis checks.
More analyses are not enough, because the compiler cannot guess the intended
specification. We cannot restrict the language either, because we definitely want
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to check the correctness of function implementations and data-type implemen
tations. We must therefore add new language elements to handle these static
analyses.
Currently, correctness requirements cannot be expressed in most languages. Some
offer support in writing specifications but restrict properties to Boolean expres
sions (Eiffel, Euclid). Algebraic properties (such as neutral elements, associa
tivity, etc.) and relations between (parts of) modules are not normally considered
in programming languages.
The first task, then, is to define a language that allows the formulation of prop
erties. This is not the hardest part. Algebraic specification languages can serve
as a model for formulating algebraic properties. Languages like Extended ML
and Opal 2 a show that the syntactic inclusion of algebraic properties is unprob
lematic.
However, the addition of algebraic properties to a programming language poses a
new series of design questions. The approach chosen in Opal/ J is a minimal ap
proach: we added only the necessary properties to the existing syntactic entities.
This gives a clear concept but requires explicit coding of many almost self-evident
properties. Section 5.2 presents the Opal/J syntax. Section 10.1 discusses lan
guage design issues.
The second task is to implement decision procedures to determine the correctness
of a program. This is quite difficult: a major difference from previously employed
context checks is that correctness is generally undecidable. This problem is tackled
in the following section.
2.2 “Literate” Justification
Given the undecidability of correctness checks, an automatic correctness check
cannot always terminate and give a correct answer. A non-terminating correctness
check is unacceptable for integration into a compiler. We must therefore lower
our requirements, and opt for less automation or less correctness (or both).
Less correctness sounds impossible, but it is in fact a viable alternative. Testing
is a “less correct” correctness check: if testing fails, we know that there is an
error; if testing succeeds, the program might or might not be correct.
Less automation calls for more help from the programmer, who must supply
additional information that the compiler can use to check the correctness.
We propose adding the justification to the source code. This means that
all information related to a single function is contained in the same piece of
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source code. This principle is borrowed from the literate programming approach
for documenting software. It ensures that our approach remains feasible because
we do not require that the justification be computed by a program. All we require
is that the justification be falsifiable by the compiler.
• For justification by testing, the test data must be provided by the program
mer. More sophisticated test methods may also require a description of the
test cases to make it possible to check whether each of the test cases is
covered.
• A simple proof checker requires the user to provide a full description of
a proof, which is then checked for syntactic correctness and whether it
constitutes a valid proof.
• More strongly automated proof tools in the style of, say, Isabelle are
controlled by tactics and possibly user-defined strategies. The user need
not give the full proof but instead programs a tactical theorem-prover.
2.2.1 Literate Programming
Literate programming was introduced by Knuth [Knu83] to produce better doc
umented software, software that is “fun to read”. The notion of “literate” pro
gramming was chosen to make other programs seem “illiterate” by comparison,
much as structured programming is superior to unstructured programming.
The most distinctive feature of Knuth’s Web system is its mixture of documenta
tion and program code within the same document. This encourages programmers
to change the documentation as they change the program, thus always keeping
it up to date. The production of documentation and the compilation of the pro
gram are performed by two filters, weave and tangle. The weave program
generates the pretty-printed documentation. The tangle filter strips away the
documentation parts, re-orders the program code as required, and then calls the
compiler proper.
The Dosfop system The literate programming principle has enjoyed only lim
ited success, but my experience with the development of the Dosfop documen
tation tool (together with Torsten Klein, see [DK96]) shows that it is possible
 to deal successfully with the acceptance problem. Knuth’s original Web system
suffers from two deficiencies:•
• Using the Web system requires more conviction than merely adding docu
mentation to source code in a programming language. The documentation
system not only adds a typesetting language for the documentation part, it
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also changes the underlying programming language. While this might be an
improvement, it effectively requires the user to adapt to a new programming
language.
• The Web system does not support modular systems or hierarchically orga
nized modules. This makes Web- type documentation systems unsuitable
for complex software systems.
The Dosfop system tackles the acceptance problem by observing the following
principles:
• Upwards compatibility: old and undocumented code is easily integrated.
• Multiple presentations: the documentation is available in printed and in
hypertext form.
• Flexibility: the documentation system is highly configurable.
The last point would seem to be of particular importance. In the last article of a
series on literate programming, C. van Wyk writes that a “fair conclusion from
my mail would be that one must write one’s own system before one can write a
literate program” [VW90]. We conclude that most literate programming systems
are too specialized for general use.
2.2.2 Consequences for the Justification Component
These principles influenced the proposed design of the justification component.
Upwards compatibility is ensured by the demand that quick-and-dirty programs
still be allowed. Instead of multiple presentations, we require support for multiple
justification methods. Flexibility is ensured by different choices as to what extent
correctness should be checked.
The following principles are adaptations of design principles of Dosfop that
proved useful in the development of the documentation system and that we intend
to apply to the integration of the justification component.
• The introduction of justifications must not change the division into com
pilation units. In order to adhere to the principle of literate programming,
the hints to the testing or the formal proof component must be recorded in
the program source.•
• Self-evident facts must not require extra work. “Extra work” means any
change to the source code. Experience with literate programming systems
shows that a new tool must recognize facts that are considered self-evident
if it is to gain acceptance.
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• The extension for handling correctness proofs must not influence the speci
fication or programming environment. In particular, it should be possible to
prove only parts of the program (for example, those modules that contain
safety-critical functions).
2.3 Integrating an Interpreter
One of the distinctive features of our approach is the use of an interpreter
during the justification check. This is only sketched here; we discuss the
arguments for and benefits of this idea in the following sections:
• An interpreter for test execution (Section 6.3)
• An interpreter as a universal external tool (Section 6.4)
2.3.1 An Interpreter for Test Execution
The implementation of support for formal testing poses a major problem: How can
the compiler execute the function to be tested before the code for this function
has been generated? If testing is performed after compilation, the object code
is available and can be executed, but this is not really an integration into the
compilation process.
The problem can be solved if we base test execution (and evaluation) on the
(annotated) abstract syntax. This is possible if an interpreter is available: We
 can execute (or rather interpret) the definition and then feed the result, together
with the specification, into a test evaluator, all before the backend of the compiler
is called.
To be really useful, the interpreter must have certain properties: it must be fast,
provide a faithful translation, and be secure. This is discussed in Section 6.3.5,
where we also present the architecture of the testing component.
2.3.2 An Interpreter as a Universal External Tool
The principle of literate justification requires that the user be able to add the
justification to the source program, close to the property that is to be justified.
 Extending the compiler by support for various justification methods often sug
gests the use of (existing) third-party tools, most notably theorem-provers, but
also tools for the computation of test cases. These third-party tools are controlled
by an input language of their own, which the user must learn in addition to the
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programming language and which cannot be context-checked by the compiler of
the programming language.
We suggest providing the implementation of the external tool in the form of a
library written in the same language that we are compiling. This has several
advantages:
• The user can develop the software project and control the external tool
using the same language.
• In particular, users can extend the library by adding their own functions.
If a new test-case selection strategy is needed or a new tactical for a formal
proof is required, users can simply add the appropriate definition to the
program.
• We get the syntax and context check of the justification, i. e. of the control
language for the external tool, for free.
Functional programming languages are particularly well suited to define embed
ded domain-specific languages [Hud98]. In fact, ML was developed from the con
trol language of the LCF system [Pau87, Section 1.1.1].
The disadvantage is that we have to provide the implementation and cannot
use existing third-party tools. On the other hand, a specialized tool can better
support the specific programming language. The translation into and from the
input language of a third-party tool does not come for free either.
We discuss these issues in detail in Section 6.4.4, where we compare the bene
fits of using a third-party theorem-prover and a specialized theorem-prover for
supporting formal proofs as a justification method.
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Chapter 3
Semantic Foundations
As semantic foundation we choose algebraic specifications. Algebraic specifica
tions have several advantages that make them a good choice for our purpose. In
particular, functional programs are algebraic specifications with a restricted no
tion of formulas. Another advantage is that correctness issues have been studied
in connection with algebraic specifications and also with respect to the composi
tion of algebraic specifications. By the use of algebraic specifications as a semantic
basis we inherit many of the correctness results.
The unreflected transfer of ideas from the area of algebraic specification some
times leads to expensive context conditions. Since we are concerned with feasible
procedures, we have to be careful. We are more willing to compromise and sacri
fice some expressive power, if necessary.
3.1 Basic Notions from Algebraic Specification
A full introduction to the field of algebraic semantics can be found in [EM85,
EM90]. The following definitions leave out some details that are dependent on
the underlying institution, most notably the exact definition of operations (and
 functionalities), of formulas, and of the satisfaction relation “f=”.
Simple programs are quite easily translated to algebraic specifications. But some
features commonly found in functional programming languages, like higher-order
functions, partial functions, and products as result types are often not dealt with
in papers about algebraic specification.
[Nic95] presents an approach for these problems. Unfortunately the proper treat
ment of partiality and higher-order functions complicates the definitions of basic
notions like functionality, homomorphism and subalgebra. To shorten the pre
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sentation and to ease understanding, we stick to the standard case and refer to
[Nic95] for the extended definitions. This is only acceptable because our results do
not depend on the exact definitions. If we were to define the algebraic semantics
of a programming language, the situation would be different.
3.1.1 Signatures
An (algebraic) signature £ = (5, OP) consists of a set of sort names S and a
set of operations OP. Each operation op has an associated functionality fc op . A
signature morphism m : £i —» £2 = (m.s,mop) is a P a i r °f mappings, such that
m s : Si ->■ S2 maps sorts and m 0 p : OP\ -> OP2 maps operation symbols such
that the continuation m* of m on the functionalities is respected, i. e. /c m ( op ) =
m^/Cop). A E-algebra A = ((A s ) s6 s, (A op ) op6 op) is a family of carrier sets, one
for each member of S together with matching operations. Let £i ,£2 be two
signatures with £1 C £ 2 , and let A be a £ 2 -Algebra. We define the £ : -reduct of
A wrt. £ 1 , written A /Sl , by A /Sl = ((A s ) se5l , (A^^oPi), be. we copy those
carrier sets and operations that correspond to items from the smaller signature.
Let A and B be two £-Algebras. A E-homomorphism h : A —> B is a family of
functions (h s ) se s j h s : A s —» B s , such that for all operation symbols op we have
h o op a = ops o h. B is called a subalgebra of A, written B C A, if B s C A s , for
all s £ S and B^ = A^ for all op £ OP.
3.1.2 Specifications
A (algebraic) specification S — (E,F) = ( S,OP,F) consists of a signature to
gether with a set of formulas F. An S-algebra is a £-Algebra A that satisfies the
formulas, i. e. V/ £ F • A (= / or shorter, A f= F. A £-homomorphism between
two <S-algebras is called an S-homomorphism. The reduct construction is also
possible for iS-algebras.
Let Fi, F2 be two formula sets over the same signature. We write Fi =£$■ F2 , iff
for all A £ Alg% we have (A (= Fx ) ==> (A (= F2 ). A specification morphism
m : S\ —» <S2 is a signature morphism m : £ x —> £ 2 that respects the formulas,
i.e. F2 =» m*(Fi) (where m* is the continuation of m on formulas).
These definitions do not make any assumptions about the formula language, in
particular they do not assume that an implication between two formula sets
exists. This is the reason for the introduction of the “ ’’-relation. However,
the formulas we normally employ do have an implication. Therefore we drop the
“F“ superscript in the following.
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3.1.3 Categories
The class of all E-algebras is denoted Alg%. The category of E-algebras and E-
homomorphisms is called Cai 2 . The class of all 5-algebras is Alg s . The category
of 5-algebras and 5-homomorphisms is denoted Cats. The category of specifica
tions and specification morphisms is called SPEC.
If the members of Algs are identical up to isomorphism, we call the specification
monomorphic , otherwise the specification is loose. If Algs is the empty set, the
specification is inconsistent. An algebra A 6 Algs is also called a model of 5.
3.1.4 Functors
There are several functors that play a special role in the definition of the semantics
of functional programs:
• Let 5 and S' be two specifications with 5 Ç S', let i : 5 —» S' be the
corresponding inclusion morphism. The forgetful functor Vi : Cat(S') —>
Cat(S) maps all algebras to the corresponding reduct algebra.
• Let 5 and S' be two specifications with 5 Ç S', let i : 5 —» S' be the
corresponding inclusion morphism. The restriction functor IZi : Cat(S') —»
Cat(S') maps each algebra A to the smallest subalgebra B Ç A such that
Vi(A) = Vi (£>). (The smallest subalgebra always exists and is uniquely
determined.)
• Let 5 be a specification, ~ be the F-induced equivalence relation on E(X)-
terms, such that ( t « i')iff(F => t = t ') for all t, f € T%(X). The identify
functor 1~ : Cat(S ) —* Cat(S ) maps each algebra A to the quotient algebra
Am-
Note that the construction of the forgetful functor and the restriction functor is
possible for arbitrary specification morphisms. An informal explanation of these
functors is given in Section 3.3.4.
3.2 Application to Functional Programs
We already mentioned that it is not the aim of this thesis to define the algebraic
semantics of a functional programming language. As far as Opal is concerned,
we refer the reader to [DFG + 94], and also to [WDC + 95], where an institution for
Opal is presented.
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3.2.1 Units
In order to abstract from concrete programming languages, we do not employ
notions like modules, structures and the like. We follow the use in the Korso
project and speak of (programming) units. A programming unit U normally is
also a compilation unit.
We assume that the semantics of a unit U is a specification Sjj =
(5, OP, F). Note that the specification is not necessarily monomorphic. Note also
that functional programs are included as a borderline case.
3.2.2 Correctness is Consistency
We have to find an interpretation for “correctness” of a single specification, be
cause correctness normally is defined with respect to another entity.
Informally speaking, we consider a unit U (with semantics Su) incorrect, if there is
a contradiction between two formulas, for example, between a definitional equa
tion and an algebraic property. Such a contradiction leads to an empty set Algs v ,
because no algebra can satisfy contradictory formulas.
This consideration motivates our definition: A programming unit is correct,
iff its semantics is a consistent algebraic specification.
3.2.3 Classification of Formulas
For algebraic specifications, there is no need to distinguish between different kinds
of formulas. For correctness proofs, i. e. consistency proofs, we need to classify
formulas. We employ two independent classifications, one of them syntactic, the
other one semantic. The idea is that we need the semantic classification to ease
consistency proofs, and that we can derive the semantic classification from a
syntactic one.
We only define the different classifications here and study the relationship in
Section 3.4.1, because we have to discuss the methods to prove consistency first
(in Section 3.3).
On the one hand, we make a semantic distinction between essential and in
significant formulas, i.e. between axioms and theorems. The formula set is
partitioned into two subsets, the axioms Fax an d the theorems Fth-, such that
 the theorems follow from the axioms: Fax => Fth■ Consistency proofs can
concentrate on the axioms set: Let Su = (5, OP, Fax U Fth) be the semantics
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of the unit, let S'u = ( S,OP,FAX ) the semantics without the theorems, then
AlgSu = Alg S y.
On the other hand, we classify formulas syntactically by their role in (functional)
programming:
Constructive Formulas The constructive formulas are those that are used
by the compiler for the generation of the executable program. Typically,
constructive formulas are definitional equations.
Algebraic Formulas Algebraic formulas are all other formulas explicitly given
by the user in the source code of the unit.
External Formulas External formulas are introduced from other program
ming units. Typically, external formulas are introduced by an import. Ex
ternal formulas (Fe) are introduced in Chapter 4.
Relational Formulas If the source code contains the claim that the unit U is
related to another unit U' by an algebraic relation, relational formulas are
added to U. See Section 3.3.2 for an explanation.
We denote these four disjoint subsets of F with Fc, FA , FE and FR respectively.
3.2.4 Interface and Implementation
Opal and other programming languages separate the interface and the imple
mentation without regarding the two as belonging to different name spaces. For
reasons of simplicity, we do not follow Opal in this respect.
We regard the units signature Colour and implementation Colour as two
distinct units with two different specifications (S s ,OP s , F s ) and (S 1 ,OP ! , F 1 )
respectively. In particular, the algebraic signatures are not related by a subset
relation, i. e. (S s ,OP s ) £ {S 1 ,OP : ).
Of course, there is a close relationship between both signatures, which is expressed
 by the existence of an injective morphism i that maps sorts and operations from
the signature to their counterparts with equal names (but non-equal origins )
in the implementation. We will refer to this morphism as a pseudo inclusion ,
because - technically speaking - it is not a real inclusion. So we have i(5 5 , OP s ) C
(S^OP 1 ). Note that this does not carry over to the formulas: neither i (F s ) C F 1
nor F 1 =>• i(F s ) hold in general.
Both units are related by an algebraic implementation relation. We will treat this
relation in Section 3.3.4.
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3.2.5 An Example Program
The example in Program 3.1 introduces an abstract data type colour. Note that
Program 3.1 contains two units, the interface unit SIGNATURE Colour and the
implementation unit IMPLEMENTATION Colour 1 .
Program 3.1 The Data Type colour
SIGNATURE Colour
TYPE colour == red green blue
implementation Colour
import Real only real 0 1- =
DATA colour == rgb(r: real, g: real, b: real)
def red == rgb(l, 0, 0)
DEF green == rgb(0,1, 0)
DEF blue == rgb(0, 0, l)
The semantics of SIGNATURE Colour consists of a single sort colour; six opera
tions, the constructors {red, green, blue} and the discriminators {red?, green?,
blue?}; and the algebraic formula Freetype[colour].
The semantics of implementation Colour consists of the sorts {real, colour},
the operations {0, 1, -, =, rgb, r, g, b, rgb?, red, green, blue, red?, green?,
blue?}, the constructive formulas {Datatype [colour], Def [red], Def[green],
Def [blue]}, some external formulas introduced by the import (e. g. NOT 0 = l),
and the relational formula Lift [Freetype [colour]], which is introduced because
Unit Colour.impl is related by an implementation relation to Colour.sign.
3.3 Proving Correctness
A proof of consistency is not an easy task. The following two possibilities to prove
consistency of a specification S are feasible in our setting:
• We can prove the consistency by constructing a model of S as a witness,
i. e. we prove that Alg$ is non-empty by constructing an algebra A and
proving that A \= F.
• Another possibility is to establish a correctness-preserving relation R be
tween iS and another unit with specification S'. A relation is correctness
preserving, if V s s' • ((s R s') A consistent (s')) => consistent (s) holds. If
1 We will treat this example in more detail in Section 7.3.
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we know that S' is consistent and if we have established 5R5', we know
that S must be consistent as well.
3.3.1 Proving Correctness by Constructing a Model
Constructing a model seems quite difficult, but in our environment this is actually
easy. For the constructive formulas, an automatic consistency check is possible
and is in fact carried out by the compiler: if they are inconsistent, the compiler
terminates with error messages, otherwise the compiler terminates successfully. If
we can also prove that the algebraic formulas follow from the constructive ones,
we have proven consistency.
Put into mathematical formulas, let S = (S , OP, Fc U FA ) be the specification,
Fc being the constructive formulas and FA being the algebraic formulas. If the
compiler terminates successfully, we know that S' — ( S , OP, Fc) is consistent. If
we have additionally Fc ==>■ FA , then we have Algs = Algs>-
We loose some expressive power, because the only specifications for which we
can use this kind of consistency proof are those specifications that are fully de
termined by their constructive formulas. Hence, the algebraic formulas exhibit
properties that follow from the constructive formulas, but they do not add new
properties. Since we started with a functional programming language and added
the possibility to add algebraic properties, this is no real loss. Actually, this re
striction is partly overcome by the possibility to synthesize programs from proofs
of their respective specifications (see Section 6.5).
We summarize: proving correctness requires to prove that Fc =>■ FA , or put
in other words, proving correctness by constructing a model requires to
prove that the algebraic formulas are theorems.
 3.3.2 Proving Correctness by an Algebraic Relation
Proving correctness by an algebraic relation R allows to replace the consistency
proof by the proof that an algebraic relation holds. Together with the knowledge
that another specification S' is consistent and the meta-knowledge that the re
 lation R holds only between consistent units, we can conclude that S is correct,
if S R S' holds. The proof that establishes the algebraic relation might be more
constructive and thus better automatable than the consistency proof.
The claim that both units are related is a separate (meta-) property of the two
units. Hence, the most direct transfer into concrete syntax is the introduction
of a new type of unit that serves to declare an algebraic relationship between
the “basic” units. The KORSO development graph [PW95] makes a distinction
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between units (nodes) and relations (edges), and both may be given justifications.
This distinction is clean but requires the introduction of a new type of (meta-)unit
into the programming language. The principles stated in Section 2.2.2 demand
that no new units are introduced, so we try to prove the relation without the
introduction of new units.
Let S = ( S , OP, F). If we want to prove that <SRS' holds, we try to find a set of
formulas FSrS< such that (SRS')iS(F =* FSrs')- This is equivalent to the proof
that the formulas Fsus 1 are theorems. This motivates our proposal: we propose to
prove correctness by algebraic relation by adding relational formulas
as theorems to one of the related units. Preferably the relational formulas
are added to the unit that is developed later.
The relational formulas depend on the kind of algebraic relation. We will study
three algebraic relations.
• A very simple relation is the equivalence relation (Section 3.3.3).
• The most important relation is the (algebraic) implementation 2 . We study
this relation thoroughly in Sections 3.3.4, 3.3.5, and 3.3.6.
• Finally, we discuss the interpretation relation (in Section 3.3.7).
3.3.3 The Equivalence Relation
Let U be a unit, the correctness of which is to be proven by establishing an
equivalence relation to a unit U'. Since both units have different signatures, we
cannot directly prove F => F' and F' =£> F. The user must provide a bijective
morphism that establishes the correspondence between the two signatures.
Let F = {/i, /2 , • • •, fk] and F' = {/{, //} be the respective formula
sets, then the relational formulas are m^(/\ F) =>■ /j for j = 1,2,..., l and
f\F' =$■ ml_y (fi) for i = 1,2, ...,k, where m ^ is the continuation of the
bijection on formulas (see Section 3.1.2).
3.3.4 The Implementation Relation
Algebraic implementation is the semantic relation that corresponds to the de
velopment by stepwise refinement. Hence, the complexity of the implementation
relation depends on the complexity of the refinement notion in the development
Algebraic implementation is not to be confused with the implementation of an algorithm.
The former is a relation between two units and neither of them needs to be executable. The
latter refers to expressing the algorithm in an executable programming language.
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environment. The general idea is that the implementation restricts the model
class of the base specification, without yielding an inconsistent specification.
Let S = ( S,OP,F ) and S' = ( S',OP',F') be two specifications (the seman
tics of two units, U - the interface unit - and U' - the implementation unit),
F : Cats' —»■ Cats be the functor that expresses the algebraic relationship be
tween the interface and the implementation, then we define
S is implemented by S' iff {F(F') => F ) A (Alg s > ^ 0)
In order to prove the implementation of S by S', we have to show that the
implementing unit is consistent and that the formulas of the implementation -
translated by F into the context (i. e. specification) of the interface - imply the
formulas of the interface. In the simple case, where stepwise refinement consists
of adding new formulas, and the signatures of S and S' are equal, no translation
is necessary and F is the identity functor. However, stepwise refinement usually
allows other programming techniques as well:
• The implementation U' may use auxiliary sorts and functions that are not
visible (hidden) in the interface U.
• The implementation of a data type t by a data type t' may contain junk,
i. e. U' may contain elements that are not the representation of any element
of t.
• The implementation of data type t by data type t' may be done in a way
that one element of t has multiple representations in data type t'.
Each of these techniques is matched by a corresponding functor in the definition
of F (where i is the pseudo inclusion from S to <S'):
• Hidden Functions: The forgetful functor V; removes these additional items
from the semantics.
• Unreachable elements: The restriction functor P\ removes unreachable data
elements.
• Multiple representations: The identify functor X~ maps multiple represen
tations to a single element.
Opal uses the composition of these functors to express the implementation rela
tion [DFG+94]: FOpal = Vi o H ;0 X*.
3.3.5 Re-Definition of the Implementation Relation
In the form presented in the previous section, a proof for correct implementation
is not possible in our approach. The proof as sketched above requires the proof of
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jF(F') =» F. These formulas are built over the signature of the implemented
unit. This has several disadvantages. First, this results in a correctness proof
that uses information from the implementation. This violates software engineering
principles. Even worse, it is impossible to justify these proof obligations by testing.
The reason is that testing requires an executable that does not exist for U. Finally,
the interface most often is developed before the implementation exists. We should
add the relational formulas to the newly developed unit, and not be forced to
change an already existing unit.
It seems less problematic to translate the formulas of the interface in
stead. We call this translation function T ~ x . The implementation relation then
reads
S is implemented by S' iff (F' => F _1 (F)) A ( Algs> ^ 0)
This translation is still not easy to define - it essentially introduces explicit defi
nitions of the domains of the variables in the formulas of the interface in terms of
the implementation. The translation is treated in [BH96, BH98] where it is called
“lifting ”, and must of course be adapted to the logic used.
There still is the problem that formulas have to be lifted at all. The user must be
aware that the lifted formulas may syntactically differ from the representation in
the interface. Fortunately there are some (not so rare) cases where we can offer
the user to employ the syntactic copy of the proof obligation, because in these
special cases the following implication holds: i(/) =» F~ l {f). If no new sorts
are defined, T is essentially the forgetful functor and some other simplifications
apply.
In Section 7.3 we present an example that illustrates the difference between the
lifted formulas and their syntactic copies.
3.3.6 Data-Type Implementation
A data-type implementation may introduce junk elements and multiple repre
sentations. This opens the possibility that an image {^{A))^ of an implemented
function Aop is not a function. In order to exclude this error we also lift the func
tion property for the implemented functions to the implementing specification.
We do this separately for junk elements by adding closedness formulas and for
multiple representations by adding congruence formulas. Note that these formulas
are only needed for operations contained in the interface. These formulas are not
needed for hidden functions.
The examples in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the additional closedness and
congruence proof obligations.
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Junk Elements The implementation of functions from the interface must be
closed on the non-junk (reachable, visible) elements of the data type. Let Pv :
s —> bool be a predicate that describes the visible elements of sort s, let op :
si x s 2 x • • • x s n —► s e OP be an operation, then we must add the closedness
formula Vxi, x 2 , ... xn • Pv {x h ) A Pv {x i2 ) A... Pv{x ik ) => Pv(op(xi,x 2 ,
to the relational formulas of the implementation unit (where • • • ,ik are the
indices of argument sorts with sq. = s).
In general it is not feasible to automatically derive an appropriate predicate Pv .
Thus, we demand that the user provides a definition for the visibility predicate.
The construction of the closedness formulas is then straightforward.
If the sort is declared to be a free type, we know that the elements consist
of exactly those values that can be constructed with the help of constructor
operations. In this case, an automatic construction of Pv is possible.
Multiple Representations The implementation of functions must not distin
guish between different representations of the same (interface) value. Let s be the
implemented sort, let be an equivalence relation, such that t ~ s t', iff t and t'
are representations of the same value, let op : s —> s € OP be an operation, then
we must add the congruence formula Vx, x' • (x ~ s x') => op(x) ~ s op(x') to
the relational formulas of the implementation unit. If the target sort is different,
we replace ~ s with = : Vx, x' • (x ~ s x') =>• op(x) = op(x').
The generalization to several variables is obvious: if the ith argument sort is s,
Xj and x\ must be equivalent, i. e. x* ~ s x', otherwise both must be equal, i. e.
Xi = x\.
Again, it is not feasible to let the compiler derive automatically the equivalence
relation. We demand that the user provides a definition for the equivalence rela
tion, if the data-type implementation uses multiple representations.
3.3.7 The Interpretation Relation
The implementation relation presented in Section 3.3.4 is not the only way to rep
resent development by stepwise refinement. In this section we treat the interpre
tation relation as defined in the SPECWARE manual [JSB + 95j. The interpretation
relation is used for development in the Specware language Slang.
Let 5 and S' be two specifications. An interpretation from S into S’ consists of
three components:
• A mediator specification M.
 • A source morphism s : <S —* M..
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• A target morphism s' : S' —> A4 that must be a definitional extension.
The Spec WARE manual defines a definitional extension as follows. A morphism
h : S —» S' is a definitional extension, if
• h is injective, and
• every sort or operation in S'\h(S ) (i. e. outside the image of h) is a defined
sort or operation.
A defined sort or operation is a sort or operation that has a definition that gener
ates a carrier set or a “provably functional relation” 3 . In our framework, a defined
sort or function is characterized by the fact that its behaviour is determined en
tirely by constructive formulas.
Example Since this construction is rather different from the other interpreta
tion relations, we present a short example. We pick up the example from Pro
gram 3.1 and show an interpretation from Colour into TripleReal. Program 3.2
shows the source and the target of the interpretation.
Program 3.2 The Source and Target of the Example Interpretation
signature Colour
TYPE colour red green blue
SIGNATURE TripleReal
IMPORT Real COMPLETELY
TYPE triplereal ==
triple(lst: real,
2nd: real,3rd: real)
The mediator is shown in Program 3.3. (We omitted the discriminator functions
for brevity.) In this example the type implementation is very simple. In [JSB + 95]
more involved examples are presented (e. g. an interpretation of sets into bags),
where the intermediate type is more complex (e. g. the subtype of all bags without
duplicates for the interpretation of sets into bags).
Finally, we can define the interpretation. Program 3.4 shows the definition in ad
hoc pseudo code. Colour and TripleReal are the domain and codomain of the
interpretation respectively, ColourAsTriple is declared to be the mediator spec
ification. The source morphism s is given after the keyword DOM — TO — MED,
the target morphism s' is introduced by the keyword COD — TO — MED and is
declared to be the (inclusion) morphism induced by the import statements. Be
cause the additional items in Unit ColourAsTriple are not only declared but also
defined (by the data and DEF keywords), the import morphism is a definitional
extension.
According to the Specware manual this property is checked syntactically.
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Program 3.3 The Mediator of the Example Interpretation
SIGNATURE ColourAsTriple
IMPORT Real COMPLETELY
IMPORT TripleReal COMPLETELY
DATA ColourAsTriple == pack(unpack : triplereal)
FUN redAsTriple greenAsTriple BlueAsTriple: ColourAsTriple
DEF redAsTriple == pack(triple(l, 0, 0))
DEF greenAsTriple == pack(triple(0,1,0))
DEF blueAsTriple == pack(triple(0, 0, 1))
Program 3.4 The Definition of the Example Interpretation
interpretation ColourlntoTripleReal : Colour ==>• TripleReal
MEDIATOR ColourAsTriple
DOM — to — MED colour —> ColourAsTriple
red —> redAsTriple
green —> greenAsTriple
blue —> blueAsTriple
COD - TO - MED IMPORT MORPHISM
Note that the introduction of a separate “interpretation” unit is not appropri
ate for our framework. We do not want to introduce additional types of units. So
we would have to add the morphisms to one of the existing units. The best choice
is the mediator specification, because it is specific to the respective interpretation.
Hence, the correctness conditions for the specification morphisms are part of
the correctness conditions of the mediator specification 4 . The result is that the
formulas translated by the morphism are added as relational formulas to the
mediator specification. This construction is simpler than the application of T
for the implementation relation.
Correctness We must discuss whether the interpretation relation is suitable
for a consistency proof. Suppose we have two units with specifications S and S
such that there exists an interpretation from S into S' with mediator A4, source
morphism s : S —» Ai, and target morphism s' : S -* Ai.
Suppose S' is consistent. Then there exists an algebra As> that is a model of
S'. Since the target morphism s' is a definitional extension, we can use it to
4 The proof obligations entailed by a specification morphism are dealt with in Section 4.2.3
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construct an algebra Aj^\ as follows (where m is a sort or operation from AA).
For the elements that are in the image of s' the morphism is an inclusion and
we can use the corresponding carrier set or operation from the algebra As' ■ The
other elements are defined sorts or operations, so we can derive a definition for
the carrier set or the operation - this derivation is called “impl” in the following
formula. Note that the inverse s ,(-1) (m) is defined if m € img(s'), because m is
injective.
A (m) = S 4s'(s ,(-1) M)>if m G img(s')
^ \ impl(m), otherwise
We can finally apply the forgetful functor Vs to the algebra A M and get the
algebra VS (A M ), which is a model of S, i. e. VS {A M ) € Alg s . The construction is
shown graphically in Figure 3.1.
As a result, we arrive at the conclusion that the interpretation relation can be
integrated into our framework. It is possible to perform a proof of consistency
by establishing an interpretation relation from a specification S into a consistent
specification S'.
3.4 Constructing a Correctness Proof
In the previous sections we have discussed different methods to feasibly prove con
sistency. In this section we go one step further and describe abstract algorithms
to actually prove the correctness of a unit.
3.4.1 Computing Proof Obligations
In Section 3.2.3 we have defined a syntactic and a semantic classification of for
mulas. Up to now, we have classified formulas according to the syntactic scheme.
Now we must classify the formulas as axioms or theorems. The validity of axioms
is guaranteed by one of the methods presented in Section 3.3. So we must prove
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that formulas that are classified as theorems are indeed theorems: FAX => FTH .
Since we have to provide proofs for these formulas, we call the theorems also proof
obligations.
Constructive Formulas Constructive formulas always hold by definition and
therefore are always axioms (Section 3.2.3).
Algebraic Formulas If the proof is performed by model construction, the alge
braic formulas are theorems (Section 3.3.1). If the proof is done by algebraic
relation, we do not know which formulas are axioms and which are theo
rems. A safe default, which minimizes the number of proof obligations, is
to assume that all algebraic formulas are axioms.
External Formulas External formulas are always axioms; this is explained in
Section 4.1.3.
Relational Formulas Relational formulas are always theorems (Section 3.3.2).
The table in Figure 3.2 shows how the formulas are partitioned into axioms and
theorems.
proof method
syntactic category
Fc Fa Fe Fr
proof by model construction axioms theorems axioms theorems
proof by algebraic relation axioms axioms axioms theorems
Figure 3.2: Computing Proof Obligations
Extent of Justification We have suggested in Section 1.2.2 that the user be
able to decide to what extent the correctness of the software system should be
checked.
Once the proof obligations have been computed, the compiler can apply additional
filters to select only those proof obligations that the user is interested in, e. g. only
definedness conditions.
In the Opal/ J prototype we decided to mark the user s choice by a compiler di
rective (pragma /$ PROOFCHECK $/) in the source code. This decision sometimes
caused confusion and hinders an easy change of the desired extent of justifica
tion. It seems preferable to introduce compiler options for this purpose and not
to record the extent of justification in the source code at all.
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3.4.2 Structuring the Proof of Correctness
If theorem-provers were more powerful, we could give /\ Fax => /\Fth as
an input to a theorem-prover and use its output to determine the consistency
of the unit. There are several problems that make this approach non-feasible.
Testing and program synthesis cannot be used to justify arbitrary formulas, but
are (in general) restricted to specifications of functions. And the efficiency of
theorem-provers depends on the number of formulas, which is large in real-life
applications.
Since the formula f\FAX =4- /\FTH is not suitable for most of our envisaged
justification methods, we split the proof of correctness into smaller proofs that
can be justified with a user-chosen method. Of course, we must do this in a way
that enables the compiler to reconstruct the correctness proof. If the following
conclusions are valid in the respective institution, we can proceed:
(T =>- A and r => A') =► (T => A U A') (1)
(r =» A) =» (TUP =► A) (2)
(r =» {<fi} and ru{</>} =>■ A) =► (r => A) (3)
Property (1) is the most important one, because it allows to prove each proof
obligation separately. Property (2) allows to restrict the set of premises, and
is important for efficiency. Property (3) allows to use previously justified proof
obligations.
3.4.3 Proof Declarations
Property (1) allows the separate justification of proof obligations. We go one
step further and require that the user declares for each proof obligation
separately the axioms that are used to prove the respective proof obligation.
These proof declarations are part of the source code, because they reflect
the user’s reasoning why the program is correct. The justification itself is part of
the source code as well. Hence, proof declaration and justification form a pair of
connected entities, similar to function declaration and function definition. Both
entities are joined by a name.
The general shape of a proof declaration is PD : {/i, /2 ,..., fn } =>■ /, where
PD is the name of the proof declaration, the fi are the premises and / is the
conclusion or the target of the proof declaration.
The introduction of proof declarations poses additional work on both the pro
grammer and the compiler writer. The compiler writer must deal with additional
syntactic entities that may contain syntax and context errors on their own and
must be integrated into the abstract syntax tree. The programmer on the other
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hand must be aware of the proof obligations of the program unit and add for
each proof obligation the “reason” why it is correct.
The structuring of the correctness proof is helpful in situations where the unit is
not correct. It is often difficult to find out why a formal proof did not succeed.
Proof declarations effectively structure the proof of correctness of the whole unit.
Errors can be assigned to a specific justification, which makes debugging of jus
tifications easier. The accompanying justifications can be checked independently,
possibly in parallel, because all dependencies are contained in the proof declara
tions, which are checked in a separate step.
3.4.4 Context Conditions
The introduction of proof declarations introduces additional context conditions.
The compiler must check the additional context condition that the proof decla
rations may be combined by Properties (l)-(3) to a correctness proof.
In Figure 3.3 the context conditions are summarized.
Completeness For every proof obligation obi there must exist a proof dec
laration P : T h obi
Non-circularity There exists an ordering of proof obligations, such that
each proof declaration with target obi only uses proof obli
gations o&i, o& 2 , • • •, obi -1 in its premises
Figure 3.3: Context Conditions for Proof Declarations
Completeness and non-circularity are easily checked automatically. It is even pos
sible to let the compiler find out whether a non-circular ordering exists. (Actually,
there are similar context checks necessary in the Opal compiler.)
3.4.5 Justifications
The proof declarations form the interface between the formal algebraic definition
of correctness and the less formal justification methods. The proof declarations
provide a standard way of integrating different justification methods.
The correctness check for a unit requires that each proof declaration has an
associated justification and that these justifications all succeed.
We treat justifications thoroughly in Section 6.
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Modular Correctness
Example programs are often very small, but in reality software projects consist of
many components, which are put together in various ways to form the final prod
uct. The import operator is the most basic composition operator that is available
in virtually all programming languages. Functional programming languages em
ploy some kind of polymorphism, and some algebraic specification languages have
other operations like quotient and subalgebra construction.
In the following section we discuss some general principles for modular correct
ness. After that we study various operations used to construct new units on the
basis of other units. These operations include operations that are not generally
found in programming languages as individual operations. Breaking up compli
cated operations into simpler parts eases explanation of the resulting proof obli
gations. In the examples we had to invent an ad hoc syntax for operations that
are not included in Opal or the currently discussed Opal 2a.
4.1 General Principles of Modular Correctness
In the treatment and the selection of composition operators we have to respect
some common principles. These principles are derived from the need to use these
composition for functional programming with correctness justifications.
4.1.1 Units Are Independent
Units are developed independently. The use of a unit V for the construction of
another unit U depends only on the interface of V and not on the implementation
of V. In our framework the interface and the implementation are independent
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units that are connected via an implementation relation. So we need to restate
the usual formulation, and demand that using a unit V does not depend on any
of the units that implement this unit 1 .
This raises the question how the independent development carries over to the
proof (or rather justification) of correctness. Suppose, for example, that a unit U
uses (e. g. imports) a unit V; see Figure 4.1. The correctness proof of unit V might
be deferred, because it shall be done by providing an implementation, which is
not yet available. So unit V has not been proven correct, but what about unit U?
If we demand that V is proven correct, before we can prove the correctness of U,
the correctness of U depends on the implementation V'. It is undesirable that the
compilation with correctness check of unit U depends on an implementation for
V whereas the “classic” compilation without correctness check does not.
Figure 4.1: An Example Configuration
We suggest to distinguish between “global correctness” and “relative correctness”.
There is no question that the whole software system is only correct if every
unit is correct. We call this “global correctness”. But during the development
of a unit U, we will perform the correctness proof under the assumption that
all units Vi,V 2 ,... used in the implementation of U are correct. The correctness
proof actually performed is thus weakened and now reads “If all of the units
V l5 V 2 ,... are correct, then so is unit U.” This weaker form is what we call “relative
correctness”.
Actually, the check for global correctness is out of scope for a compiler. The
compiler is concerned with a single unit and has no knowledge about the system
as a whole. The task of checking the global correctness is better assigned to the
linker. The linker should check whether all units the software system is composed
of have been proven relative correct. Even if the difference between linker and
compiler is concealed by an integrated development environment, it is useful to
separate between the treatment of a single unit and the building of a software
system.
The differences between global and relative correctness are summarized in the
following table:
*If we adopt the notion of “horizontal” and “vertical” structuring, this translates to a real
principle of orthogonality.
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checked at checked entity correctness
global correctness link time whole software
system
absolute
relative correctness compile time single unit relative
to units used
The distinction of relative and global correctness makes the independent devel
opment of units together with their respective correctness proofs possible, and
thus improves the integration of correctness proofs into the software development
process.
4.1.2 Availability of an Algebra
In Section 3.3.5 we encountered the problem that the implementation relation
requires that relational formulas are added to a unit for which no algebra exists.
The re-definition of the implementation relation was necessary to enable the use
of testing as a justification method. This problem recurs with other algebraic
relations as well. We want to be able to justify the proof obligations with various
proof techniques, some of which require the availability of an algebra.
The only way we have to construct an algebra is provided by the compiler, which
uses the constructive formulas to construct an algebra. We do not have the possi
bility to change an existing algebra. (It might be possible to automatically derive
definitional equations, but this is a meta-operation on source-code level.) There
fore we have to limit the specification-building operations to those operations
that protect (i. e., do not change) the argument algebra.
4.1.3 External Formulas
We have already introduced the notion of “external formulas” but have not yet
made use of them. The concept of relative correctness is the reason for the intro
duction of the category of external formulas. Since correctness of a unit U with
semantics S — (S,OP, F) is proven under the assumption that every used unit
V is correct, we can safely assume that formulas of V are valid. It is the “respon
sibility“ of V (or rather the developer of V) to show that the formulas of V are
valid. The developer of U may use formulas from V in the correctness proof of U.
The correctness proof by constructing a model is only slightly changed. External
 formulas are treated as axioms in the correctness proof of U: Fc U FE =$► FA .
The correctness proof by implementation is in principle not changed. In the gen
eral case, we must prove F' =» F~ l (F). We can omit the relational formulas
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of F, because these are always theorems. With external formulas, this reads
F^UF^UF^ ==>■ T ^Ec) UF~ 1 (FE) UF~ 1 (Fa ). The implementation relation
affects only elements that are introduced in one of the related units. For external
formulas the functor T and therefore also the inverse translation T~ l is the iden
tity. Quite often we will have the situation that Fg C F¿v; the Opal language,
for example, enforces this relationship. In this case, there is no need to prove the
translated external formulas and the proof obligation simplifies to
F^UF^UF' F-\Fc )UF-\Fa )
F'
4.2 Entities for Modular Programming
We need some additional variations of units for the composition of software sys
tems. In this section we present parameterized units and theory units, and intro
duce specification morphisms as separate entities.
For later introduction of composition operators we need additionally a notation
to define a unit that is defined by the composition of other units. We will use the
notation “STRUCTURE U is o V 2 ” to denote that unit U is the composition of
Vi and V 2 by the composition operator o.
4.2.1 Parameterization
Parameterization is an important technique for code re-use, and can also be used
on the unit level. A certain part of the unit is marked as the (formal) parameter
and can be replaced by entities from another unit as the actual parameter. The
mechanism for instantiation is presented in Section 4.3.3.
From the algebraic point of view a parameterized specification is a pair of spec
ifications, one of which (the parameter) is included in the other (the body)
PAR c -> BODY. The fact that the parameter is again a (closed) specification
poses some problems. Quite often, only a part of the parameter is meant to be
freely instantiated. The “formal bool” problem [Cla91] was discovered when the
first version of Act One was introduced as the specification language of the
Lotos environment. Since bool is part of nearly every specification, it is part of
almost every non-trivial formal parameter specification, and could be instantiated
with other sorts.
Later versions of Act One ([Did92], [CEW93]) introduce additional language
 elements to distinguish the part of the parameter that can be freely instantiated
from the part of the parameter that is fixed. Figure 4.2 shows the resulting
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situation. Note that the sets of sorts, operations and formulas that are designated
with a superscript “0” do not constitute a closed specification. In functional
programming languages, most often only the changeable part of the parameter
(Sp,OPp, Fp) must be explicitly designated as the parameter.
(Sf, OPf, Ff ) C ( Sp,OPp,Fp ) C (S Jb, OPB , FB )
parameter body
SF OPf Fp fixed part of parameter
S°F OP°F Fp changeable part of par am.
Sp = S°pUSF OPP = OP QpCOPF FP = Fp U Fp parameter
S B = S°B USP OPB = OP°BUOPp FB — FB U Fp body
Figure 4.2: The Algebraic View on Parameterization
A specification morphism m between parameterized specifications ( PAR\ M-
BODY i) and (PAR 2 BODY 2 ) is a specification morphism m : BODY i -*
BODY 2 that repects the parameter, i. e. PARi is mapped to PAR 2 .
Program 4.1 shows (part of) a parameterized unit that will be used in the fol
lowing examples. The sort bool is part of the parameter specification, but not
part of the variable part. It is introduced in the unit BOOL, which is imported into
every unit. The part of the parameter that can be freely instantiated consists of
only those entities that are introduced in the parameter specification.
Program 4.1 An Example for a Parameterized Unit
SIGNATURE DataWithOrd
sort a
FUN <: a x a —> bool
LAW dfd
LAW total
LAW transitive
law irreflexive
SIGNATURE Set
PARAM DataWithOrd
SORT set
FUN {}: set
FUN incl: a x set —> set
FUN in: a x set —* bool
== ALL x y. DFD x < y
== ALL xy. X<yORy<xORx = y
== ALL x y z. x <1 y AND y < z =» x < z
== ALL X. NOT X < X
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We must decide whether the formulas of the parameter part belong to the axioms
or to the theorems. Parameterized specifications as such (uninstantiated) cannot
be used in a software system, it is always necessary to instantiate them. The actual
parameter unit contains a justification for the parameter formulas, otherwise the
correctness proof of the actualization morphism fails. Hence, there is no need to
prove the properties in Fp, and we classify them all as belonging to the external
formulas of the parameterized unit.
4.2.2 Algebraic Relations and Parameterized Units
The introduction of parameterized units requires an adaptation of the definition
of proof obligations for algebraic relations.
Equivalence We must not only show that the bodies are equivalent, we must
also show that the parameter parts are equivalent. This results in additional
relational formulas: Let S be the specification that is known to be correct, let
S' be the specification that is supposedly equivalent, let FP — {/i, /2 , • • •, fn }
and Fp = {/{, /2 ,..., /^} be the formulas of the parameters of the related units,
then the relational formulas are m*^(f\FP ) => /j for j — 1,2, ...,m and
[\Fp => for i — 1,2, ...,n, where is the continuation of the
isomorphism m++ : S —»• S' between the two specifications.
Implementation The implementation relation in general requires that the im
plementation unit has fewer models than the implemented unit. For the parame
ter, this condition is reversed, though. It is acceptable, if the implementation can
be done with a parameter that is less restricted than the original parameter. The
definition of implementation for parameterized units is changed to (compare this
to the definition in Section 3.3.5):
(<S is implemented by S') iff
(jr-i(Fp) =» Fp) A (F'°B => T-\F°B)) A(AlgS ' ± 0)
If the parameter of both units is equal, we can ignore the parameter formulas in
the construction of the relational formulas. Opal enforces this condition, so we
can make use of this simplification for Opal/ J.
Interpretation For the interpretation relation nothing really changes. We must
prove that the source and target morphism given are indeed specification mor-
phisms. This is a little bit more complicated for parameterized specifications than
in the standard case.
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4.2.3 Specification Morphisms
Specification morphisms are central to the algebraic treatment of parameter
ization, but also used for renaming. Most often specification morphisms are
implicitly denoted, sometimes specification morphisms are explicitly given, but
they are not given the status of “citizens“, let alone “first-class citizens”. Obj,
Act One-C, and Specware are exceptions of this rule.
We introduce here specification morphisms as separate entities in order to ex
hibit the proof obligations that are induced by the declaration of a specification
morphism.
Program 4.2 A Specification Morphism
SPECIFICATION MORPHISM m
FROM DataWithOrd TO Nat BY a —» nat
</DataWithOrd —> >' Nat
We assume that items that are not introduced in the source specification (e. g.
the ubiquitious bool) are mapped to the corresponding items in the target spec
ification by default.
We recall from Section 3.1 that a specification morphism is a signature morphism
that respects the formulas, i. e. F2 =>■ m*(Fi). This directly translates to
the proof obligations for the correctness of the specification morphism m. We
have to prove the validity of the translated laws dfd*, total*, transitive* and
irref lexive* from the formulas of Nat.
Feasible Specification Morphism Specification morphisms are frequently
used in the construction of software systems. If specification morphisms are de
clared separately, the additional proof obligations are not a big burden, but spec
ification morphisms are often declared implicitly. In this case, the cost of the
check of the proof obligations becomes important and the semantic implication
“ =>- ” too expensive.
We propose to replace the semantic implication “=>■ ” in F2 =» m*{F\)
by the subset relation. Of course, if F2 D m*(Fi) holds, then we also have
F2 —> m*(Fi). Hence, our proposal is sound. The advantage is that the com
piler can check the proof obligations syntactically. We demand that the translated
formulas of the source specification are part of the target specification. The fol
lowing table compares the characteristics of the standard proof obligations and
our proposal for a feasible definition of proof obligations.
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standard
proof obligations
feasible
proof obligations
definition F2 =► m*(Fi) F2 2 m*(Fi)
correctness check semantic syntactic
cost high low
automatable no yes
Program 4.3 shows the adapted declaration of the specification morphism. (We
assume that Nat contains appropriate formulas for the > function.)
Program 4.3 The Specification Morphism - Improved Version
SPECIFICATION MORPHISM m
FROM DataWithOrd TO Nat BY a -» nat
<' Data -A >' Nat
dfd —» dfd_gt
total total_gt
transitive —» transitive _gt
irreflexive -> irreflexive_gt
The source code of Program 4.3 is longer than the source code of Program 4.2,
so the introduction of feasible proof obligations does not really look like an im
provement. The introduction of theories in the next section solves this problem.
The feasible proof obligations are better suited for implicit specification mor-
phisms, which should not be burdened with heavy proof obligations. Of course,
the validity of laws like df d_gt, total_gt, transitive_gt and irreflexive_gt
must be proven in the context of unit Nat, i. e. in the context of the target spec
ification of the morphism. So we have a “principle of conservation of energy”:
somewhere the validity has to be proven.
For explicitly defined specification morphisms the feasible proof obligations are
too restrictive. It is not necessary to avoid proof obligations that must be checked
semantically, because we have a separate unit where we can attach these proofs
to.
The experience with Opal/J shows that the feasible proof obligations fit well in
the existing environment for the following reasons:
• Specification morphisms are perceived as simple objects and should not be
burdened with separate proof obligations.
• On the other hand, units are regarded as complex and the addition of
further proof obligations is acceptable.
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• Specification morphisms often require the proof of simple mathematical
properties that are anyway part of the specification. So it is often no extra
work for the developer to explicitly denote the properties used in actualiza
tion morphisms.
• The compiler can easily check the correctness of the specification morphisms
and provide useful error messages, if the proof obligations for an actualiza
tion morphism are not fulfilled.
The introduction of theories in the following section further facilitates the check
of specification morphisms for the compiler and programmer.
4.2.4 Theories
The introduction of laws into functional programming languages requires the
introduction of an additional type of unit. Theories are introduced (e. g. into
Opal 2a or Ob j) to group properties together into a single unit and apply these
properties to groups of functions. Program 4.4 shows the theory of total orders
as it could have been used in Program 4.1.
Program 4.4 The Theory of Total Orders
theory TotalOrder
sort a
fun <: a x a —> bool
y
x < z
LAW df d == ALL X y. DFD X < y
LAW total == ALL X y. x < y OR y < x OR X =
LAW transitive == ALL x y z. x c y and y < z =>
law irref lexive == all x. not x < x
A first application of theories is to shorten the denotation of specification mor
phisms with explicit formulas. Suppose that DataWithOrd and Nat contain the
necessary declarations (see Program 4.5 2 ), then the specification morphism m can
be written as shown in Program 4.6.
The compiler can easily find the correspondences for the laws of the theory, which
therefore need not be written down explicitly. The syntactical representation
of the specification morphism is again as short as the first variation shown in
Program 4.2. This time, however, the correctness of the specification morphism
has already been proven by the compiler.
 2 The keyword assert is introduced in Section 4.3.5.
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Program 4.6 The Specification Morphism Using Theories
SPECIFICATION MORPHISM m
FROM DataWithOrd TO Nat
by a
c'Data
-» nat
>'Nat
optional
dfd[o!, <] —> dfd[nat,>]
total[a, <] -> total[nat,>]
transitive [a, <] —> trans it ive [nat, >]
irref lexive[o:, <] —> irreflexive [nat, >] y
The main reason for the introduction of theories is that we need a different seman
tics for theories and standard units. Theories are not intended to be translated to
executable code. Theories are introduced to be able to add algebraic properties
to sorts and functions introduced in standard units, and we want this intent to
be reflected in their semantics.
A non-standard, but elegant semantics for theories is the ‘‘classical” or ‘hyper-
loose” semantics proposed in [Pep91]. By this semantics every algebra that has a
 subalgebra isomorphic to an Algs- algebra is considered an element of the hyper
loose semantics. More precisely, let S = ( S,OP,F ) be the base specification
contained in the source code of the theory. Then we have
HLAlg s = (J {A e Alg T | 3A' C A • A' e Alg s }
TeSPEC
The correctness of a theory can be similarly defined to that of a standard unit
as consistency, i. e. non-emptyness of the semantics. Both methods - proof by
algebraic relation and proof by providing a model - are possible. Because theories
are not intended to be given a concrete implementation, we suggest a different
syntax for proof by constructing a model. Instead of providing an implementation
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in a different unit, our idea is to require the user to declare a witness within the
source code of the theory, see Program 4.7.
Program 4.7 The Theory of Total Orders with Witness
THEORY TotalOrder
sort a
FUN <: a x a -» bool
y
x < z
WITNESS Nat ONLY nat <
RENAMED BY nat Q <-» <
LAW df d —— ALL X y. DFD X < y
LAW total == ALL xy.X<yORy<xORxE
LAW transitive == ALL xyz.x<y AND y < z =>
LAW irreflexive == ALL x. NOT x < x
The identifiers after the only keyword 3 constitute the subalgebra of Nat that
must be proven to belong to the theory. If the correctness of a theory is to be
proven by a witness, the formulas of the witness are added as external formulas
Fe, and the formulas introduced in the theory are treated as algebraic formulas
Fa. In Figure 3.2 the partitioning of formulas into axioms and theorems for
proof by model construction was shown: Fc and FE are axioms, FA and FR are
theorems. In a theory, we do not have constructive formulas, so we must prove
Fe ==>■ Fa U Fr.
We will continue the discussion in Section 4.3.5. There we will introduce the
assertion operation (the “import” for theories)
4.3 Import and Related Operations
Importing other units is the most important operation for combining modular
software. The import operation as found in functional programming languages,
such as Opal, is in fact a compound operation, which comprises several simple
algebraic operations. These are treated separately in the following, before the
complex import is discussed. Finally, we introduce the assertion operator, which
is the import operator for theories.
3 The only keyword is treated in Section 4.3.2.
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4.3.1 Simple Import
We start with the most important and most often used operation to construct new
units, namely the import of one unit into another. (We do not consider selective
import here, but further down in a section on restriction; see Section 4.3.2.)
Let V be the unit that is imported into unit U. The semantics of V is Sy =
(Sv, OPv , Fv ), the semantics of U contains that of V and is represented as Sv =
(■Su , OPu, Fu) = (Sv U S', OPv U OP', Fv U F'), where S', OP', F' denote those
specification elements that are introduced in unit U. Note that S',OP',F' in
general do not constitute a closed specification.
The compiler will use the model constructed for unit V unchanged in the con
struction of the model of U, in general it will not even physically copy the model
of V but use references. This method must be mirrored by the semantics. We
require therefore that the models of U contain a model of V:
VT G Algs v • A /€ Algsy
This property is ensured, if those formulas that refer to items of V, i. e. those
formulas from Fu/^y, are consequences of the formulas Fy. Formulas of Fu / Sv
must therefore not be constructive formulas, because these are always interpreted
as axioms in our approach.
The language definition of Opal prohibits redefinitions of functions, as do the
definitions of most other languages. Formulas of Fu/z v therefore can be algebraic
formulas only. So there is no difficulty in demanding that formulas from Fu/t. v
must be proven from the imported axioms.
Following the principle of relative correctness, we conclude that the formulas Fy
 belong to the axioms, since these are external formulas with respect to U.
4.3.2 Restriction
With the help of restriction the developer can reduce the number of names that
 are visible. This helps to reduce name clashes; it is not essential for programming.
Program 4.8 shows a restriction of unit Nat to the type nat and the greater
function.
Program 4.8 A Restriction of Nat
STRUCTURE NatRestrict
IS Nat ONLY nat >
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 The construction is always possible provided that the resulting specification is
closed, i. e. the part after the only must constitute a specification. The corre
sponding construction on the underlying algebra is simple: the items not men
tioned in the restriction are removed, but the carrier sets and operations that are
kept are unchanged and therefore fulfil the same algebraic properties as the cor
responding functions in the unrestricted algebra. Formulas that contain removed
names are not visible in the resulting specification.
The change of the algebra is very simple and does not prevent the use of testing as
justification method. Every function from the restricted algebra can be replaced
by the corresponding function from the base algebra.
4.3.3 Instantiation
In the framework presented in Chapter 3 instantiation refers to the process of
replacing the formal parameters of a unit with actual parameters. For languages
that support polymorphic definitions (e. g. ML), instantiation is done in a similar
fashion, but separately for every sort and function.
The algebraic view on instantiation is shown in Figure 4.3. The upper row rep
resents the parameterized unit, the lower left-hand specification is the actual
parameter. The lower right-hand specification is the categorical pushout of the
diagram. The dashed arrows and the pushout specification are constructed by
the compiler. The user must provide the actualization (specification) morphism,
the target of which defines the actual parameter.
(SP ,OPp,FP )
inclusion morphism
( Sp, OPB , FB)
actualization
morphism
(SU, OPa, Fa) r ii _ j{Sr, OPR: Fr) I
Figure 4.3: The Algebraic View on Instantiation
The actualization morphism is the central point of the construction. We continue
the example from Programs 4.3 and 4.6 in Program 4.9.
Program 4.9 An Instantiation of Set
STRUCTURE NatSet
IS Set ACTUALIZED BY in
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Besides being a specification morphism, there are two further requirements. First,
the source specification of the actualization morphism must be the same as the
formal parameter. This requirement can easily be checked automatically. Second,
the actualization morphism must not change the fixed part of the parameter
specification. Again, this requirement is easily checked.
Instantiation with Implicit Morphism The situation changes if the speci
fication morphism is defined implicitly, as done in Program 4.10.
Program 4.10 An Instantiation of Set Using an Implicit Morphism
STRUCTURE NatSet
IMPORT NatRestrict COMPLETELY
IS Set[nat, >]
In this case, we inherit the proof obligations from the specification morphism (as
discussed in Section 4.2.3) for the complex import, i. e. we must prove that the
implicitly constructed signature morphism is also a specification morphism. The
additional conditions for an instantiation morphism hold by construction of the
implicit morphism and need not be checked.
We have presented a feasible variation of the definition of a specification mor
phism, which requires the developer to prepare the properties that are necessary
to check the correctness of the instantiation. The transfer of this variation to
the instantiation is straightforward. Program 4.11 shows the resulting source
code.
Program 4.11 An Instantiation of Set Using Explicit Properties
STRUCTURE NatSet
IMPORT NatRestrict COMPLETELY
IS Set[nat, >, dfd_gt, total.gt, transitive-gt, irref lexive_gt]
The advantage of this formulation is that the user does not have to remember lots
of trivial specification morphisms; the disadvantage is that the properties must be
prepared and listed among the actual parameters. If the properties are standard
properties (like the ones used in the example), it is possible to use theories to
help the compiler to find and match the corresponding properties.
4.3.4 Complex Import
In Section 4.3.1 we have studied the simple import of one unit. Functional pro
gramming languages do not have separate operations like the declaration of spec
ification morphisms, restrictions, or instantiation. Instead, these operations are
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merged into the simple import. Opal does not require the user to declare a sep
arate unit Nat Set, as we did in the examples in the previous section. Instead a
single import statement suffices, see Program 4.12.
Program 4.12 Importing Sets Over Natural Numbers
import Nat only nat >
import Set [nat, >, dfd-gt, total_gt,
transitive_gt, irreflexive_gt] COMPLETELY
Restriction and instantiation do not pose special problems and do not generate
proof obligations, the only problematic operation is the actualization morphism.
The correctness of the actualization morphism must be checked, and as there
is no separate declaration of a specification morphism, the proof obligations are
connected with the corresponding import statement. The imported properties are
external properties and thus belong to the axioms of the importing unit.
Transitive Import If the import is done transitively, the two situations in
Program 4.13 are treated the same. This poses no problems in the simple case,
but if proof obligations for anonymous specification morphisms are involved, the
situation changes. Consider the example in Program 4.13 under the assumption
that Set [nat, =] is not correctly instantiated.
Program 4.13 Problems With Transitive Import
SIGNATURE U
IMPORT V
SIGNATURE U
IMPORT V
IMPORT Nat ONLY nat =
import Set [nat, =] completely
SIGNATURE V
IMPORT Nat ONLY nat =
IMPORT Set[nat,=] COMPLETELY
SIGNATURE V
import Nat ONLY nat =
import Set[nat,=] completely
 The situation on the left-hand side requires one check of the actualization mor
phisms, on the right-hand side two checks are necessary. The reason for this ad
ditional check is that the specification morphisms are declared implicitly (anony
mously), and the compiler performs two checks for two anonymous specification
morphisms.
 If the check of the specification morphism succeeds, this introduces “only” an
inefficiency, but if the check fails, the relative correctness for unit U is different
for the two examples. On the left-hand side, unit U is relative correct, whereas
it is not on the right-hand side. “Flattening” the transitive import by lifting all
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imports to the top unit is therefore not possible. At least the information about
the origin of the anonymous specification morphisms must be kept, such that it
is possible to determine whether the correctness must be checked in the top unit.
The Opal compiler does perform a flattening of transitive imports and had to
be patched to make a correct treatment of relative correct units possible in the
Opal/J prototype.
4.3.5 Assertion
In Section 4.2.4 we have introduced theories to group properties. Program 4.14
shows an excerpt of the unit of natural numbers, which uses theories to make two
assertions, namely that the functions less and greater are total orders.
Program 4.14 An Assertion of Total-Order Properties
SIGNATURE Nat
TYPE nat == 0
succ(pred: nat)
FUN < = > : nat X nat —> bool
ASSERT TotalOrder RENAMED BY a —♦ nat <1 —►<
ASSERT TotalOrder RENAMED BY a —> nat <
Another use of assertions is shown in Program 4.15. The assertion restricts the
parameter of unit Set.
Program 4.15 An Assertion for a Parameter of a Parameterized Unit
SIGNATURE Set [a, <]
SORT a
FUN <1 : ol x a —> bool
ASSERT TotalOrder
SORT set
FUN {} : set
FUN Incl : a x set —> set
FUN in : a X set —> bool
The semantics of an assertion is the claim that the models of the current unit
belong to the (renamed) theory. This claim is treated like any other axiom in
troduced in the current unit, i. e. we regard this claim as a non-constructive and
non-external property.
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Recall the definition of the semantics of a theory with base semantics S:
HLAlg s = \J T€S pec{ A e Q A • A' G Algs }■ If we want to prove
that A 6 HLAlg s , we have to find a subalgebra A! of A that fulfils the formulas
of the theory.
The renaming morphism already identifies the subalgebra to be used, namely the
target of the renaming morphism. So we must prove that the properties of the
theory hold for the indicated subalgebra.
We add the formulas of theory to the algebraic formulas of the semantics. This
has the desired effect for the correctness proofs. If the correctness of the current
unit is to be proven by an implementation, the properties of the theory are treated
as axioms; if the correctness is proven by a model, the properties are treated as
theorems.
If the asserted theory restricts the parameter, i. e. the signature of the theory is
a subsignature of the parameter signature (after renaming), the formulas are not
 added to the algebraic formulas, but are treated as all other parameter formulas,
and added to the external formulas of the unit.
4.3.6 Summary
The table in Figure 4.4 summarizes how formulas that are introduced by one of
the previous operations are classified in the new unit.
operation classification comments
simple import external formulas
restriction external formulas only visible formulas
instantiation relational formulas as necessary for the actualization
morphism; syntactic check
complex import rel. and ext. formulas combination of the three above op
erations
assertion f algebraic formulas body formulas
(external formulas parameter formulas
Figure 4.4: The Classification of Imported Formulas
4.4 Miscellaneous Operations
This section contains some operations that are not found as widespread as those
previously presented. The common characteristic of these operations is that they
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generate a new specification from an argument specification, whereas the other
operations combine existing specifications.
It is often difficult or impossible to use the algebra of the argument specifica
tion for the new specification. Therefore an integration of these operations into
our approach is often impossible, sometimes difficult, and depends on additional
application conditions.
4.4.1 Renaming
Renaming is an operation that is not often found in functional programming
languages but that is part of most algebraic specification languages.
The example renaming in Program 4.16 shows why we cannot unconditionally
introduce the renaming operation.
Program 4.16 Natural Numbers - Wrongly Renamed
STRUCTURE NatRenamed
IS Nat RENAMED BY nat —> num <—» f 00 >-4 f 00 [t]
Both the less and the greater function are given the same name. For algebraic
specifications, it is no problem to construct the resulting specification. However,
it is not possible to construct a model for the resulting specification from the
model of the source algebra.
If the renaming morphism is bijective, however, there are no difficulties (see Pro
gram 4.17). The existing model can be re-used for the renamed specification, so
there is no need to prove the correctness of the renamed unit again.
Program 4.17 Natural Numbers - Correctly Renamed
 structure NatRenamed
IS Nat renamed BY nat —> num <—>■ greater >—>• less
4.4.2 Extension
In algebraic specification languages, the term "extension is often used where
programming languages use “import” or “inclusion . However, there are different
variants of extension. Obj distinguishes four import modes and allows the user
 to chose between simple (two variants), consistent and conservative extension.
By a (simple) extension new sorts S', operations OP or formulas F can be
added to a specification <S = (S,OP,F), resulting in a new specification 5' =
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(SOS', OPllOP 1 , FuF'). Note that S', OP', F' need not be a closed specification.
A consistent extension is a simple extension that does not identify data items from
S, a conservative extension is consistent extension that does not introduce new
elements to S.
• A simple extension works like the textual inclusion of some older program
ming languages like C or Pascal. If the extension operator is used to
handle modularized software systems, the compiler does not need to han
dle modularization itself. Extension is therefore a quick (and dirty) way to
add modules to a language. But extension is an inefficient way to imple
ment modularization. Every time the unit is compiled, the inclusion must
be expanded, and the resulting (large) text is fed to the following compiler
phases.
Concerning the semantics, the unrestricted possibility to add new formulas
allows to change any possible semantics of the included unit in an unforesee
able way. This prohibits any systematic treatment of extension, and makes
extension an unusable specification building operation in our framework.
 • A consistent extension does not identify elements, but may add new ele
ments to S. Therefore we cannot use an algebra A G Algs to construct an
algebra A' G Algs'- In particular, we cannot extend the operations of OP
to handle the new elements properly.
• For a conservative extension, we have A G Alg s > => A/s G Algs • Hence,
a conservative extension can be expressed as a simple import. This operator
was discussed in Section 4.3.1.
4.4.3 Subalgebra
The subalgebra construction restricts the carrier sets while the functions are the
same as in the original algebra. Program 4.18 shows as an example a subalgebra
built over natural numbers. The carrier set restriction is given by a predicate
odd?, which selects the odd natural numbers.
Program 4.18 A Subalgebra of Nat
STRUCTURE NatSubalgebra
is Nat restrict nat by odd? [Tj*
The subalgebra construction requires to prove that the functions are closed
 on the restricted set. The restriction-by predicate facilitates the justification,
but the justification must be performed for every function, which might be an
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extensive task 4 .Testing of the subalgebra property is possible, if the predicate
is executable. Once the subalgebra property has been proven, the model for the
original algebra can serve as a model for the subalgebra.
In general, formulas that are valid in the original specification need not hold in
the subalgebra, because their validity could depend on elements that are removed
in the subalgebra. Therefore, the validity of all formulas must be proven for the
restricted carrier sets again.
4.4.4 Quotient
The quotient construction identifies elements by an equivalence relation. We
might construct sets from lists as shown in Program 4.19.
Program 4.19 A Quotient of Seq
STRUCTURE SetsFromSeq
IS Seq QUOTIENT BY equiv
FUN equiv: seq x seq —> bool
LAW seq_as_set_l == ALL a b S. equiv(a::b::S,b::a::S)
LAW seq_as_set_2 == ALL a S. equiv(a::a::S, a::S)
The difficulties are similar to those of the subalgebra construction. However, the
check that the function indeed has the equivalence property is (possibly) not as
expensive as the check of arbitrarily many functions. Again the resulting speci
fication need not be consistent, even if the original specification is. Suppose, for
example, that the unit Seq contains the usual definitions for the length function
(denoted #). Then the laws of Program 4.19 allow to conclude that 1 = succ(l):
1 #(a::0) #(a::a:: 0) succ(#(a:: 0)) succ(l)
Therefore we must prove that the formulas of the argument specification hold for
the equivalence classes.
 4.4.5 Comparison with Data-Type Implementation
The subalgebra and the quotient operation as presented in the previous sections
 are closely related to the restriction functor and the identify functor used in the
definition of the implementation relation (see Section 3.3.4).
4 It will fail for the example in Program 4.18, because the sum of two odd numbers is even
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• Actually the restriction functor does construct a subalgebra, namely the
smallest subalgebra that contains the implemented algebra. The visibility
predicate demanded in Section 3.3.6 for computing the proof obligations
for data-type implementation corresponds to the restrict predicate in
the subalgebra construction.
• Just the same the identify functor constructs a quotient algebra, namely
the quotient wrt. the congruence induced by F. The quotient relation
corresponds to the equivalence predicate demanded for computing the proof
obligations in Section 3.3.6.
The main difference is that the subalgebra and the quotient operator construct a
new algebra A' from an input algebra A, whereas for the data-type implementa
tion we only check that A is a subalgebra (resp. a quotient algebra) of another
algebra A 1 .
As regards program development, the difference is that the subalgebra and the
quotient operator reduce the cardinality of the carrier sets, whereas the implemen
tation increases the cardinality of the carrier sets (by junk elements or multiple
representations).
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Chapter 5
Integrating Justification Support
It is our aim to integrate the justification support into the classical compilation
process. Figure 5.1 roughly depicts the stages of the compilation process: the
parser turns source code into an internal representation as an abstract syntax tree,
the context checker not only checks context conditions, but also adds attributes
used in later stages. The optimizer rearranges the syntax tree in order to make
the code smaller and/or faster. The coder finally synthesizes object code from
the abstract syntax.
source code abstract syntax tree attributed a.s.t.
 OPTIMIZER —- A *• CODER —►0100110 ...
optimized a.s.t. object code
Figure 5.1: The Classical Compilation Process
This picture omits some details - the parser is often split into a scanning and
 a parsing phase, optimizations are also performed on object-code level, and the
coder will probably use other intermediate representations to translate the ab
stract syntax into object code. But it serves to give an idea of the abstract repre
sentations available during the compilation process. It will be easier to integrate
a justification method, if we do not have to invent a new intermediate language.
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The compilation process can be roughly divided into an analysis and a synthesis
phase. During the analysis the compiler checks (analyzes) whether the input
actually constitutes a valid program of the respective programming language.
During the synthesis phase the result of the analysis phase is processed and
transformed into the target language.
The analysis is done incrementally. The compiler first checks regular and context-
free properties of the input language before the more expensive check for context-
sensitive properties is done. The justification component checks even more general
properties than can be expressed by a context-sensitive language. Hence, the
justification component fits naturally in the analysis phase right after the context
checker.
As a first approximation we conclude that the justification component is
best situated between the context checker and the optimizer.
FRONT-END attributed a.s.t. extended a.s.t.
Figure 5.2: The Integration of the Justification Component
In this chapter we present the general architecture of the justification component
as far as it is independent of the various justification methods. Chapter 6 deals
with the implementation of the individual justification methods.
5.1 Running Example
We will use the sort function as a running example throughout this and the
following chapter for the illustration of our concept. Program 5.1 shows the source
code for this example. Line numbers are included for later reference. Chapter 7
contains additional examples, in particular, the set instantiation and the deque
implementation from the introduction.
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Program 5.1 Sorting Lists
SIGNATURE SortList ±
IMPORT Seq[nat] ONLY seq 2
Nat ONLY nat 3
SeqNatFunctions ONLY permutation ascending 4
FUN sort: seq[nat] —> seq[nat] 5
SPC sort(S) = T 6
PRE true 7
POST S permutation T AND ascending(T) 8
IMPLEMENTATION SortList 1
import Seq[nat] ONLY seq 0 " 2
DEF sort ( 0 ) == 0 3
DEF sort(a::R) == a:: sort(R) [T] 4
The sort example consists of two Opal units, signature SortList and
 IMPLEMENTATION SortList, the first one being the interface unit, and the
other one the corresponding implementation unit. SIGNATURE SortList is im
plemented by implementation SortList as defined in Section 3.3.4.
The interface unit imports some items from other units, namely the data type
seq of sequences from the unit Seq[nat], the data type nat of natural numbers,
and two auxiliary functions from SeqNatFunctions. In this chapter, we will ap
peal to the reader’s intuition, as far as the contents of other units is concerned.
So we will not present the formal specification of the auxiliary functions here.
The auxiliary functions have the obvious specifications: permutation returns
 true, iff both sequences contain the same elements, possibly in different order;
ascending returns true, iff the elements of the parameter list are ordered in
ascending order.
The implementation is obviously wrong and contains no justification at all. In
the sections that deal with the various justification methods, we will see how the
source code has to be completed, and how the incorrectness is detected by the
various justification methods.
5.2 Syntax
Before we explain the three phases of the justification component, we need to
introduce some syntax for the new entities. The syntax introduced here is also
used by the Opal/J prototype.
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Named Algebraic Formulas Algebraic formulas are introduced by the key
word law, followed by a name and the formula itself. For example, the fact that
sort is an idempotent function can be expressed by the following formula:
LAW idempotent == ALL S. sort (sort (S)) = S
Algebraic formulas are already part of Opal. Opal allows also anonymous for
mulas, but this is forbidden in our framework - we need to be able to address
every formula separately.
The syntax for function specifications, however, is new. The signature of Sort
(Program 5.1) contains a function specification in lines 6-8. This specification is
equivalent to the following laws (the premise comes from the given precondition,
the conclusion of Spc[sort] comes from the postcondition):
LAW Dfd[sort] == ALL S. true =» DFD sort(S)
LAW Spcfsort] == ALL S. true =>■ LET T == sort(S)
IN S permutation T AND ascending(T)
The names for these laws are constructed from the name of the associated func
tion. We will use names like these for all formulas that are introduced implicitly,
e. g. by a data-type declaration or by the declaration of an algebraic relation.
The declaration by the keyword law carries no information whether the formula
should be regarded as an axiom or as a theorem. One might consider introducing
additional keywords axm and thm, so that the user can classify the formulas
accordingly. If the law idempotent is added to the interface of Program 5.1, we
could declare that it should be a theorem. This eases the later proof of the im
plementation relation between the program units in Program 5.1, because we can
omit theorems in the implementation proof. On the other hand, if the correctness
of the unit is shown by constructing a model, all algebraic formulas are theorems
(see Section 3.4.1) and the user has no freedom to decide which formulas are ax
ioms and which are theorems. In this case, the introduction of special keywords
merely introduces additional possibilities to make errors.
 Proof Declarations Proof declarations are introduced by the keyword PROOF,
followed by the name of the proof declaration. As a first example, consider the
following proof declaration:
PROOF spc_sort: Freetype[seq[nat]] =>• Spc[sort]
This declares a proof named spc_sort, which proves that the formula named
Spc[sort] can be proven from the premise Freetype[seq[nat]]. This latter for
mula is implicitly declared by the data-type declaration of the free type seqfnat].
A proof may employ a set of formulas as premises. The names of these formulas
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 are separated by spaces as customary in Opal. A proof declaration may even have
no premises at all, in particular if the associated justification is a certification or
a formal test.
Justifications Proof declarations must be complemented by a justification, so
that the compiler can check the validity of the justification (and is not forced to
invent a justification by itself). The justification is introduced with the keyword
JUSTF:
JUSTF spc.sort == ...
The “ ... ” part, i. e. the justification itself, is dealt with in Chapter 6. The name
of the justification must match the name of a proof declaration. We speak of a
“justification that is associated with a certain proof declaration”.
As a first step towards full automation, we consider the possibility to let the user
declare a “default” justification. This default justification is used every time no
justification has been explicitly associated with a proof declaration.
Theories For theories we use the same syntax as for signature parts. Only the
introducing keyword is changed from signature to theory.
An assertion is introduced with the keyword assert. For the denotation of the
renaming morphism, we (ab)use the standard Opal syntax for instantiation.
Instead of assert TotalOrder RENAMED BYa-) nat < —»< we write shorter
assert TotalOrder[nat, <].
5.3 Phases of the Justification Component
The general architecture of the justification component is given by the three main
tasks the justification component has to take care of:
 • First, the justification component must collect the information that is essen
tial for justifying the correctness of the current unit, but has been neglected
by the classical context checker.
• Then, the unit correctness check is performed: this concerns the proof dec
larations given by the programmer.
• Finally, and most importantly, the justification correctness check is done,
this phase checks whether the justifications in the source code are valid
justifications.
68 CHAPTER 5. INTEGRATING JUSTIFICATION SUPPORT
Figure 5.3: The Three Main Phases of the Justification Component
Figure 5.3 shows the three phases together with a graphic illustration of the
 information checked. In the example we suppose that the source contains the
following laws, proof declarations and justifications:
LAW f ! == . . . PROOF Pi : f ! f 2 ==> f 4
 LAW f 2 == . . . JUSTF Pi == Ji
LAW f 3 . . .
LAW f 4 == . . . PROOF P 2 : f 3 f 4 => f 5
LAW f 5 == .. . JUSTF P 2 == J 2
• After the collection phase the compiler knows the named formulas that are
visible in the current unit, and has collected the proof declarations and
 the associated justifications. Most important, the compiler has partitioned
the formula set into axioms and proof obligations. In the illustration, the
axiom set consists of the formulas {/i,/2 ,/s}, the set of proof obligations
is {/4>/o}- Those form the top and the bottom of a proof tree. Moreover,
the compiler collected the proof declarations P 4 and P 2 with justifications
Ji and J 2 respectively.•
• During the unit correctness check, the compiler tries to construct a pro
visional proof tree from the proof declarations in the source code for the
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 correctness check Fax ==>■ Fth■ The shaded triangle represents the proof
tree for FAx ==» FTH , with the axioms at the top and the proof obliga
tions at the bottom. The hollow triangles represent the proof trees for the
respective proof declarations, which are in this stage only assumed to exist.
• The justification correctness check ensures that the provisional proof tree
constructed is sound. In the illustration of Figure 5.3 justification J* is valid,
but justification J 2 does not “fit” the proof declaration it is supposed to
justify.
5.4 The Collection Phase
The first task is to create the environment necessary for the check of unit and
justification correctness. This environment contains the formulas, the proof dec
larations, and the justifications that are visible in the current unit as well as the
information which formulas are axioms and which formulas are proof obligations.
Recall that we divide the formulas into four groups: constructive formulas, al
gebraic formulas, external formulas and relational formulas. These formulas are
partitioned into axioms and proof obligations according to the table in Figure 3.2.
If the syntax allows the explicit declaration of axioms and theorems by the user
(as opposed to unspecified laws, see Section 5.2), this declaration must be re
spected as well.
As far as proof declarations and justifications are concerned, things are more
straightforward. In principle, proof declarations and justifications are all con
tained explicitly in the source code. However, sometimes it is useful to add im
plicit proof declarations and justifications.
In the case of correctness proof by algebraic implementation, the lifting by T 1 in
general changes an axiom / of the interface to the proof obligation •7r-1 (/). How
ever, there are some simple criteria that allow to automatically decide whether
i(/) ==$> holds. To make this implication accessible, we add an implicit
 proof declaration PROOF «Incl[f] =► Lift[f], The user can now decide whether
to prove T~\f) or i(/). Most often, i(/) is simpler than so the user will
decide for i(/), but this is not always possible: even if the implication holds, i(/)
need not be valid. See Section 7.3 for an illustrative example.
The result of the collection phase for our running example is shown in Figures 5.4
and 5.5. Normally this output is not printed during the compilation. User in
put is printed in italics , output of the program is printed in typewriter or
underlined typewriter . We use wjayy^underline to highlight formulas. In Fig
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ure 5.5, the differences to the environment of the interface are highlighted this
way.
The signature is proven by providing an implementation. The formulas
Spc [ascending] and Spc[permutation] are imported from SeqNatFunctions. For
every imported free type, we have the respective laws. This concerns the explic
itly imported sorts nat and seq[nat], and the implicitly imported sort bool. The
dots abbreviate some auxiliary laws from SeqNatFunctions.
In the implementation, we have the following changes: The definitional equation
for function sort (denoted Def [sort]) is added to the axioms. The specification
Spc [sort] has been removed from the axioms. Instead, jF _1 (Spc[sort]) (denoted
Lift [Spc[sort]]) has been added to the proof obligations. As described above
the additional proof declaration i(Spc[sort]) =^> Jr_1 (Spc[sort]) has been
added to the environment. The definedness law Dfd[sort] is treated similarly.
The environment for these toy examples is rather short. This is due to the fact
that only very few names are imported. In general the lists of imported items are
much longer, and thus the number of laws imported from other units increases
quickly.
>jcheck-info env SortList.sign
Axioms:
{Spc [sort] , Spc [ascending] ,Spc [permutation] ,Freetype[bool] ,
Freetype[nat],Freetype[seq[nat]] , ... }
Proof obligations:
0
Proof declarations:
O
Extra proof declarations:
_0
Figure 5.4: The Justification Environment of SortList. sign
5.5 The Unit Correctness Check
This phase checks the correctness as far as this is possible without taking the
justifications into account. The information available is the set of formulas, the
knowledge which formulas are axioms, and which formulas are proof obligations,
and the proof declarations, i. e. the justifications the user has “promised” to
deliver. Since the check not only involves a single justification, but checks the
correctness of the unit as a whole, we call this phase unit correctness check.
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>jcheck-info env SortList.impl
Axioms :
{BêiXâSîil >Spc [ascending] ,Spc[permutation] .Freetype [bool] ,
Freetype[nat],Freetype[seq[nat]], ... }
Proof obligations:
Proof declarations:
{}
Extra proof declarations :
Figure 5.5: The Justification Environment of SortList. impl
The check consists of building the proof tree for the implication FAX =$■ Fth,
with the help of the proof declarations. Since Fax , FTh and the set PD of proof
declarations are finite, we can do this by an iterative algorithm.
1. Axioms are trivially derivable laws, so we start with D 0 — FAx-
2. In the next iteration we have D i+ 1 = D, U {Z|(li 1 2 ... l n =£■ 1)G PD A
Oil k, ■ ■ • i In} Q Di}
3. Stop, if D i+ 1 = Di. We call the final set D.
HDD FTH , the check succeeds.
The algorithm always terminates, because the size of the set Dj+i either increases
 or stays the same. The only formulas that may be added to a set Di are the target
formulas of the proof declarations. The number of proof declarations is finite, and
therefore the number of iterations that enlarge the set D t of the previous iteration
is also finite.
If the check fails, we do not only output the set of proof obligations that are not
derivable Fth \ D, but differentiate the reasons. Let ob be a non-derivable proof
obligation, then we might get one of the following error messages:
• There is no proof declaration with ob as the target.
• There is one (or more) proof declarations with ob as the target, but at least
one of the premises is not derivable either.
• In particular, there may be a (most probably indirect) circular dependency.
 Example The correctness check of the signature unit of the sort example (Pro
gram 5.1) is performed by providing an implementation. The instantiation has
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no proof obligations associated, and therefore all formulas are axioms, and the
unit correctness check succeeds trivially.
The implementation, however, is proven correct by model construction. Since
there is no proof for the lifted specification and definedness formulas for the
function sort, the unit correctness check of the implementation of Sort (Pro
gram 5.1) fails, as shown in Figure 5.6. We see two error messages because the
proof obligations Lift [Spc [sort]] and Lift [Dfd [sort]] are not resolved. The
error messages contain additional information. The first error message tell us that
there exists a generated proof declaration Incl[Spc[sort]] =>• Lift[Spc[sort]]
that could have been used to prove the proof obligation, but it contains a formula
Incl[Spc[sort]], which in turn cannot be proven. The second error message
contains similar information about the other proof obligation Incl [Dfd [sort] ] .
>jc SortList.impl
ERROR [SortList.impl at unknown location]:
Lift [Spc [sort]] could not be proven:
unproven premises of GeneratedPD[0]: Incl[Spc[sort]]
..no proof declaration with target Incl[Spc[sort]] found
ERROR [SortList.impl at unknown location]:
Lift [Dfd[sort]] could not be proven:
unproven premises of GeneratedPD[1]: Incl[Dfd[sort]]
..no proof declaration with target Incl[Dfd[sort]] found
Figure 5.6: The Failing Unit Correctness Check of SortList. impl
73
Chapter 6
Justification Methods
In the previous chapters we have discussed the semantics (Chapters 3 and 4)
of correctness checks and the integration into the compilation process (Chap
ter 5) as far as this is possible without knowing how the proof is performed.
To this end, we have introduced proof declarations. By a proof declaration
PROOF PD: li 1 2 ... l n =>• 1, the user declares that the validity of 1 follows
from {l 1} 1 2 ,..., l n }. The user must complement this declaration by a justifica
tion, i. e. a description of a “proof”.
The important question here is: What is a “proof”? This is by no means an
objective notion. Since the first half of the 20th century logics are classified as
intuitionistic or classical because intuitionists do not believe in the law of the
excluded middle. In the second half new techniques were introduced into math
ematical proofs that stirred up discussions what constitutes a valid proof. Most
famous is the proof of the Four-Colour Theorem [AH77, Tho98], which heavily
relies on computer support.
The distrust against long and non-human-readable verifications is the central
theme in [MLP79], where the authors argue that verifications will never be useful.
Mathematical proofs being simple and understandable, they can be “subjected to
the social mechanism of the mathematical community” 1 . This polemic paper and
the discussion in the following issues of CACM show that there is no universally
accepted proof method.
So it is no surprise that there are several methods in use for justifying a program’s
correctness with respect to its specifications. People with an engineering back
ground most often prefer testing to establish correctness, whereas people with
a background in theoretical computer science choose formal proofs. In the be
1 Interestingly, the paper does not comment on the - then recent — proof of the Four-Colour
Theorem. But the authors do mention the first failed attempt to prove it.
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ginning, it was felt that both methods complement each other [GG75], but both
communities diverged later on [Sha97].
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the merits of different justifica
tion methods and choose one or two of them. Instead, we recognize that people
from different communities prefer different methods for justifying correctness.
Hence, we discuss in this chapter the different methods, with particular focus on
the properties that are important for the implementation, namely what kind of
information must be available to perform the justification.
6.1 The Justification Correctness Check
The final stage of the justification component checks the justifications individu
ally. It is therefore that we call this phase the justification correctness check.
Depending on the type of justification, the compiler must be extended with new
capabilities. There are the following possibilities:
• Use an external tool.
- Use a third-party tool. This allows the integration of external knowl
edge, and saves the implementation of the tool itself.
- Use a specialized tool. We can tailor the tool to our specific needs, but
we have to implement the tool ourselves.
Since we will probably call the tool several times, it is more efficient, if the
external tool can act as a server, answering justification requests from the
compiler, which plays the role of a client.
• Integrate the new capabilities into the compiler. This promises to be even
more efficient than using a specialized external tool. However, this approach
is less flexible than the use of an external tool.
 We will discuss the question whether to use a third-party tool or to implement a
specialized tool for the integration of support for formal proofs in Section 6.4.4.
6.2 Certification
Certification is “proof by authority’ in its purest form. No attempt is made
to demonstrate the correctness of the property by its semantics. Instead, the
 skeptical reader is pointed to an authority that is assumed to carry enough weight
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to convince the reader. Whether this is actually the case, users must decide for
themselves.
This is actually the biggest disadvantage of certification as a justification method.
Correctness of a program is no longer an absolute property of the program, cor
rectness by certification is instead a user- dependent property. The authority given
in a certification may be accepted by one user and rejected by another, and opin
ions about the credibility of authorities may change over time. This raises prob
lems if the source code is distributed. Some users might even feel compelled to
accept a certificate, although they do not really believe the authority.
The main advantage of certification as a justification method is that it can cope
with non-formalized or semi-formalized properties. Hence, certification can be
used in the early stages of software development, and later be replaced with
other justification methods.
Depending on the kind of authority used we can distinguish different forms of
certification.
6.2.1 Referring to a Common Authority
The certification itself points to a common authority, e. g. a mathematical text
book, where the real proof can be found. This allows to embed mathematical
theorems that have been proven, even if the proof is too long, too complicated,
or simply relies on yet unformalized notions.
As example we take the “Chinese postman problem”, which calls for finding a
shortest non-simple cycle in a graph that contains every edge at least once. The
following lemma [vL90] describes an algorithm to solve this problem:
The Chinese postman problem can be solved by means of an all-pairs
shortest path computation, solving a minimum weight perfect matching
problem, and tracing an Eulerian cycle in an (Eulerian) Graph.
The correctness proof of this algorithm is rather long:
In analogy to Theorem 2.12 (ii) the minimum cost set of edges that must be dou
bled in G to make G “Chinese postman optimal” must be the union of minimum
cost paths connecting nodes of odd degree, and (conversely) any union of this
kind added to G will yield an Eulerian graph. Thus, let A be the set of nodes of
odd degree and solve the (.4, .4)-shortest path problem in G . To select a minimum
cost set of paths, design a complete graph G' on node set A with ) equal to
d{i,j) for i,j € A (the shortest distance between i and j in G), and determine a
minimum weight perfect matching in G'. (Note that, necessarily, \A\ is even.) For
every edge (i, j) of the matching, double the edges of the shortest path from i to
j in G. Tracing an Eulerian cycle in the resulting graph will yield an (optimal)
postman walk.
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If the algorithm is part of a larger library of graph algorithms, it may be feasible to
 formalize this proof. But if the algorithm is used to solve an application problem
that has no relation to graphs, Eulerian cycles, etc., the situation is different. The
choice is either to insert the necessary theory and perform the formal proof, or
to ins ert, a pointer to the place where the proof has been done.
The use of certification as a justification method is justified in this situation,
because this is the only method that can cope with non-formalized proofs. We
can also expect that most readers will accept textbooks as credible authorities.
6.2.2 Taking Responsibility
In the previous section we discussed the situation where a proof does exist, but is
not formalized and thus not available to the compiler. Often not even a rigorous
proof exists, because the property to be justified is itself not formalized, because
only an informal reasoning has been performed, or even because a formal proof
might convey too much information about a proprietary algorithm.
In these cases the only other possibility to convince the user of the correctness
 is the authoritative statement that the property in question actually is indeed
correct. The only thing left to convince a skeptical reader is knowledge of the
person who claims the correctness. Knowing the person can help because the
reader may trust into the skill of the certifying person, or because a mistakenly
certified property has unpleasant (legal) consequences for the certifier.
6.2.3 Implementation Aspects
Obviously it is very important that the certifier is identified correctly, and that the
property is indeed the very same property that the certifier declared correct. In
order to solve this problem we can adapt methods developed for digital signatures.
Roughly speaking, a digital signature is a hash value of the document, which is
encrypted by the owner’s private key. Users who want to check the validity of
the signature use the owner’s public key to check the signature [Riv90]. The
implementation of certification as a justification method seems straightforward,
but there are some problems that make the implementation more difficult than
anticipated.
The main difficulty is the necessity to coordinate the check of the digital signature
- which is part of the compilation process - with the tool that adds the digital
signature - preferably as a part of an integrated development environment (IDE).
In the previous section we sketched the general idea for certification:
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• First, the proof declaration to be justified is turned into a textual represen
tation.
• Then, this document is digitally signed by the author (or another person
willing to take the responsibility).
• The digital signature is inserted into the source code.
The validation of the certification is performed in the following steps:
• The proof declaration to be justified is turned into a textual representation.
• The digital signature is checked with respect to the textual representation.
• If the signature is good, the author is checked against the list of accepted
authors.
The problem is the generation of the “textual representation”. There are two
independent tools that must be able to generate identical representation from
different views on the program. The certification tool has access to the source
code, together with all layout information, like white space characters, and with
comments, documentation, etc. The compiler on the other hand uses a more or
less abstract view on the source code.
It would be an advantage, if we could insert the certification component earlier
into the compilation process where easier access to the source code is possible.
Still, we would have to adapt the parser of the compiler, because comments and
white space are usually skipped. But this is not enough: the compiler can only
decide which part of the source code is a certification after the parser has finished.
Knowing which part of the source code is a certification does not suffice, we have
to find the corresponding proof declaration. This search is done with the help of
the names of the proof declaration and the justification (which must match), and
can only be carried out if the abstract syntax tree is available.
The implementation of the certification method must take this problem into ac
count. The compiler and the certification component must be able to construct
the same textual representation of the goal for certification and validation respec
tively.
A further difficulty arises, because the target of the proof declaration typically
depends on items (types, functions, laws) that are declared in other units. The
certification is only valid, if none of those items has changed since the certificate
was issued. Hence, support for certifications requires that the compiler keeps
time stamps for every item in every unit. Usually changes to the source code are
checked on the unit level only. For our purpose this is too coarse. Everyone has
had the experience that a change to a comment can cause the recompilation of
many other units. Since the recompilation is automatic (and hardware is getting
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faster), this is acceptable. Certification, however, is not automatic, so any change
to an imported (or otherwise used) unit, has the consequence that the user must
 check and confirm every certification.
Finally, the compiler must know about the user’s opinion, which authors, or which
authorities are to be trusted and which are not. The compiler must have access
to a user-specific data base, which contains the trusted authorities 2 .
In the simplest case, the data base contains the names of the authorities accepted.
This information may be augmented, for example with an expiration date, or with
a restriction for certain units or subsystems (groups of units).
The “verification” of the certificates can be started as soon as the compiler knows
which certificate belongs to which proof declaration. Figure 6.1 shows how we
could add the certification checker to the compiler as depicted in Figure 5.1.
source code abstract syntax tree attributed a.s.t.
optimized a.s.t. object code
Figure 6.1: The Integration of the Certification Component
 It is our aim to base the justification component on the attributed abstract syntax
tree that is available after the context checker has successfully completed. It is
no problem to check the authors with respect to the user’s certification data base
with the information contained in the abstract syntax tree. But we must take care
to carry enough information in the abstract syntax tree to reconstruct the textual
representation of the proof declarations that are to be justified by certification.
2 Note that a compiler cannot ask a user interactively about the acceptability of a digital
signature, like web browsers can do.
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6.2.4 The Certification Component
This check of a digital signature is best performed by an external tool for the
following two reasons: Input and output consist of simple text that requires no
expensive parsing, and second, an external tool can also be used by the integrated
development environment for the generation of the digital signature.
The check of a certification is divided into three parts: extraction, call and eval
uation, see Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: The Certification Component
• The extraction phase makes the source code of the associated proof decla
ration and the digital signature available to the external tool. As described
above, the compiler must be able to reconstruct the source code from the
abstract syntax tree.
• The external tool is called and checks the digital signature with respect to
the source code of the proof declaration.
• The result of the tool is evaluated for the answers to the following questions:
- Is the signature valid at all?
- Is the author of the signature among the trusted authors?
— Is the certification newer than all items that it references?
As discussed in the previous section, the compiler will often lack the means to
answer the last question.
Example The justification of the sort function by certification is shown in
Program 6.1 3 . Opal/J uses the GNU Privacy Guard (gpg, see [FSFOO]) as an
external tool. For compatibility reasons the signature is nevertheless dubbed a
3 Some line breaks have been added for better readability.
80 CHAPTER 6. JUSTIFICATION METHODS
“PGP” signature. Since the certification is rather long, the editor should be able
to hide the certification.
Program 6.1 Sorting Lists - Certified
IMPLEMENTATION SortLiSt
IMPORT Seq[nat] ONLY seqO ::
DEF sort(0) == 0
DEF sort(a::R) == a::sort(R) [T]
PROOF spc_sort_l : =$• Lift[Spc[sort]]
JUSTF spc_SOrt_l == CERTIFICATION
(" BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE
Version: GnuPG vl. 0. 0 (GNU/Linux)
 Comment : certificate for justification ‘spc-sort-l 7
Wed Aug 30 17: 40: 18 MEST 2000
iD8DBQA5rSriJLvU+9PlFxQRAmCHAJw
NIDobCiSM631VlhuTT2ifPcPUtQCeNu
i42PFStStQZuA4marzm6qEAJo==N8z+
 END PGP SIGNATURE ")
The result of checking the justification spc_sort_l is shown in Figure 6.3. The sig
nature is “good” but "Klaus Didrich (TU Berlin) <kd@cs.tu-berlin.de>"
is not registered as a trusted certifier. Therefore an appropriate error message is
generated.
>jc SortList.impl
checking certification of spc_sort_l
gpg: Signature made Wed Aug 30 17:40:18 2000 MEST using DSA key ID D3E5171
gpg: Good signature from "Klaus Didrich (TU Berlin)
<kdflcs.tu-berlin.de>"
ERROR [SortList.impl at 17.7-17.16]:
author ‘Klaus Didrich (TU Berlin) <kdQcs.tu-berlin.de>’ not registered
Figure 6.3: The Output of the Certification Check
6.3 Testing
Another possibility to establish trust in the correctness of an implementation is
collecting empirical evidence that the function performs as expected. Put into
other words, the implementation is tested with various input values, and the
output is checked afterwards whether it meets the specification. The more input
values are used and the more “difficult” these input values are, the higher is the
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trust in the correctness of the implementation. (We will restate this sentence
more precisely below.)
Correctness is thus seen as an empirical science, not unlike a scientific theory.
Following Popper (“I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific
only if it is capable of being tested by experience.” [Pop72]), the correctness
cannot be proven , the correctness can only be “corroborated” by (successful)
past experience. Popper concludes that falsifiability is the crucial property of
an empirical system. We therefore demand that a function must be specified,
if its correctness is justified by testing, because this is the only way to ensure
falsifiability of the correctness property of the function in question.
The function tested must be formally specified, but the test can be executed
even if the functions on which the tested function depends are not treated for
mally. Hence, testing is a method that may be used to justify the correctness of
“hot spots”. Testing has the advantage that a failed test immediately delivers a
counterexample, which can be used for debugging.
The need for a formal specification and an executable function is a first hint at
the difficulties that lie in the implementation of justification by testing. Before we
discuss the difficulties we look closer at the subcomponents of the testing process.
6.3.1 Test-Case Selection
It is in general impossible to execute a program for all possible input data, be
cause the set of possible input data is very large, possibly even infinite. Hence,
a subset of test data has to be chosen, which is not too large, but which never
theless allows to gain enough empirical evidence for a successful justification. For
easier management this task is performed in two stages. First, the test cases are
determined, then the test data is chosen.
A test case is a subset of the input data; the notion is also used for the charac
teristic predicate of the subset. All subsets together must cover all possible input
data. Test cases should be “uniform” [Gau95], i. e. the execution with an arbitrary
member of the test case will fail or succeed independent of the choice of test data.
This property cannot be guaranteed, otherwise we would have a formal proof of
correctness.
In general, test cases must be selected by hand, possibly with the help of an
interactive tool (such as CTE [Gri95]). But test cases can also be selected on
 the basis of the specification (black-box tests) or the implementation (white-box
tests). There are several possible criteria for each of the two families of test-case
selection, such as statement, branch or path coverage [How87] for white box tests
and CDNF (canonical disjunctive normal form) [SC96] for specification-based
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testing. [Wei97] discusses several methods for obtaining test cases from Z-based
specifications.
6.3.2 Test-Data Selection
After the test cases have been defined, representatives must be selected. In gen
eral, the selection is performed by the user, requiring additional checking whether
the user-supplied test data cover each of the previously computed test cases.
Another possibility is to derive the test data from the test cases. This can be done
e. g. by Prolog-like systems or as a by-product of checking consistency of a test
case: Let Ptc be the test case (i. e. the characteristic predicate of the test case),
then 3x • Ptc(x) must be proven before automatic generation of test data can
begin. If the proof is constructive, it contains a witness for the existentially quan
tified variable, and we can use this witness as a test data item for the respective
test case.
 The automatic generation of test data is expensive and has the disadvantage that
it requires the use of further sophisticated tools. This does not fit well with the
simplicity of testing as a justification method (as compared, e. g., to program
synthesis), and might be rejected by some users for this very reason. In the
environment we propose, the derivation of test data from test cases could be
integrated, though.
6.3.3 Test Execution
Once the test data has been selected, the function to be tested is applied to each
of them. Some precautions have to be taken: the function might be undefined
for the respective test data, which may manifest either as a run-time error or as
non-termination. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of security issues.
If we are in a pure functional setting, there is no need to establish an external
state before the test can be performed, and there is no need to undo changes to the
external state afterwards. With imperative languages, the situation is different 4 .
6.3.4 Test Evaluation
The test evaluator checks, whether the result meets the specification. For simple
specifications that have the general shape ALL x. f (x) = E(x), it is possible to
4 Some Y2K damage occurred after an otherwise successful test, because the test data cor
rupted working data bases.
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execute the right side of the equation as well, and compare both results automat
ically.
If the specification has a more complicated structure, we have to prove formally
that the result does meet the specification. Still, we can substitute the test data
item and the result of the test execution into the specification, and hope that a
formal proof of the specialized specification is considerably simpler than a formal
proof for the unchanged specification.
6.3.5 Implementation Aspects
A very basic test support is possible on the basis of syntactical transformations
alone, but this excludes support for test-case selection and requires an executable
predicate for test evaluation.
The situation is different, if we want support for test-case selection and more
possibilities for test evaluation. Figure 6.4 shows a first attempt to integrate
the testing component into the compiler. The testing component consists of four
sub-components:
• The test-case selector computes the appropriate test cases. The user may
define the test cases directly, but most often the user will denote the type
of test to be performed (white-box test, black-box test, etc.) and will leave
the computation of the actual test cases to the compiler.
• The test-data checker ensures that for every test case there is at least one
test input. The test input may be either generated or user-defined.
• The test executor calls the function to be tested with every item of the test
data and records the results.
• The test evaluator checks whether the results meet the specification of the
function tested.
The main problem is indicated in Figure 6.4 by the thick arrows. Test-case selec
tion and test evaluation need information from the abstract syntax as well as test
evaluation of the result. The execution however depends on the availability of
executable code. We can therefore not perform the justification between context
checker and optimizer, as proposed in Section 5. Matters are further complicated
because the input and output from the execution is represented in binary form,
which is different from the abstract syntax.
We have already presented our solution to this problem in Section 2.3. Using
an interpreter provides a way to carry out the test execution on the basis of
the attributed abstract syntax. This solution is feasible, if the interpreter fulfils
several conditions:
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source code abstract syntax tree attributed a.s.t.
optimized a.s.t. object code
Figure 6.4: The Integration of the Testing Component / First Attempt
• It must be reasonably fast. After all, the compilation process is prolonged
by several test executions, and if the extra justification effort should be
acceptable, the extra time spent on testing should be short.
• The interpreter must be faithful , i. e. the execution of the abstract syntax
by the interpreter must be semantically equivalent to the code generated by
the compiler. This seems to be self-evident, but we must stress here, that
“equivalent” includes errors.
• The interpreter must be secure. The interpreter must be able to cope with
— aborting functions
— non-terminating functions
— malicious functions
As long as we stay in a pure functional setting, we need not worry about
malicious functions. Pure functions cannot change the external state of
a software system, they cannot delete files, or send secret data over the
Internet. For the other two cases, we will assume that the interpreter is
able to cope with these situations, and postpone a discussion to Chapter 8.
Figure 6.5 shows the improved integration of the testing component into the
compilation process.
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Figure 6.5: The Integration of the Testing Component / Improved Version
6.3.6 The Testing Component
The architecture of the testing component contains the four subcomponents that
have been named in the previous section (see Figure 6.6). We have already men
tioned that an interpreter will be used as external tool for the test execution.
Note that we will use the interpreter as well for the implementation of external
tools that implement the test-case selector and test-data checker subcomponents.
Figure 6.6: The Testing Component
 Example Program 6.2 shows how the implementation of sort (Program 5.1)
can be augmented by a justification for the specification of the sort function. The
second argument given to FORMALTEST is the heuristic to compute the test cases
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(allGuards is a white-box test that checks that every branch of the definitional
equations is evaluated), the third argument is the list of test data items.
Program 6.2 Sorting Lists - Justification by Formal Test
IMPLEMENTATION SortList
IMPORT Seq[nat] ONLY seq 0 ::
Nat ONLY nat 12 3
Seq[seq[nat]] ONLY seq '/,
DEF sort(0) == 0
DEF sort(a::R) == a::sort(R) [T]
PROOF spc_sort_2a: =S> Lift[Spc[sort]]
justf spc_sort_2a == formaltest (sort,allGuards,*/,(<>))
PROOF spc_sort_2b : Lift[Spc[sort]j
JUSTF spC-Sort_2b == FORMALTEST (sort, allGuards,
%(0, %(l, 2), #/,(3, 2,1)))
6.3.6.1 Test-Case Selection
Test-case selection generally requires intimate knowledge of the abstract syntax of
the underlying programming language. We therefore decided to use a specialized
tool for the test-case selection. The specialized tool is the interpreter together with
a library of functions that compute test cases according to different strategies.
The interface of these functions is shown in Program 6.3.
Program 6.3 Test-Case Selector Functions
FUN allGuards : repo x objectName —> resultT
FUN allConstructors :repo x objectName —>• resultT
TYPE resultT == okay(testcases : seqjexpr], diags : diag)
The first argument to the test-case selector functions is the abstract syntax tree,
the second argument is the function to be tested. The result is a list of predicates
in an internal representation and, if necessary, error messages.
The use of the interpreter enables the user to extend test-case strategies or to
combine them. Of course, the implementation of new strategies requires knowl
edge of the abstract syntax tree. Program 6.4 presents the definition for a function
that concatenates the results of two test-case strategies.
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Program 6.4 A Concatenation Function for Test-Case Selectors
 FUN HI- : (repo x objectName —y resultT) x
(repo x objectName -4- resultT) -4
(repo x objectName -4 resultT)
DEF (strati HI- strat2)(R,n) ==
LET res 1 == stratl(R,n)
res2 == strat2(R, n)
IN
okay(testcases(resl) HI- testcases(res2),diags(resl) <+ diags(res2))
6.3.6.2 Test-Data Checker
The test-data checker is implemented with the help of the interpreter as well.
Since the result of the test-case selector uses the abstract syntax for the repre
sentation and the test data given by the user is available in the abstract syntax
tree, we can again use the interpreter with a test-data library. Program 6.5 shows
the test-data function used in the Opal/J prototype. The first argument is the
test case (represented as a Boolean-valued function), the second argument is the
list of test data.
Program 6.5 The Test-Data Checker Function
FUN checkTestCases : (a -4 bool) x seq[a] -4 bool
DEF checkTestCases (f, 0) == false
DEF checkTestCases(f, dl ::R) ==
IF f(dl) THEN true ELSE checkTestCases(f, R)fi
Example The list of test data items given in justification spc_sort_2a does
not cover all test cases: as already mentioned, allGuards is a white-box test
that checks that every branch of the definitional equations is evaluated. This
is obviously not the case for justification spc_sort_2a. Figure 6.7 shows the er
 ror message. For better documentation, we have appended the predicates that
represent the test cases for the heuristic used.
>jc SortList.impl
ERROR [SortList.impl at 19.7-19.17]: no test data for test case
\\ x_4. ::?[nat](x_4)
 >jcheck~info testcases sort allGuards
Test cases for function ‘sort’ with heuristic ‘allGuards’
<\\ x_4. <>?[nat](x_4), \\ x _4. : :? [nat](x_4)>
Figure 6.7: An Error Message For a Failed Test
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6.3.6.3 Test Execution
For executing the formal test, we take the specification, remove the quantifiers
that bind the argument variables to the specified function, replace the arguments
given to the specified function with the respective piece of test data and call the
interpreter to perform the evaluation.
Example For justification spc_sort_2b, the following formulas are given to the
interpreter:
true =*> LET T
true LET T
true => LET T
sort(O) IN S permutation T AND ascending(T)
sort(l::2:: 0) IN S permutation T AND ascending(T)
sort(3 :: 2:: 1 :: 0) IN S permutation T AND ascending(T)
6.3.6.4 Test Evaluator
In general, the result of the test execution is a formula, which must be further
simplified. Quite often (and also in our example) the only quantified variables are
the function arguments. In this case we can do the whole evaluation automatically.
Figure 6.8 shows the result of checking justification spc_sort_2b. The last test
case does not fulfil the specification, and we get the appropriate error message.
>jc SortList.impl
ERROR [SortList.impl at 22.7-22.17]: test failed for
input data no. 2 <3,2,1>
Figure 6.8: A Failed Test of sort
The interpreter must be protected against non-terminating evaluations. Of
course, we cannot check termination in advance. A feasible way to prevent non
terminating evaluations is a forced break after a previously defined time-out.
This restricts the justification method to those functions that terminate within
the defined time-out period.
6.4 Formal Proof
If a formal specification is given, we can formally check whether the implemen
tation meets the specification. The idea of being able to check the correctness
formally has two advantages:
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• The correctness is not just more or less corroborated, but computed with
100% accuracy.
• A formal algorithm offers more possibilities for automatic support.
This benefit comes at a price: Justification by testing requires a formal seman
tics for the data-type part of the programming language only. Testing requires a
formal semantics for the data so that a formal specification can be given against
which the result of the test execution can be checked. A formal proof requires
that we are able to reason about the computation encoded in the implementa
tion. Formal proof as a justification method requires a formal semantics of the
underlying programming language.
Theorem-provers are already good at performing lengthy computations of proofs,
but for large theories they need assistance in choosing the right assumptions
[Gri96, RS97] and in choosing the right derivation at points where no obvious
choice exists. Our approach is more explicit and asks the user to provide more
information and to present it in a way to the compiler that allows easy addition
of the automatically deducible parts.
6.4.1 Representation of Proofs
The representation of proofs poses another problem that must be solved before
formal proofs can be used as a justification method in our framework. Currently,
formal proofs cannot be computed automatically, therefore we need a notation
to include the formal proof (or some parts of it) in the source code.
Formal proofs are most naturally represented as trees with the axioms on top
and the goal at the bottom 5 . Figure 6.9 shows such a formal proof tree given as
an example in [DF94], Note that the proof tree has been cut twice in order to
narrow the representation. Q is an abbreviation for the definitional equations of
the program environment.
The example shows that a proof tree for longer proofs will quickly exceed the
available space. The two-dimensional tree representation cannot be integrated
easily into the linear representation of source code. Hence, we have to use a linear
representation of the proof, which is less human readable, but better suited for
automatic treatment.
[NL98a] discusses the efficient representation of proofs in the framework of proof
carrying code. The representation takes advantage of the redundancy in the proof
5 This is in contrast to other areas of computer science where the leaves are at the bottom
and the root is on top.
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Figure 6.9: A Formal Proof Tree
tree, which is removed in a way that a reconstruction algorithm can easily com
pute the full representation. Whereas this is a way to deal efficiently with auto
matically computed proofs, this is no solution for us. The resulting representation
is only useful for automatic check, but not for human-guided development.
6.4.2 Tactics and Tacticals
Tactical theorem-provers like Isabelle system or Pvs follow a different ap
proach. These systems use a command language for proof construction. The user
combines tactics and tacticals to describe how the proof shall be performed. We
will use this way to include proof descriptions in the source code.
The user states the goal, i. e. the formula to be proven, and then directs the
interactive prover towards the resolution of the goal. The command language
consists of tactics and tacticals. Tactics change the current goal, tacticals combine
tactics. Typical tacticals are THEN (for sequencing), ORELSE (for alternation),
REPEAT (for iteration).
In addition to the interactive proving facilities, these systems offer the possi
bility to add new proving tacticals. Tactics are the atomic statements, tacticals
the control structures of a proof engineering language, which features impera
tive elements (sequencing, iteration) as well as elements from logic programming
(backtracking). The user programs an underlying proof machine in quest of the
proof.
6.4. Formal Proof 91
The proof engineering languages are quite powerful and the predefined tactics
that are delivered with these systems have become more and more sophisticated.
Often, only a few tactics must be combined to resolve a proof. The Pvs tuto
rial [COR + 95] contains the following statement: “A knowledgeable Pvs user can
typically get proofs to go through mostly automatically by making a few critical
decisions at the start of the proof.”
With these powerful tactics, the difference between interactive and automatic
proof systems becomes blurred. If only one or two user actions at the beginning
of a proof session are required, there is no reason, why the user should not write
down these actions and let the system perform its task without interaction.
6.4.3 Implementation Aspects
The integration of the prover into the compilation process is less problematic
than the integration of the testing or the certification component. All necessary
information is available in the abstract syntax: the goal (the property to be
proven) and the proof program given by the programmer.
So we only have to translate the goal and the proof program into the input
language of a tactical theorem-prover (like Pvs or Isabelle), call the theorem-
prover and await the result.
source code abstract syntax tree attributed a.s.t.
optimized a.s.t. object code
 Figure 6.10: The Integration of the Formal Proof Component
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6.4.4 The Formal Proof Component
The simplicity of the graphic in Figure 6.11 is not surprising, because the integra
tion of a theorem-prover poses no problems. It might be surprising, though, that
the external theorem-prover is not a third-party tool, but that we use again the
interpreter with a dedicated library. Before we discuss the pros and cons of our
proposal, we present our running example with a formal proof as a justification.
Figure 6.11: The Formal Proof Component
Program 6.6 Sorting Lists - Justified by a Formal Proof
IMPLEMENTATION SortList
import Seqfnat] ONLY seqO ::
DEF sort(O) == 0
DEF sort(a::R) == a::sort(R) (T]
PROOF spc_sort_3 : Def [sort] Freetype[seq[nat]] dfd_0 dfd_ ::
permu.O permu_l ascending_0 =>• Lift[Spc[sort]]
JUSTF spc_sort_3 == FORMALPROOF (opalR; mlnduct; rewriter30)
Example The Proof Declaration spc_sort_3 in Program 6.6 states that the
specification of the sort function can be justified with the help of free-type and
definedness properties of the sequence data type, the definitional equation of
sort and other formulas. The formal proof in the associated justification consists
of three tactics: opalR, mlnduct and rewriter30, which are connected by the
tactical . The tactic opalR simplifies the specification law. The second tactic
instructs the theorem-prover to use induction on the sequence data type. The
third tactic uses simple (non-dangerous) rules of the underlying sequent calculus,
plus directed substitution (hence the name “rewriter”). The semicolon is the
“followed-by” tactical: the resulting tactic first simplifies the proof state by ap
plying OPAL-specific rules, then applies the mlnduct tactic on the resulting proof
state, and finally calls the third tactic with the result of the induction tactic.
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6.4.4.1 Third-Party vs. Specialized Theorem-Prover
Given the number of available theorem-provers, there seems to be no need to
develop the n + 1-st theorem-prover for our extended compiler. Closer analysis,
however, reveals that both third-party and specialized theorem-provers require
considerable work on the part of the compiler writer.
The integration of a third-party tool saves the implementation of the theorem-
prover as well as the development of a library of proving strategies. But the
programming language differs from the input language of the theorem-prover. We
must translate the proof declarations and justifications into the input language,
and we must be able to do the backwards translation as well: if the formal proof
fails, the user needs information about the reason in terms of the programming
language.
The following list enumerates some of the difficulties the translation faces:
 • Syntactic differences. Even if the abstract syntax hides many details of
the programming language, some differences remain, e. g. different rules for
identifiers, or different keywords. All these differences can be dealt with
by the translation, but often the re-translation is difficult or impossible.
This is important if error messages must be re-translated from the context
of the third-party tool into the programming language. One aspect of the
translation of error messages is the problem of positions, which are most
often impossible to translate 6 .•
• Semantic differences. Functional programming languages are quite similar
as far as the basic features are concerned, but differ in the more advanced
features. Opal and Pvs for example, handle partiality in different ways.
Opal allows partial functions. Pvs knows total functions only, but supports
subtypes. If the domain of the partial function is known, we can translate
partial functions from Opal to Pvs, but Opal does not require to declare
the definedness domain.
Other features that differ among functional programming languages are sup
port of free types, dependent types, type classes; strict vs. lazy evaluation;
 recursive let; and last, but not least, polymorphism vs. parameterization.
These are some of possible problem areas. It is not always possible to encode
the source code that is written in the programming language in terms of
the input language of the external prover. This restricts the programs that
may be justified by formal proof to those that can be successfully encoded.
 These encodings may additionally cause syntactic problems in re-translating
messages from the tool.
6 C has the _LINE_ and _FILE_ preprocessor directives for this purpose.
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• Modularization. Opal uses a two-level modularization structure with an in
terface unit and an implementation unit, both are connected by an algebraic
implementation relation. If this relationship must be encoded in the tool
language, this causes again semantic and syntactic translation problems.
• Program library. At first glance, a formal proof of spc_sort_3 requires only
the translation of a few formulas. But these formulas are built over a signa
ture that comprises many units of the programming language. In particular
the standard library, but also all of the units of the current project must
be translated into the tool’s input language.
Some of the translation difficulties can be overcome if a generic theorem-prover
(like Isabelle) is used that allows to define the input language. Still, syntactic
and semantic differences remain and make the correctness proof more difficult.
[Pus94] contains a study of a verification of a development written in Spectrum.
With the help of an automated translator, the source code was transformed into
an Isabelle theory, which was the basis for the verification. Some peculiarities of
Spectrum made the verification quite laborious: Spectrum’s three-valued logic
made the use of Isabelle’s automated prover for predicate logic quite difficult.
Some of the automatically generated axioms had to be changed for easier proving.
We checked the derived rules of the Opal sequent calculus [DF94] with an ex
perimental implementation in Isabelle (based on the classical sequent calculus
LK). For the experiment only a small subset of Opal was needed; the inclusion
of all peculiarities of Opal would have been more tedious. No precautions were
made for a re-translation to Opal. For the implementation of the basic tactics we
had to familiarize ourselves with the Isabelle environment. Once these prepara
tions were finished we could benefit from the tacticals provided by Isabelle/LK
and could also make use of the possibility of batch proofs.
In Figure 6.12 we compare the cost for the implementation of a third-party
theorem-prover, a specialized theorem-prover and the prototype of specialized
theorem-prover. Based on our experience we assign a “high”, “middle” or “low”
cost to each of the parts that must or should be implemented, or “none”, if no
implementation is necessary.
If we use a third-party theorem-prover, the translation and re-translation has
a high cost. The basic tactics for the programming language must be written
from scratch, but tacticals and decision procedures for special domains (e. g.
natural numbers) come for free, because they are already part of the standard
environment. Batch processing is probably not very well supported, the user
interface and error handling and debugging facilities assuming that the proof is
done interactively.
For a specialized theorem-prover, costs are reversed. The translation and re
translation come for free, whereas all other parts have to be implemented. Note
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third-party specialized
theorem-prover
prototype
translation high none none
basic tactics middle middle middle
tacticals none middle low
decision procedures none high none
batch proofs middle middle middle
re-translation high none none
Figure 6.12: Comparison of Implementation Costs
that the estimation of a “middle” cost for the implementation of tactics and
tacticals depends on the choice for Opal as implementation language (see the
discussion in the following section). For other implementation languages the cost
might be “high”.
For the prototype of a specialized theorem-prover, we can omit the support of
decision procedures and restrict the implementation of tacticals to a few basic
tacticals. The cost for complicated proofs is higher, but we have an “early” func
tional prototype.
There is no clear answer to the question whether to use a third-party theorem-
prover or to implement a new one. The costs must be re-evaluated for implemen
tation languages other than Opal and other languages than functional languages.
Especially if the gap between the languages is large or the use of a tactics library
 or decision procedures is important, it might be more effective to implement two
small compilers to translate between the compiled language and the input or
output language of the third-party theorem-prover.
6.4.4.2 Comparison between Isabelle and the Opal/J Prototype
 Fortunately, we do not have to do the implementation entirely from scratch. If we
find a theorem-prover whose implementation language is similar to the language
we are processing, we may possibly re-use parts of the implementation.
It is for this reason that we chose Isabelle as a reference implementation. The
implementation language of Isabelle is ML, a functional language like Opal.
Of course, there are syntactic and semantic differences, but most of them can be
 expressed within Opal. The most striking difference - ML’s use of polymorphism
vs. Opal’s parameterization - can be overcome at the expense of a few additional
Opal units.
 More important is the fact that both languages are strict languages. Isabelle
does use laziness in its implementation, but since ML is a strict language, this
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laziness must be explicitly written down in the source code. So we can re-use this
explicit laziness in the re-implementation in Opal.
We compare three examples taken from the Isabelle implementation in ML and
the corresponding equivalents in Opal. The first one shows the implementation
of a lazy sequence data type, the second presents the functions and data types
used for interaction with the user and the compiler and finally we show the
implementation of the repetition tactical.
Lazy Sequence Data Type The (central part of the) implementation of the
data type is shown in Program 6.7, on the left-hand side the ML implementation
of Isabelle, on the right-hand side the Opal implementation. The ML imple
mentation is contained in a single file, the Opal implementation is split into two
files, one for the interface and one for the implementation.
Three corresponding pairs of pieces of source code are marked in Program 6.7
to emphasize the similarity between the two implementations. The data-type
definition differs in the way both languages denote data-type constructors (postfix
in ML - prefix in Opal), how both languages represent tuples (Opal needs an
auxiliary data type pair) , and the chosen identifiers (abs and rep are the usual
names for solitary type constructors and selectors in Opal). The definition of
the function pull is identical modulo renaming. The definition of rt is almost
identical modulo renaming; the Opal implementation is augmented with error
handling code.The reader will have no difficulties in finding other correspondences
between the two implementations.
Prover Interface The prover interface is compared in Program 6.8. The upper
part contains the definition of tactic and proof script. The ML definition is
shorter for two reasons: Opal uses additional data types to encapsulate error
information 7 , and ML uses the thm data type, where Opal uses seq[sequent].
The thm type is more general than the Opal counterpart seq[sequent]; after all,
Isabelle is a generic theorem-prover. For the Opal implementation, we decided
to specialize the data type.
The lower part of Program 6.8 contains the declarations of the top-level function
for batch processing. Both declarations need some explanation. The arguments
of the ML function prove_goal are the context, in which the proof is to be done,
the formula (goal) that is to be proven, and a (function that returns a) list of
tactics. These tactics are applied sequentially to the goal. The function returns
the head of the resulting list of proof states.
7 The definition of result is similar to the definition of the Opal’s I/O monad data type
com.
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Program 6.7 Lazy Sequences
Signatur« SEQ ■■igtyp« ’a s«qvai так«: (unit -> (»a * »a s«q) option) -> 'a s«qvai pull: ’a s«q -> (»a * ’a s«q) optionvai empty: 'a s«qvai cons: 'a * ’a s«q -> »a s«qvai single: ’a -> »a s«qvai hd: *a s«q -> ’avai tl: »a s«q -> ’a s«q•nd;
structure S«q: SEQ »struct
datatype *a seq * Seq of unit -> (»a * *a seq) option;
(«the abstraction for making a sequence*)vai make ■ Seq;
(*return next sequence element as None or Some (x, xq)*)
fun pull (Seq f) - f ();
(*the empty sequence*)val empty ■ Seq (fn () ■> None);
(«prefix an element to the sequence — use cons (x, xq)only if evaluation of xq need not be delayed, otherwiseuse make (fn () ■> Some (x, xq))*)fun cons x_xq ■ make (fn () *> Some x_xq);
fun single x * cons (x, empty);
(«head and tail — beware of calling the sequencefunction twice!!*)fun hd xq ■ #1 (the (pull xq))
and tl xq - *2 (the (pull xq));
SIGNATURE LS«q[a]SORT Cc — X Type declarationTYPE lseq == 0:: (ft : a, rt : lseq)— X lazy constructorFUN make : (() -* option [pair [a, lseq]]) —* lseq— X Construct a listFUN X : a —► lseq — X Accessing ElementsFUN pull : lseq opt ion [pair [a, lseq]]
IMPLEMENTATION LSeq— X Type implementation
DATA lseq == abs(rep :()—»■ opt ion [pair [a,l».q]])
DEF make == abs—XAccessing Elements
DEF pull (abs (f)) == f()
DEF 0 == abs(A. nil)DEF f ::R == abs (A . avail (f k R))—XConstruct a listDEF X(d) == d:: 0
DEF ft(s) ==IF »0? THEN ABORT("ft / LS«q : empty sequence")ELSE lst(cont(pull(s))) FI
DEF rt(s) ==IF »0? THEN ABORT("rt / LSeq : empty sequence")
ELSE 2nd(cont(pull(s))) FI
DEF <>?(•) == nil?(pull(s))DEF ::?(«) == avail?(pull(»))
The Opal function apply is not meant to be called interactively, hence the
many arguments. The first argument corresponds to the first argument of the
ML function, repo being the name of the data type that represents the abstract
syntax tree. The following two arguments serve to construct error messages. The
 arguments with type seq[formula] and formula are the premises and the target
of the initial sequent. The proofscript encapsulates the tactic to be used. The
function applies the tactic to the initial sequent, and checks, whether all subgoals
 are resolved in the resulting proof state. If not, an appropriate error message is
added. The result of the function consists of the error messages only and not of
the final proof state itself. Since the compiler and the theorem-prover are different
processes, we found it necessary to minimize the information sent between the
two processes.
Program 6.8 The Prover Interface
(*A tactic maps a proof tree to a »«queue« of proof tree»:if length of sequence * 0 then the tactic doe» not apply;if length > 1 then backtracking on the alternative»can occur.*)
type tactic * thm -> thm S«q.»«q;
TYPE »tate == stat«(. . . ,diag» : diag,»ubgoal» : »eq[»equent], . ..)TYPE result == okay (a : l»eq[»tate])fail(lastState : state)
 TYPE proofscript abs (rep : state —f result:)
val prove_goal: theory -> string ->(thm list -> tactic list) -> thm TYPE re suit F == okay(. . . , diags : diag)FUN apply : repo X unitName X anX»•q[formula] X formula X proofscript —► reeultF
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Repetition Tactical The implementation of the repetition tactical shows both
similarities and differences of the implementation languages. Program 6.9 shows
the source code of both implementations. Function calls for tracing or debugging
have been removed, and some identifiers have been renamed to emphasize the
correspondences. It is not possible in Opal to define local mutually recursive
functions. Therefore we have to lift the local definitions and make the tactic
argument explicit, which is supplied implicitly to the local functions rep and
repq in ML. Otherwise, the OPAL functions *, repeat and repeatq closely
resemble their ML counterparts REPEAT, rep, and repq respectively.
Program 6.9 The Repetition Tactical
val REPEAT : tactic -> tactic FUN * : proofscript —► proofscript
fun REPEAT tac - DEF *(abs(tac)) == pscript( A st. repeat(0 • tac,st))fun rep qs st - FUN repeat: seq[lseq[statej] X (state —* result) X state —►case Seq.pull(tac st) of lseq[state]None -> SomeCst, Seq.make(fn()->repq qs)) DEF repeat (qs, tac, st) ==1 SomeCst’,q) -> rep (q::qs) st’ IF fail?(tac(st)) THEN '/, (st) Hb (A. repeatq(qs, f))and repq [] ■ None ELSE LET (stl, q) == pull(data(tac(st)))1 repq(q::qs) ■ case Seq.pull q of IN repeat(q::qs, tac, stl)None ■> repq qs FI1 SomeCst,q) ■> rep (q::qs) stin rep [] end; FUN repeatq: seq[lseq[state]] X (state —► result) —►lseq[state]DEF repeatq( 0 , tac) == 0DEF repeatq(q::qs, tac) ==IF qO? THEN repeatq(qs, tac)ELSE LET (st, ql) == pull(q)IN repeat(ql ::qs, tac, st)FI
6.4.4.3 Example
The formal proof of the sort function fails. Figure 6.13 shows the result of the
justification of Program 6.6. The error message states that the tactical could be
successfully applied, but the resulting proof state contains unresolved subgoals.
The hint points the human prover to the fact that the resulting lazy sequence
of proof states (see Program 6.8) has more than one element. Access to the
other elements involves backtracking of the proof tree. Since this is very ex
pensive, it is not done automatically; instead, the user is informed about this
possibility.
The error message also lists the unresolved subgoals of the proof. Only the tar
get formulas of the sequents are printed, because the list of premises often is
rather long. Full information is contained in a separate file, see Figure 6.14. The
Opal/J prototype provides some additional information about the formulas by
colour coding, but the output is still difficult to understand. The goal is ex
pressed in terms of names of formulas (Def [sort], ascending_0, Spc[sort]), but
the resulting proof state contains many formulas, some of them with generated
variable names. An improved Opal/J compiler should close this gap by provid-
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>jc SortList.impl
ERROR [SortList.impl at 27.7-27.16]: unfinished proof
unresolved subgoals are:
—LUJiSTklsJJUXL > dfd rt«>), dfd ft«»,
EX ft_5_cj:nat rt_4_cj:seq[nat]. (ft_5_cj :: rt_4_cj) === <>,
EX ft_5_ck:nat rt_4_ck:seq[nat] . <> === (ft_5_ck :: rt_4_ck)>
HINT [SortList.impl at 27.7-27.16]: resulting proof state ambiguous
Figure 6,13: An Unsuccessful Proof of Program 6.6
ing higher-level descriptions of the final proof state. This issue is discussed in
Section 10.2.4.
final proofstate is:
<
[ 0 ]
targets: <§0 [ascending((c! :: sortCa!)))], §1 DFD rt(<>),
§2 DFD ft«»,
§3 EX ft_5_cj:nat rt_4_cj : seq[nat] . (ft_5_cj :: rt_4_cj) === <>,
§4 EX ft_5_ck:nat rt_4_ck:seq[nat] . <> === (ft_5_ck :: rt_4_ck)>
premises : <§0 DFD c! , §1 DFD a!, §2 LAW permu_<>, §3 LAW permu_l,
§4 LAW ascending_<>, §5 LAW dfd_<>, §6 LAW dfd_::,
§7 sort(<>) === <>, §8 ALL ft_5_a0:nat rt_4_a0:seq[nat].
sort((ft_5_a0 :: rt_4_a0)) === (ft_5_a0 :: sort(rt_4_a0)),
§9 Gen[seq[nat] «>, ::>], §10 Discr[::, ::?], §11 Discr[::, <>?],
§12 Discr[<>, ::?], §13 Discr[<>, <>?] , §14 Sel[::, rt] ,
§15 Sel [: : , ft], §16 Equiv[::, : :] , §17 Equiv[<>, <>] ,
§18 DDfd[::?] , §19 DDfd[<>?], §20 SDfd[rt], §21 SDfd[ft],
§22 DFD sort (a!), §23 j^ermutay^^ort^ja .
§24 J^scendümglsqrtjjJJXl>>
end of final proofstate
Figure 6.14: The Resulting Proof State
The first formula of the proof state exhibits the problem: It is not possible to
prove ascending(c:: sort(a)). The variables a! and c! are global variables. We
chose ! to mark names of global variables, because these are bound by an ! !
quantifier in Isabelle. The other formulas are part of the free-type properties
of seq[nat]. The variable names reveal that these formulas are automatically
generated.
There is a single subgoal [0] with 5 target formulas and 25 premises. Most
formulas are those given in the source code: premises §2-§6 are explicitly given,
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premises §7 and §8 are derived from Def [sort], premises §9—§21 and targets §1—§4
are derived from Freetype[seq[nat]].
The interesting formulas are underlined: premises §23 and §24 express the induc
tion hypothesis, target §0 is the formula to be proven by induction.
Debugging unsuccessful proofs can be as difficult as debugging errors in function
implementations. Even if the immediate reason is clear, it is still difficult to
understand the underlying reason. In our small example, this is easy: the equation
sort(a::R) == a::sort(R) does not fulfil the requirement that the resulting
sequence is “ascending”.
6.5 Program Synthesis
Program synthesis (or program derivation) is not exactly a method to justify
correctness, it is rather a method to avoid the need for a separate justification.
A justification by a formal proof - as described in the previous section - consists
of the property (specification), the implementation and the formal proof. All
three parts are supplied by the programmer. The compiler merely checks whether
specification, implementation and proof agree.
Program synthesis ensures by construction that the implementation of a function
meets the respective specification. This is an advantage and a disadvantage at the
same time. It is an advantage, because implementation and justification are done
simultaneously, which is more efficient than doing both tasks separately. It is a
disadvantage, because we loose redundancy: the need to provide a specification
and an implementation and to show that they both agree introduces an additional
level of reliability.
Program synthesis is a rather involved technique. The descriptive specification is
turned into an implementation. This implies the introduction of control structures
(iteration, recursion) that is often the “eureka” step in program development and
therefore defies automation. However, an important special case is handled easily.
In functional programming, the specification of many auxiliary functions is not
only executable but almost identical to the implementation. Figure 6.15 shows an
excerpt of the axioms given for the Spectrum specification of lists in [BDDG93],
namely the axioms for the length function (#) and the concatenation (++).
In these simple cases, there is no need to require that the user writes a separate
implementation and a separate justification. This is formal noise. It is more ap
propriate to skip an explicit implementation and just tell the compiler to re-use
the specification.
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#«» = 0;
#(x ~ s) = succ(#(s));
<> ++ s = s;
(x “ s) ++ t — x ~ (s ++ t);
Figure 6.15: Spectrum: The Specification of Some List Functions
The efficiency of synthesized implementations is another point of concern. But
experience shows that automatic development need not result in inefficient pro
grams. The Amphion system [LPPU94] synthesizes programs with “acceptable
performance” in a restricted domain area. The Kids system has been successfully
used to develop transportation scheduling algorithms that outperform tradition
ally developed programs [SP93],
Program synthesis differs from the other three methods in an important aspect.
The other methods require that the implementation exists and check whether it
meets its specification. It is possible to eliminate this check and run the compiler
without the justification component, just as it is possible to compile without
optimization for rapid prototyping. If program synthesis is employed as justifi
cation technique the situation is different. The existence of the proof is a pre
condition for the program. We are therefore committed to perform the justifica
tion.
6.5.1 Synthesis Techniques
The information available in our application is the specification of the function
to be implemented. Hence, we cannot use methods that try to deduct the imple
mentation from examples. This has been studied in the area of artifical intelli
gence for a long time and is still subject of ongoing research (see, for example,
[SW98]).
The general form of a specification for a function / is Vx*.Pre(x) => Post(x , /(x)).
We can either apply correctness preserving transformations to this formula, until
we arrive at a formula Vx • Pre(x ) => (/(x) = I( x ))- If l( x ) I s executable, we
can use I as the implementation for /. A short example, the development of an
implementation for the maximum segment sum problem (presented in [Gib94])
is shown in Figure 6.16.
A more general method is Constructive Programming [Hue95]. The function /
is unskolemized in the specification. This yields the theorem Vx • Pre(x) =£>
3 y • Post(x, y ). The point is that the proof must be done constructively, i. e. the
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mss — max o sum* o segs
= max o sum* o flatten o tails* o inits
— max o flatten o sum** o tails* o inits
= max o max* o sum** o tails* o inits
 = max o (max o sum* o tails)* o inits
= max o (id, ®) -f)* oinits
-- max o (id, ®) /»
Figure 6.16: The Development of Maximum Segment Sum
existence of a y is proven by producing a witness. This witness is used for the
implementation.
6.5.2 Implementation Aspects
The integration of a program synthesis tool into the compilation process poses
not more difficulties than the integration of the formal proof tool. The main dif
ference is that the result of a successful program synthesis must be inserted into
the abstract syntax tree. Since no additional checking is needed for automati
cally generated implementations we can easily insert the new implementation.
Figure 6.17 shows the structure of the compiler that has been extended by a
synthesis tool.
source code abstract syntax tree attributed a.s.t.
PARSER CONTEXT
CHECKER
program
synthesis
OPTIMIZER A CODER
optimized a.s.t.
- 0100110 ...
object code
Figure 6.17: The Integration of the Program Synthesis Component
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6.5.3 The Program Synthesis Component
The ability to support program synthesis is a by-product of the possibility to
perform formal proofs. We support the Constructive Programming approach. Let
Vx • Pre(x ) =r- Post(x, f(x)) be the general schema for a function specification.
If we find a constructive proof for this formula, we can use the witness for the
existence of a y for the implementation.
Figure 6.18 shows the structure of the synthesis component. The resulting func
tion is sent to the compiler as part of the “ ... ” in the type definition of resultF
(see Program 6.8).
U nskolemization Call Insertion
Interpreter + Theorem-Prover Lib
Figure 6.18: The Program Synthesis Component
No Example Opal/J has only tactics for the synthesis of simple functions
(without recursion), therefore we cannot present an example attempt to derive
 an implementation for the sort function.
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Chapter 7
Examples
We have presented three examples in the introduction to motivate the develop
ment of a compiler that supports justifications. The sort function served as a
running example in the previous chapter. This leaves two examples pending: the
instantiation of sets and the implementation of deques. We will make up for this
omission in this chapter, and complement these two examples with the imple
mentation of a colour data type. To balance the bias towards Opal/J we sketch
a small example in two other programming languages, Haskell and Java.
A longer Opal/J example, the proof of an implementation of the Sieve of Er
atosthenes, is contained in [Did99].
The emphasis in this chapter is not on the justifications. Instead, we want to show
how a correctness-aware compiler can assist in developing correct programs. We
expect that such a compiler detects the properties that are not fulfilled, and we
will see that the failed justifications also point the skilled engineer to the deeper
reasons for the failures.
7.1 Instantiation of Sets
This example shows how a compiler can detect errors in the instantiation of data
types, and thus prevent the user from committing errors that are difficult to find.
Before we can present the example, we want to define the environment of the
example, i.e. the Opal implementation of the set data type.
Part of the implementation of sets is shown in Program 7.1. The signature declares
in Line 4 that the parameter must obey the total ordering properties as defined
in the theory of total orderings (see Program 7.2).
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The implementation uses ordered sequences for the representation of sets. Line 3
defines the data type of sets with the constructor abs (short for “abstraction”)
and the selector repr (for “representation”). Line 4 declares that the visible sub
set of the data type (see Section 3.3.6) is characterized by the predicate ordered.
This entails proof obligations for the functions that are declared in the interface.
We will return to the subject of data-type implementation with junk elements in
Section 7.3.
Program 7.1 The Set Data Type
SIGNATURE Set [a, <] 1
sort a 2
FUN < : a x a -4 bool 3
ASSERT TotalOrderfa, <] 4
SORT set 5
FUN {} : set 6
fun incl: a x set -4 set 7
FUN in: a x set -4 bool 8
9
IMPLEMENTATION Set [a, <] 1
IMPORT Seqfo] COMPLETELY 2
DATA set == abs(repr: seq[a]) 3
visible set: ordered 4
FUN ordered : set -4 bool 5
DEF ordered(abs(0)) == true 6
DEF ordered(abs(x:: 0)) == true 7
DEF ordered(abs(x::y::R)) == x < y and ordered(y::R) 8
DEF {} == abs ( 0 ) 9
DEF incl(x, abs(0)) ==abs(x::0) 10
 DEF incl(x, abs(a::R)) == ... 11
DEF x inabs(O) == false 12
DEF x inabs(a::R) == IF x < a THEN false 13
IF a < x THEN x in abs(R) 14
ELSE true 15
FI 1617
The implementation of incl is omitted for lack of space, but the implementation
of in is given in Lines 12-16. The implementation exploits the fact that < is
 required to be a total order and that the representation of sets is done by ordered
sequences. The total-order property guarantees that the guards in Lines 13 and 14
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Program 7.2 The Theory of Total Orderings
THEORY TotalOrderfa, < : a x a -> bool]
SORT a
FUN < : a x a —> bool
y
X < z
LAW dfd == ALL X y. DFD X < y
LAW total == ALL xy. x<yORy<xORx =
LAW transitive == ALL x y z. x < y AND y < z =>■
LAW irref lexive == ALL x. NOT x < x
are defined and that a and x are equal, if the elements cannot be ordered by <.
The branch in Line 13 skips the rest of the set and returns false immediately,
because we know that the searched element cannot occur in the rest of the ordered
sequence.
7.1.1 Wrong Instantiation - First Attempt
For the example application we use the colour data type together with the or
dering on colours as shown in Program 7.3. We assume that the colour data
type is implemented with three constants red, green and blue, as shown later
in Program 7.11.
Program 7.3 An Ordering on Colours
SIGNATURE ColourOrd
IMPORT Colour ONLY colour
FUN < : colour x colour —> bool
IMPLEMENTATION ColourOrd
IMPORT Colour ONLY colour red green blue
DEF red < x == true [Y]
def green < red == false
DEF green < x == true [?]
DEF blue < x —- false
An example instantiation is shown in Program 7.4. The instantiation of Set with
 [colour, <] entails several proof obligations, because the Set interface contains
the requirement that the parameter meets the total-order properties.
The justification environment of ColourOrdAppl (see Figure 7.1) contains several
axioms that are imported from Colour and the ubiquitous BGOL, as well as the
proof obligations that are induced by the requirement assert TotalOrder[a:, <]
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Program 7.4 Wrong Instantiation of Sets
SIGNATURE ColourOrdAppl
IMPORT Colour ONLY colour
ColourOrd ONLY <
Set [colour, <] COMPLETELY [t]
ColourSetAppl.sign>jcheck-info env
Axioms:
{LAW inv_inv, LAW inv.fix, LAW in_incl[colour, <],
LAW inv_fix_green, Freetype[bool], Freetype[colour]}
Proof obligations:
Proof declarations:
{}
Extra proof declarations:
{}
Figure 7.1: The Justification Environment of ColourOrdAppl.sign
in signature Set. Since these proof obligations are not resolved, the compiler
issues error messages.
7.1.2 Justifying Total Order Properties
The only way to fulfil these proof obligations is to add an assertion of the total-
order properties for the < function from ColourOrd. The best place to add the as
sertion to is the interface of ColourOrd. The implementation must be augmented
with proof declarations and justifications for these assertions. Program 7.5 shows
the resulting source code.
Since the program of ColourOrd claims that the function < is a total order,
the instantiation in unit ColourOrdAppl is now (relative) correct. Of course,
the program as a whole is not globally correct. The problem shows up in the
justification of the implementation of ColourOrd.
The justifications are all done by formal proof. The tactic mlnduct performs
an induction proof, which degenerates to a complete case distinction for the
colour data type. The other tactics apply logical rules (rewriter30, tApartS)
or properties of the Opal language (opalR).
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Program 7.5 The Ordering on Colours With Assertion
SIGNATURE ColourOrd
IMPORT Colour ONLY colour
 assert TotalOrder[colour, <]
FUN < : colour x colour -4 bool
IMPLEMENTATION ColourOrd
DEF red < x == true |T]
DEF green < red == false
DEF green < x == true [?]
DEF blue < x == false
PROOFdfd: dfdjfalse Def[<] =» Lift[dfd]
JUSTF dfd == FORMALPROOF (mlnduct; rewriter30; opalR; rewriter30)
PROOFtotal: dfdjfalse Def[<] => Lift[total]
JUSTF total == FORMALPROOF (mlnduct; rewriter30; opalR;
rewriter30)
PROOFtransitive : Def [<] =>■ Lift [transitive]
JUSTF transitive == FORMALPROOF (mlnduct; tApartS)
PROOF irreflexive : Def [<] ==» Lift[irref lexive]
JUSTF irreflexive == FORMALPROOF (mlnduct; tApartS)
The proofs for definedness, totality and transitivity succeed, but the proof for
irrefiexivity fails. The final proof state (see Figure 7.2) exhibits the problem to
the justification engineer. There are two subgoals to be proven. Both have an
empty target list, because the initial target contained a negation. We find the
initial target as a premise §9 in both subgoals. Premises §0 - §8 originate from
the definitional equation of <.
The underlined premises represent the irrefiexivity (not x < x) for red and
green. And indeed, this is the problem with the implementation of the less func
tion on colours: irrefiexivity is violated for red and green and this results in the
problems sketched in the introduction.
7.1.3 Correction
The correction is simple in this case. We must ensure that the irrefiexivity prop
erty is valid for red and green as well. Since we used pattern-matching in the
implementation, we only have to add the patterns for the cases red < red and
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final proof state is:
<
CO]
targets: <>
premises: <§0 [(red < red)], §1 [(red < green)],
§2 [(red < blue)], §3 (green < red) === false,
§4 (green < green) === IF false THEN false ELSE true FI,
§5 (green < blue) === IF false THEN false ELSE true FI,
§6 (blue < red) === false, §7 (blue < green) === false,
§8 (blue < blue) === false, §9[(red < red)]>,»✓V/S/nA/WWWWWWvO^w *
[1]
targets: <>
premises: <§0 [(red < red)], §1 [(red < green)],
§2 [(red < blue)], §3 (green < red) === false,
§4 (green < green) === IF false THEN false ELSE true FI,
§5 (green < blue) === IF false THEN false ELSE true FI,
§6 (blue < red) === false, §7 (blue < green) === false,
§8 (blue < blue) === false, §9 [(green < green)]»
end of final proof state
Figure 7.2: The Final Proof State of the Irreflexivity Proof
green < green. The best-fit pattern-matching of Opal will create the correct
implementation.
Program 7.6 The Ordering on Colours - Corrected
IMPLEMENTATION ColourOrd
def red < red == false
DEF red < x == true
DEF green < red == false
DEF green < green == false
DEF green < x == true
DEF blue < x  == false
7.2 The Deque Example
Next, we study the failed implementation of the deque data type. Deques are
algebraically equivalent to sequences, but their run-time behaviour is different.
Deques allow (amortized) 0(1) access to the last element as well as to the first
element.
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The example in Program 7.7 has been augmented with respect to Program 1.4
in the introduction. The exist? function receives two arguments, a predicate
and a deque, and returns true, iff there is at least one element in the deque that
fulfils the predicate. The find? function is an extension of exist?: if there are
elements that fulfil the predicate, one of them is selected. The in function used
in the specifications of exist? and find? is omitted for lack of space.
The implementation defines deques as an abstraction of a pair of sequences
(Line 4). The CONG keyword in Line 5 is explained immediately in Section 7.2.1.
Lines 6-11 define the operations induced by the free type declaration in terms
of the implementation. The implementations of exist? and find? (Lines 16-
21) make use of the corresponding functions on sequences. Of course, we could
have used the simple definition def exist?(P,d) == exist?(P, asSeq(d)), but
 the implementation given here is more efficient, because we spare one call to the
concatenation function and one to the revert function.
 7.2.1 Data-Type Implementation
The data-type implementation of deques uses multiple representations. To make
this known to the compiler the declarations in Line 5 and the function definition
of asSeq (Lines 14-15) are necessary.
 Line 5 shows an extension to regular Opal. The declaration CONG deq: asSeq
has the semantics that two deques are considered to be observationally equal,
if both are mapped to identical values by asSeq, i. e. x = deq y iff asSeq(x) =
asSeq(y). (This means that the equivalence predicate demanded in Section 3.3.6
is all x y. asSeq(x) = asSeq(y).) This declaration entails proof obligations for
every function from the interface that contains the type deq in its functional
ity. Those functions must not distinguish between different representations of
observationally equal implementations.
We are interested in the congruence properties of exist? and find?, shown in
Figure 7.3.
Cong[exist?]
ALL a b b'.(asSeq(b) = asSeq(b / )) ==» (exist?(a, b) - exist?(a, b'))
Cong[f ind?]
ALL a b b'.(asSeq(b) = asSeq(b')) =>• (find?(a, b) = find?(a, b'))
Figure 7.3: Congruence Properties
A data-type implementation may also make use of junk elements, i. e. elements
 that do not correspond to any of the elements of the interface. We will deal with
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Program 7.7 Deques
SIGNATURE Deq[a] 1
import Optionfo] only option avail? nil? cont 2
sort a 3
TYPE deq == 0 4
:: (ft: o, rt: deq) 5
FUN exist? : (a —»• bool) x deq -» bool 6
 SPC exist?(P, d) == r 7
PRE true 8
POST r » EX I. P(x) AND x in d 9
FUN find? : (a —» bool) x deq —> optionfa] 10
SPC find?(P, d) == r 11
PRE true 12
POST (avail?(r) =>• cont(r) ind and P(cont(r))) and 13
(nil?(r) =$■ ALL x. x ind ==> NOT P(x)) 14
15
IMPLEMENTATION Deq[d;] 1
IMPORT Seq[o;] ONLY seq 0 :: ft rt 0? ::? 2
revert exist? find? last 3
DATA deq == abs(left: seq[a], right: seq[a]) 4
CONG deq: asSeq 5
def 0 == abs(0, 0) 6*****
DEF x::(abs(l,r)) == abs(x::l,r) 7
DEF ft(abs(x:: 1, r)) == x 8
DEF ft(abs(0,r)) == last(r) 9
DEF rt(abs(x::l,r)) == abs(l,r) 10
DEF rt(abs(0,r)) == abs(rt(revert(r)), 0) 11
DEF 0?(abs(l,r)) == (10?) and (r0?) 12
def ::?(abs(l,r)) == (1::?) or (r ::?) 13
FUN asSeq: deq -» seq[a] 14*
def asSeq(d) == left(d) HI- revert (right (d)) 15
DEF exist?(P, d) == 16
IF exist?(P, left(d)) then true 17*
ELSE exist?(P, right(d)) FI 18
DEF find?(P, d) == 19
IF avail?(f ind?(P, left(d))) THEN f ind?(P, left(d)) 20
ELSE f ind?(P, right (d)) [t] FI 21
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junk in Section 7.3; the implementation of deques does not make use of junk
elements.
7.2.2 Proof Obligations
The proof obligations for the implementation of deques (Program 7.7) are shown
in Figure 7.4. The proof obligations fall into three groups:
• the lifted formulas from the interface
• the closedness properties
 • the congruence properties
Proof obligations:
{Lift[Dfd[exist?]].Lift[Dfdffind?]].Lift[Spc[exist?]],
Lift[Spc[find?]].Lift[Freetype[deq]],
Closed[::],Closed[rt], Closed[<>],
Cong[::],Cong[::?],Cong[rt],Cong[ft],Cong[<>?] ,
Cong[exist?],Cong[find?]}
Figure 7.4: The Proof Obligations for the Implementation of Deques
In this example, most proof obligations can be justified. This includes the spec
ifications of exist? and find?. So we leave out the justifications of these proof
obligations and concentrate on the justifications for the congruence properties
Cong[exist?] and Cong[find?]. Congfexist?] is valid, but the justification of this
proof obligation helps in understanding the mistake in the definition of find?.
7.2.3 Justification
We plan to perform the justification by a formal proof. We start with the simpler
task of justifying Cong[exist?]. Program 7.8 shows the proof declaration and the
beginning of the proof tactic. The proof declaration uses the definitional equa
tions, several definedness properties and some properties of the exist? function
 on sequences. The properties are shown in Program 7.9.
The concatenation properties allow to add or remove parts of the sequence. The
two variants of law exist_conc2 are useful in different parts of the proof. Actu
ally, they are not equivalent: exist_conc2a follows from exist_conc2b. Finally,
LAW existjrevert states that the result of applying exist? is independent of a
previous revert.
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Program 7.8 The Justification of cong[exist?]
IMPORT SeqLawsja] completely
PROOF cong_exist: Def [asSeq] Def [exist?] dfd_exist dfdjrevert
SDfd[left] SDfd[right] exist_concl
exist_conc2a exist_conc2b exist_revert =>■
Cong[exist?]
JUSTF cong_exist == FORMALPROOF (rewrite_r_deep; rewrite_r_deep;...
Program 7.9 Some Properties of exist? on Sequences
LAW exist_concl == ALL si s2 P. exist?(P, si) =>• exist?(P, si HI- s2)
LAW exist_conc2a == all si s2 P. exist?(P, si) = false and
exist?(P, si HI- s2) ==>• exist?(P, s2)
LAW exist_conc2b == ALL si s2 P. exist?(P, si) = false ==>•
exist?(P, si HI- s2) = exist?(P, s2)
LAW exist_revert == ALL s P. exist?(P,s) = exist?(P,revert(s))
The implementation of find? is similar to the implementation of exist?, and
therefore we could expect that the justification of Cong[f ind?] might be easily
derived from the justification of Cong[exist?]. In collecting the premises for a
proof declaration cong_find, we detect that this is not the case. The concate
nation properties are valid for find? as well (with some small changes, because
exist? returns a Boolean value, and find? returns an option), but the result of
find? for a reversed sequence is in general different from the result of find? for
the original sequence. So there is no law find_revert that corresponds to the
formula exist_revert.
7.2.4 Correction
Without actually starting the proof, merely by inspecting the proof for a similar
function, we found a mistake in the implementation. The correction is simple: If
we cannot use the identity find?(P,s) = find?(P, revert(s)) during the proof,
we have to revert the sequence in the implementation. Program 7.10 shows the
correct implementation of the find? function. Note that this implementation is
still more efficient than DEF f ind?(P, d) == f ind?(P, asSeq(d)), because asSeq
contains an additional call to the concatenation function.
Program 7.10 A Correct Implementation of find? __
DEF find?(P,d) ==
IF avail?(f ind?(P, left(d))) THEN f ind?(P, left(d))
ELSE f ind?(P,revert(right(d))) FI
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7.3 The Colour Data Type
We continue the series of examples with the implementation of a data type
colour. This example is admittedly artificial. The purpose of this example is
twofold: On the one hand, the example serves to illustrate the implementation of
a data type with junk elements. On the other hand, this example illustrates that
it is not always enough or possible to prove the inclusion Incl[f] of a formula f.
Instead, it is necessary to prove Lift[f] (see Sections 3.3.5 and 5.4).
Program 7.11 shows the interface unit Colour.sign and the implementation
unit Colour. impl, which contain a data-type declaration and the declaration of a
function inv together with some properties. The inv function is specified by three
 properties: It is its own inverse (LAW inv_inv), it has a fixpoint (LAW inv_fix),
and the only fixpoint is green (law inv_f ix-green) 1 .
The colour data type is implemented by triples of real numbers. So we must
implement the constructors and discriminators from the interface in terms of the
implementation. This is done in Lines 4-6 and Lines 7-9 respectively. Line 10
contains the definition of the inv function.
Program 7.11 The Colour Data Type
SIGNATURE Colour 1
type colour == red green blue 2
FUN inv : colour —»■ colour 3
 law inv_inv == ALL x. inv(inv(x)) = x 4
LAW invjfix == EX X. inv(x) = X 5
LAW invjfix_green == ALL x. inv(x) = x =>• x = green 6
IMPLEMENTATION Colour l
IMPORT Real ONLY real 0 1-= 2
DATA colour == rgb(r:real, g:real, b:real) 3
DEF red == rgb(l, 0, 0) 4
DEF green == rgb(0, 1, 0) 5
DEF blue == rgb(0, 0, 1) 6
DEF red?(rgb) == r(rgb) = 1 and g(rgb) = 0 and b(rgb) = 0 7
DEF green?(rgb) == r(rgb) = 0 and g(rgb) - 1 and b(rgb) = 0 8
 DEF blue?(rgb) == r(rgb) = 0 and g(rgb) = 0 and b(rgb) = 1 9
DEF inv(rgb(r, g, b)) == rgb(l - r, g, 1 - b) [Y] 10
1 These properties uniquely determine the inv function.
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7.3.1 Proof Obligations
The proof obligations (as shown by the command j check-info env) are these:
Proof obligations:
Lift[LAW inv.inv].Lift[LAW inv_fix].Lift[LAW inv_fix_green],
Lift[Freetype[colour]].Closed[blue].Closed[green].Closed[red],
Closed[inv]
Figure 7.5: The Proof Obligations of Program 7.11
The proof obligations fall into two parts. The closedness properties ensure that
no junk is visible and the lifted formulas ensure that the implementation meets
the requirements from the interface. We explain these obligations in the following
two sections.
7.3.1.1 Representation of Colour
The implementation of a data type may contain “junk”, i. e. values that are not
accessible with functions from the interface, and it may use multiple representa
tions for the implementation of values. We have already seen the use of multiple
representations in the previous example.
The representation of the colour data type uses junk elements. Since colour is
a free type, the compiler is able to derive a predicate that describes the visible
(non-junk) part of the colour data type. The set data type requires an explicit
definition of the visible part, because set is not a free type. See Line 4 in the
implementation of set in Program 7.1.
Colour.impl>jcheck-info sorts
colour: visible(x) <=> [red?(x)] OR [green?(x)] OR [blue?(x)],
no multiple representations
 Figure 7.6: The Visibility Predicate for colour
The decision to implement the data type differently from the interface entails
additional proof obligations (see Section 3.3.6). The user must prove that the
functions in the interface are closed on the visible values. The closedness property
for the inv function is shown in Figure 7.7.
 Colour.impl>jcheck-info formula Closedfinv]
ALL a:colour, ([red?(a)] OR [green?(a)] OR [blue?(a)]) ==>
([red?(inv(a))] OR [green?(inv(a))] OR [blue?(inv(a))])
Figure 7.7: The Closedness Property for inv
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7.3.1.2 Included vs. Lifted Formulas
The second purpose of this example is to illustrate the relationship between in
cluded and lifted formulas. The peculiar laws have been chosen for this purpose.
In Figure 7.8 the inclusion and the lifting of the formulas from the interface are
shown; Lift[Freetype [colour]] has been omitted, because its representation is
too long. The underlined parts of the lifted formulas are those that restrict the
domain of the bound variable to the visible values.
LAW inv_inv
Incl
Lift
ALL X. inv(inv(x)) = X
ALL x. ([red?(x)] OR [green?(x)] OR [blue?(x)]) =^(inv(inv(x)) = x)
LAW inv_fix
Incl
Lift
EX x. inv(x) = X
EX x. ([red?(x)] OR [green?(x)] OR [blue?(x)]) AND (inv(x) = x)
LAW inv_f ix_green
Incl
Lift
ALL x. (inv(x) = x) => (x = green)
ALL x. ([red?(x)] OR [green?(x)] OR [blue?(x)]) =>
((inv(x) = x) => (x = green))
Figure 7.8: Inclusion vs. Lifting
 The relationship between included and lifted laws is different for the three for
mulas.
 inv_inv This is the “standard” case. The implication Incl[inv_inv] ==*>■
Lift[inv_inv] is valid 2 and the compiler detects this and adds an appropri
ate proof declaration. The user has two options: it is possible to justify either
Incl[inv_inv], which has the advantage of being syntactically equal to the law
 in the interface, or Lift[inv_inv], which might be easier to justify (because the
domain is restricted) but has a more complicated structure.
inv_fix The situation is different for the second law. The law Incl[inv_fix]
is valid, because inv has fixpoints: all members of the set {(0.5, x, 0.5)|x € i?}
are fixpoints of inv. The proof obligation Lift [inv _fix] states explicitly that
only fixpoints that are visible are to be considered. This proof obligation cannot
be fulfilled. This property shows that we cannot always add a proof declaration
Incl[f] =>• Lift[f] for an arbitrary formula f.
“The implication is always valid, if the only quantifier is a universal quantifier and no
negation is present.
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inv_f ix_green Finally, LAW invjfix_green states that if there is a fixpoint,
then this fixpoint is equal to green. In this case, the restriction to the visible
values is crucial. The formula Incl[inv_f ix_green] is not valid in the implemen
tation, but the lifted version Lift[inv_f ix_green] is valid.
7.3.2 Justification Attempt
A first attempt to justify that the implementation fulfils the requirements listed in
the interface unit is shown in Program 7.12. The formal proof for invjfix_green
requires some auxiliary lemmas and is omitted in this presentation. The intro
duction of LAW inv_f ix_i eases the formal proof of law inv_f ix.
Program 7.12 The Justification Attempt for inv-Related Proof Obligations
 PROOF inv.closed: =4- Closed[inv]
justf inv_closed == formaltest (inv, allGuards, */,(red, green, blue))
PROOF inv_inv: =>• Incl[inv_inv]
JUSTF inv.inv == FORMALTEST (inv, allGuards,’/.(red, green, blue))
LAW invjfix_i —= inv(green) = green
PROOF inv_fix_i : Def[inv] Def [green] dfd_0_real dfd.ljreal =>• invjfix_i
JUSTF invjfix.i == FORMALPROOF (rewriter30)
 PROOF inv_fix : inv_fix_i Lift[Discr[green, green?]] =» Lift[inv_fix]
JUSTF invjfix == FORMALPROOF (exjr; tApartS)
PROOF inv_fix_green: redX greenX blueX no_fix => Lift [inv jfix_green]
JUSTF invjf ix_green == FORMALPROOF ...
The error messages shown by the compiler point directly to the problematic
issues: The first error message indicates that the justification for inv_closed
failed for input data green. The result is “some' unprintable value. The second
 error message shows an unresolved subgoal of the formal proof of inv_f ix_i,
 which could be simplified further, but one can already recognize that the proof
will not succeed.
ERROR [Colour.impl at 81.7-81.16]: test failed for input
data no. 1 <some>
ERROR [Colour.impl at 88.7-88.15]: unfinished proof
unresolved subgoals are:
<rgb((1 - 0),1,(1 - 0)) === rgb(0,1,0)>
Figure 7.9: The Error Messages of the Failed Justification Attempt
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Both errors have the same reason: the inv function returns a wrong colour. Nei
ther holds the closedness property, nor is green a fixpoint of inv:
inv(green) inv(rgb(0,1, 0)) rgb(l — 0,1,1 — 0) rgb(l, 1,1) ?
This error can lead to cryptic behaviour. The function print in Figure 7.13
converts a value of type colour to a readable representation.
Program 7.13 Printing Colours
FUN print: colour —> denotation
 DEF print(red) == "red"
def print(green) == "green"
 DEF print(blue) == "blue"
Evaluating the expression print (inv(green)) will result in a run-time error mes
sage that complains about a “missing else in print”. The Opal compiler uses a
defensive translation scheme that inserts an additional else branch that generates
the error message. If the compiler is instructed to optimize aggressively, no else
branch is added, and the result of print (inv(green)) will be an arbitrary value,
which makes search for the error even more difficult.
7.3.3 Correction
The correction is not as obvious as it was in the previous examples. Still, it is not
 too difficult to come up with a correct implementation. Instead of inverting the
red and blue components separately, we swap the red and blue components (see
Program 7.14). After this change, all of the above verification tasks go through.
Program 7.14 The Colour Implementation - Corrected
implementation Colour
IMPORT Real ONLY real 0 1- =
DATA colour == rgb(r: real, g: real, b: real)
DEF red == rgb(l, 0, 0)
def green == rgb( 0 , 1 , 0 )
 DEF blue == rgb(0, 0,1)
DEF red?(rgb) == r(rgb) = 1 and g(rgb) = 0 and b(rgb) = 0
DEF green?(rgb) == r(rgb) = 0 and g(rgb) = 1 and b(rgb) = 0
DEF blue?(rgb) == r(rgb) = 0 and g(rgb) = 0 and b(rgb) = 1
DEF inv(rgb(r, g, b)) == rgb(b, g, r)
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7.4 Other Languages
To round off our presentation of examples, we conclude with two sketches in
languages other than Opal/ J. Both sketches deal with the problem of defining an
ordering relation on the colour data type. The examples are not fully equivalent
to Program 7.3 because we try to stay close to the spirit of the respective language.
The first of these sketches is written in Haskell [PH99]. Haskell is a general
purpose, purely functional programming language like Opal and ML, but with
some differences like lazy evaluation and type classes.
The second example is written in Java. With Java we present how a “literate
justification” might look in a non-functional programming language.
7.4.1 Haskell: Type Classes with Specifications
In Haskell type classes are used to introduce overloaded functions in a re
stricted, structured way [WB89]. A type-class declaration introduces the names
of the overloaded functions that must be supported by every type that is an in
stance of this type class. Types can be declared to be instances of type classes.
An instance declaration includes definitions of the overloaded functions declared
in the type class.
Program 7.15 shows the type classes Eq for types that have an equality function,
and Ord for types that have a total order 3 . Both type classes provide default
definitions for some functions. For example, type class Eq provides a default
definition for the /= (unequal) function. In the definition of Ord the functions <=,
<, >= and > are defined in terms of the compare function. For brevity we omit the
default definition of compare in terms of == and <= and the default definition of
max and min. The user must define either the compare function or the equal and
less-than function in order to make sensible use of the class Ord.
In principle there is no semantic meaning associated with type classes and the
overloaded functions. Of course we do associate certain algebraic properties with
a function named “<” and therefore it makes sense to add specifications to the
source code to make these hidden assumptions visible. Program 7.16 shows the
Ord type class with an additional specification of the compare function. The laws
 are introduced by their name, followed by a formula.
 The implementation of the Colour data type in Haskell is shown in Pro
gram 7.17. The first line declares the data type and the constructor functions,
followed by the definition of the function cmp and two instance declarations. The
3 Note that Haskell uses == and :: where Opal uses - and : and vice versa.
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Program 7.15 Haskell: The Eq and Ord Type Classes
class Eq a where
(==), (/=) :: a -> a -> bool
x /= y = not (x == y)
class (Eq a) ==> Ord a where
compare
«), «=), (>=), (»
max, min
x <= y = compare x y /= GT
x < y = compare x y == LT
x >= y = compare x y /= LT
x > y = compare x y == GT*I
: a -> a -> Ordering
: a -> a -> Bool
: a -> a -> a
Program 7.16 HASKELL: The Ord Type Class with Specification
class (Eq a) ==> Ord a where
-> Bool
compare : : a ->
(O, «=), (>=), (» : : a ->
max, min : : a ->
compare x y
I x == y = EQ
I x <= y = LT
I otherwise = GT
dfd
reflexive
symmetric
transitive
ail x y -> dfd compare x y
ail x y -> compare x y === EQ <=> x === y
 ail x y -> compare x y === LT <=> compare y x
ail x y z -> compare x y === LT &&
compare y z === LT ==> compare x z ===== LT
GT
7.4. Other Languages 121
function cmp need not be declared separately, its type is inferred from the defini
tions.
Program 7.17 Haskell: The Colour Data Type with Justifications
data Colour = Red | Green I Blue
cmp Red Red = EQ; cmp Green Red = GT; cmp Blue Red = GT;
cmp Red Green = LT; cmp Green Green = EQ; cmp Blue Green = GT;
 cmp Red Blue = LT; cmp Green Blue = GT; [T] cmp Blue Blue = EQ;
instance Eq Colour where x == y = cmp x y == EQ
instance Ord Colour where compare = cmp
DfdColour :: Def cmp ==> did
DfdColour = FormalProof {mlnduct; haskellR; tApartS}
ReflColour :: Def cmp ==> reflexive
ReflColour = FormalProof {mlnduct; haskellR; tApartS}
SymColour :: Def cmp ==> symmetric
SymColour = FormalProof {mlnduct; haskellR; tApartS}
TransColour :: Def cmp ==> transitive
TransColour = FormalProof {mlnduct; haskellR; tApartS}
The instance declaration entails proof obligations for the laws of the specifica
 tion. The lower half of Program 7.17 shows the additional proof declarations and
justifications. Haskell does not require to declare functions, but we have to add
proof declarations explicitly, because the unit correctness check depends on them.
Def cmp refers to the definition of the cmp function. The syntax of the justifi
cations assumes that FormalProof introduces a sequence of monadic commands
like the Haskell keyword do.
The definition of cmp violates the symmetricity law, because cmp Green Blue
and cmp Blue Green both evaluate to GT.
7.4.2 Java: Interfaces with Specifications
For Java we want to show how the ordering of the colour data type could be
checked. We have already given the definition of the Comparable interface in
Section 2.1.3, where the method compárelo is specified informally. Program 7.18
shows how the interface could be specified formally. We assume that the identi
 fiers declared within the laws are universally quantified (and avoid answering the
 question how existential or nested quantifiers should be written down explicitly).
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Program 7.18 Java: The Comparable Interface - with Specification
public interface Comparable {
public int compárelo(Object o)
/** Compares this object with the specified object for order. Returns
a negative integer, zero, or a positive integer as this object is less than,
equal to, or greater than the specified object.
 It is strongly recommended, but not strictly required that
(x.compárelo(y)==0) == (x.equals(y)). Generally speaking,
any class that implements the Comparable interface and violates
this condition should clearly indicate this fact. The recommended
language is “Note: this class has a natural ordering that is
inconsistent with equals.”
*/
public law symmetric(Object x, Object y) {
sgn(x.compárelo(y)) == -sgn(y.compárelo(x))
}
public law transitive(Object x, Object y, Object z) {
(x.compárelo(y) > 0 && y.compárelo(z) > 0)
implies x.compárelo(z) > 0
}
public law equivalent(Object x, Object y, Object z) {
x.compárelo(y) == 0 implies
(sgn(x.compárelo(z)) == sgn(y.compárelo(z)))
}
}
The colour data type is defined as a Java object in Program 7.19. Java does
not support enumeration types very well, therefore we defined the comparison
method in terms of the internal representation.
We tried to make the justification syntax fit into Java’s syntactic conventions.
The justifications start with the “type” of the justification, followed by the key
word justf. This is followed by the target law, in turn followed by the premises
(the definition of the method compárelo and laws on the double type). Finally
 the specific information for the justification is given. In our example, we use al
ways the same tactic: we start with an induction over the objects accessible to
 the public, apply some Java specific rules, and use simple logic to resolve the
proof.
The proofs of the transitivity law and the equivalence succeed, but the
proof of the symmetricity law fails. The result will be similar to the result
in Section 7.1.2, but this time the formula sgn(red.compareTo(green)) ==
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Program 7.19 Java: The Colour Data Type
class Colour implements Comparable {
private double red;
private double green;
private double blue;
private Colour(double red, double green, double blue) {
this.red = red; this.green = green; this.blue = blue;}
public static Colour Red = new Colour(1, 0, 0);
public static Colour Green = new Colour(0, 1, 0);
public static Colour Blue = new Colour(0, 0, 1);
 public int compárelo(Colour c) {
return (int) ((this.red + this.green + [?] 2 + this.blue * 4) -
(c.red + c.green * 2 + c.blue * 4));
formal proof justf symmetric(compareTo, doubleLaws)
{ mlnduct; javaR; tApartS; }
formal proof justf transitive(compareTo, doubleLaws)
{ mlnduct; javaR; tApartS; }
formal proof justf equivalent(compareTo, doubleLaws)
{ mlnduct; javaR; tApartS; }
}
}
—sgn (green. compareTo (red) ) will indicate the error committed in the imple
mentation.
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Security and Correctness Checks
The introduction of an interpreter as a tool in the compilation process
 causes a security risk. The interpreter is used for the implementation of
 external tools and for the execution of tested functions. The implementa
tion of external tools with the help of an interpreter poses only a low risk.
Of course the implementation of these tools might contain mistakes, but in
principle these tools can be trusted as much as the compiler itself can be
trusted.
But the execution of functions always involves a security risk, and even more
so, if the function was implemented by an unknown or untrusted programmer.
So it might happen that the execution of the tested function with some of the
test-data values has a malicious effect on the host system, such as deleting files
or compromising the user’s security.
So far we have ignored this issue, because we have concentrated on pure functional
languages, i. e. languages without side effects. If the compiler works properly, the
execution of pure functions cannot have malicious effects. But if our approach is
 transferred to a language with side effects, we must expect that programs expose
bad behaviour.
 Options to ensure that execution of untrusted software poses no risk fall into
 two categories: We may either prove before execution that the untrusted code is
secure, or we can monitor the program while it is executed in order to prevent it
from doing real damage.
We present the sandboxing technique, the Java byte-code verifier and the Proof-
Carrying Code approach, and then discuss how we can lower the security risks in
the Opal/J compiler.
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8.1 Sandboxing
The technique of monitoring the execution of the program is also known as “sand
boxing” . The sandbox metaphor describes the restricted access of the program to
the outer world. Any access to the area outside the sandbox (e. g. to the host’s
file system) is considered a harmful operation and inhibited.
Sandboxing is most easily implemented by interpreting the untrusted code. In this
case the interpreter is extended to not fulfil requests for dangerous operations by
untrusted sources. Another possibility is to insert run-time checks into native
code. While this has to be done at compile time, modern operating systems offer
a possibility to add checks dynamically by intercepting calls to functions from
dynamic libraries [BG99].
Sandboxing has become known as the technique that ensures security of Java
code, but has been employed before in multitasking environments. Processes run
ning in parallel should not interfere, but buggy programs might access or change
memory that belongs to other processes. The operating system must protect user
and - even more important - system processes from other, possibly hostile, pro
 grams. The Unix operating system allows to limit the memory size, the CPU
time of a process or the maximum size of a file that a process may create.
The advantage of the sandboxing technique is its feasibility. The disadvantages
are the overhead involved, because every instruction must be checked before it is
actually executed, and its coarse security model that excludes many applications.
8.2 The Java Byte-Code Verifier
The Java byte-code verifier is called whenever an untrusted applet is loaded.
The implementation as described in [LY97] splits the verification into four passes,
which are performed at different stages during loading, linking and execution of
an applet. Since it may not be assumed that the class file was generated by a
(friendly) Java compiler, the verifier must repeat some of the work that another
compiler already did.
Pass 1 roughly corresponds to a syntax check. When a class file is loaded, it is
checked for its basic format: correct magic number, proper length of attributes,
and so on. After this pass, the file is known to adhere to the class file structure.
Pass 2 is executed, when the class file is linked. During Pass 2, checks are made
that can be done without looking at the code array: the class structure must be
 well-built and the constant pool is checked for consistency.
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Pass 3 finally looks at the code. First the code is checked for consistency: branches
 are only allowed within the same method, branches may not target the middle of
 an instruction, and other conditions. Then, the typing of operands, method invo
cations and field accesses are checked, as well as proper access to local variables
and the operand stack, which must not over- or underflow.
The final Pass 4 is done when a type, method or field is used for the first time.
Only then the access permission and the existence of the method or the field in
 the given class is checked.
The notion of “verification” seems exaggerated, since there are no formally de
fined properties that are checked 1 . The only property that is actually checked
is the definedness of the (operational) semantics of the object code. From the
algebraic point of view, this is not an exciting property. For systems security this
is of course great progress. Many security holes exploit undefinedness properties,
e. g. accessing memory that does not belong to the own process, or deliberately
overflowing the stack.
The byte-code verifier checks “low-level” security properties, properties that can
be expressed on the object level. Security properties that deal with access to
certain files or services are not checked by the verifier, but are dealt with by the
sandboxing technique of the Java byte-code interpreter.
8.3 Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code [Nec97] is a recently developed mechanism by which a host
can determine whether code is safe to execute. The typical scenario consists of
the host, which will only execute code that adheres to the host’s safety policy,
 and of the programmer, who writes a program that is to be executed by the host.
Normally, it is the host, who must check that execution of the program is secure.
But without knowledge of the source code, it is very difficult to perform a proof
of security.
In the Proof-Carrying Code approach, it is the programmer, who generates a
“safety proof” [sic!] in addition to the object code, possibly with the help of the
compiler. This proof is bundled with the object code and sent to the code con
sumer. This corresponds to a certification, but certification only establishes the
authorship and relies on personal authority for the proof. In contrast, a safety
proof has nothing to do with authorship, but provides a greater degree of cor
rectness.
1 Once in [LY97] a “simple theorem-prover” is mentioned, but its activities during the veri
fication process are not further detailed.
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The code consumer can independently verify that the code obeys the necessary
safety properties. This verification is cheap because the proof has already been
produced. The verification process consists of mere proof validation: it checks
first, whether the proof is indeed a proof for the safety properties and second,
whether the proof matches the object code. The verification can also be trusted,
because the host need only execute a simple verifier of his own choice.
Some technical points have to be considered, e. g. the representation of proofs
[NL98bj. The approach has been used in several case studies, one of them being
the extension of ML by code written in C that does obey the ML type constraints
[Nec97].
8.4 Comparison of Byte-Code Verification and
Proof-Carrying Code
Both approaches, Java byte-code verification and Proof-Carrying Code, perform
their respective verifications on the object code; the source code is not available.
The checks performed necessitate the addition of information to the object code
about types, or objects, or loop invariants. This is a lot of valuable informa
tion about the source code - some Java byte-code disassemblers (Mocha) do
 a frighteningly good job in reconstructing source code from byte-code. It seems
that verification even of restricted areas needs most information of the source
code 2 .
The approach used by the Java byte-code verifier has the disadvantage that the
whole work must be performed by the host. The code producer is not required
in any way to help the verifier. Consequently, the information gathered by the
verifier is not as specific as in the case of Proof-Carrying Code. The JVM may
assume that the code does not compromise the security of the operating system.
High-level security is not handled by the byte-code verifier (but dealt with by the
sandbox approach).
The combination of a byte-code verifier and a sandbox interpreter is not enough
to guarantee secure execution. The code in Program 8.1 (published in [\an96])
demonstrates how ignoring implicit assumptions about methods can be exploited
for evil purposes. The applet class is defined with a (non-final) method stop,
intended to clean up after an applet exits, for example to kill threads created by
the applet. The hostile applet overrides the method stop with an empty body.
The JVM executing this applet has no means to stop the denial-of-service attack
started by this hostile applet.
 2 This development raises interesting questions concerning the protection of intellectual prop
erty.
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Program 8.1 A Part of Consume, java, an Hostile Applet
/* Create and start the offending thread in the standard way */
public void start() {
 if (wasteResources == null) {
wasteResources = new Thread(this);
wasteResources.setPriority(Thread.MAX_PRIORITY);
wasteResources.start();
}
}
/* We won’t stop anything */
public void stopO {}
 The Proof-Carrying Code approach offers a framework to deal with a denial-of-
 service attack. What is needed to defend against this kind of attack, is a formal
specification of the effects of stop in the Applet class, and a proof that this
specification is met by every overriding method.
Another advantage of the Proof-Carrying code approach is that the host has only
the cheap duty to check whether the proof supplied with the object code is indeed
a safety proof for the accompanying program. The proof is developed only once.
The JVM on the other hand will perform the byte-code verification every time
the program is executed.
 The partition into a proof and the object code provides another level of security.
It is not enough to change either the proof or the object code, both must be
changed consistently.
8.5 Application to an Integrated Interpreter
We must be able to handle two kinds of security problems that may occur using
the interpreter.
 • A denial-of-service attack: The function executed might not terminate or
 use too much memory or both.
• Execution of a malicious function : The malicious function could delete files,
compromise data bases, etc.
We can deal with a denial-of-service attack by restricting the (time and space)
resources we give to the interpreter. But if we restrict the resources too much,
 we will not be able to execute tested functions or to execute proof programs that
 do not expose bad behaviour but simply require more time or more memory for
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a successful execution. We have to find a balance such that (almost) all harmless
executions can be carried out, but harmful executions are stopped before wasting
too much resources.
Malicious functions can be executed in a sandbox. Since sandboxing lowers the
performance, only user-supplied functions should be run within the sandbox, but
not the external tools, such as the testing component or the theorem-prover.
The Proof-Carrying Code approach is not directly applicable, because in our ap
proach, it is the source code that carries proofs. The general model, however, can
be used in our framework as well. The customer provides a formal specification
of the desired safety properties as a part of the interface specification. The pro
 grammer provides a formal proof that the safety properties hold. The customer
can use the integrated compiler to check the safety properties.
If the source code should not be disclosed to the customer, we have to bring
in a trusted certification agency. The programmer sends the source code with
literate justification to the trusted certification agency. The certification agency
checks the safety properties. If the check succeeds, the certification agency certifies
the object code (e. g. by a digital signature) and returns this certified object
code to the programmer, who may sell the certified code without revealing the
source code.
If we follow this approach, the compiler would have to be extended to treat the
safety properties differently from other properties. First, the only justification
 method that is acceptable for safety properties, is a formal proof. Second, the
safety properties must be completely proven correct before any test is carried out.
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Related Work
 9.1 Languages
There are lots of programming languages and specification languages, but only
a few of them have actually been defined with the verification process in mind.
 This includes most specification languages that have a clear semantic definition of
 the specification constructs and also define correctness conditions. But this alone
 makes verification not necessarily easy, because the formulation of the correctness
conditions is not tailored towards easy verification.
We introduce two languages that have been designed as verifiable extensions to
existing programming languages.
9.1.1 Euclid
 The language Euclid [LHL + 77] is included here for historical reasons. Eu
clid was derived from Pascal “to make it more suitable for verification
[ ... ].” [PHL + 77] and it is this design objective that makes the language interest
 ing for our purposes. The authors “expect many of these changes [from Pascal
to Euclid] to improve the reliability of the programming process, firstly by en
larging the class of errors that can be detected by the compiler, and secondly
by making explicit in the program text more of the information needed for un
derstanding and maintenance.” The transfer of the verification process from the
programmer to the language and its compiler [PHL+77] is seen as a natural con
tinuation of the development of compilers.
 The language itself is as close to Pascal as possible; it was a design decision to
 change Pascal only where necessary, e. g. visibility of names, pointer handling.
A major addition is the introduction of “modules”, which serve in Euclid to
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introduce abstract data types. For verification purposes specifications and asser
tions can be inserted into a program. Boolean expressions are used as the basic
assertion language, other elements of the assertion language are defined by the
particular verifier. These extended assertions are inserted as comments and thus
hidden from the compiler. Proof rules for Euclid using a Hoare-style axiomatic
method have been published in [LGH+78]. One example procedure from the pa
per contains pre- and postconditions as part of a revised syntax. The correctness
of the following procedure is proven in an appendix of [LGH + 78].
procedure p(var a: signedlnt, b: signedlnt)=pre true; post a < 2 * b;
begin var c: signedlnt; c := 2 * b; if a > b then a c end if end.
The language authors’ confidence in formal verification earned them an attack
in [MLP79] as “foremost verification adherents”, especially their decision not to
include exceptions in Euclid - because “we expect all Euclid programs to be
verified” and “runtime software errors should not occur in verified programs”
(both [PHL + 77]) - was target of polemic comments. The authors of [MLP79] see
this as an example of the so-called “Titanic effect” (when failure does occur it
is massive and uncontrolled): “Errors should not occur? Shades of the ship that
shouldn’t be sunk”.
9.1.2 Extended ML
The work on Extended ML ([KST94], for a gentle introduction see [KST97])
closely resembles the approach presented in this thesis. Extended ML was
specifically developed as a framework for the formal development of ML software
 systems. Extended ML is therefore a wide-spectrum language suitable for ex
pressing all stages in the development of a ML program from the first high-level
specification to the executable program.
Just as Euclid was designed as a minimal extension of Pascal, Extended ML
was designed to be a minimal extension of ML. Syntactically, axioms are added
 to structures, e. g. to express partial orders (copied from [ST89]):
Axioms are expressions of type bool, the expression language is augmented with
quantifiers and keywords to express properties like termination and whether an
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evaluation raises an exception. Another extension is the introduction of place
holders that serve to omit concrete definitions for types and functions. These
placeholders are replaced with concrete implementations during program devel
opment.
The semantics of Extended ML consists of a static semantics for type-checking,
a dynamic semantics for evaluation - as with ML - and a verification semantics
for “verificating” [sic!] that the constraints imposed by the axioms are met. This
semantics does not define the proof obligations induced by development steps.
The definition of an extension to ML for specification purposes turned out to be
more difficult than anticipated [KS98]. From the very beginning most imperative
features were excluded from Extended ML (so it is not really an extension of
ML, but of a sublanguage of ML), but the features that remain - e. g. exceptions
- still pose problems in reasoning about ML. Other problems include the pos
sible mixing of formulas and Boolean expressions and dealing with behavioural
equivalence.
 An intricate problem is caused by an interaction between the type inference
algorithm of Extended ML and the fact that the validity of formulas may
depend on the type of quantification. Consider the following example:
type ’a dummy = bool
 val b: ’a dummy = forall (x, y: ’a) => x == y
In this example, a type ’a dummy (in Opal, one would write “dummy[a]”) is
introduced that is isomorphic to the type bool. Then, a constant b of this type
is defined; the value of this constant is determined by an axiom (remember that
axioms are expressions of type bool). If the constant b is applied somewhere, its
value depends on the type inferred for ’a. The value of b might be true or false,
and it is not always possible the reconstruct the exact type the type checker
infers 1 . Fortunately, this situation is rarely encountered. Extended ML handles
this problem by regarding axioms that contain type-dependent expressions as not
satisfied.
9.2 Verification Systems
Most proof systems are directed towards interactive proving of theorems written
in a specification or formula language tailored towards their specific logic. There
are some verification systems that allow the user to write specifications in a func
tional programming style and allow interactive reasoning about these functions.
Tor details, see [KS98].
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These systems support the development of proofs and allow the replay of previ
ously conducted proofs. The specifications are not intended to be run, however,
and the systems do in general not check verification conditions.
Pvs and the Kiv system have the most complete approach. They support a mod
ule system and manage proof obligations and proofs. Isabelle/HOL and Coq
have been written for different purposes, but can also be used to prove the cor
rectness of programs. STeP is a tool for the computer-aided formal verification
of reactive system, which is interesting for us, because it also supports differ
ent verification methods. A recently proposed development system for Haskell
cannot be classified due to lack of information.
9.2.1 PVS
Pvs [COR + 95] is a Lisp-based system for specification and verification of pro
grams. Pvs was not designed to prove programs correct, the purpose is rather to
help “in the detection of errors as well as in the confirmation of ‘correctness.’”
To this end, Pvs uses a rich type system, provides operators that are guaranteed
to preserve consistency and finally contains an effective theorem-prover.
Type checker and proof checker support each other. The type checker generates
type-checking conditions that stem from the use of predicate subtypes and de
pendent types that are then given to the proof checker. The (interactive) proof
checker in turn uses the type checker to ensure the well-typedness of the user’s
inputs. The proof support has been designed in a way that the tedious work of
proof is done by the system, while the system is still controlled by the user.
A small example specification taken from the tutorial:
sum: THEORY
BEGIN
n: VAR nat
sum(n): RECURSIVE nat =
(IF n = 0 THEN 0 ELSE n + sum(n - 1) ENDIF)
MEASURE (LAMBDA n:n)
closed_form: THEOREM sum(n) = (n * (n + l))/2
END sum
The measure function is used to generate a termination proof obligation. The
system generates two proof obligations for this specification. The first is due to
the fact that is not a total function 2 , the second expresses the termination
property.
2 Actually, Pvs functions expresses partiality by dependent types. In principle, all Pvs func
tions are total.
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7. Subtype TCC generated (line 7) for n - 1
7, unchecked
sum_TCCl: OBLIGATION (FORALL (n: nat): NOT n = 0 IMPLIES n -1 >= 0) ;
7. Termination TCC generated (line 7) for sum
7. unchecked
sum_TCC2: OBLIGATION (FORALL n: nat): NOT n = 0 IMPLIES n - 1 < n) ;
9.2.2 KIV
The Kiv (Karlsruhe Interactive Verifier) system [Rei95] is a tool designed for
the formal development of correct software systems. The formal development
starts with a formal specification written in a specification language that is
similar to Asl 3 . The components of the specifications are refined into inter
mediate specifications or, finally, into program modules. The implementation
is a collection of functional programs in a PASCAL-like notation. The com
 position operators are constrained in a way that ensures compositionality of
correctness.
 The proof obligations are expressed as sequents of Dynamic Logic (DL). DL
extends ordinary predicate logic by formulas ( 7r)0 (“if 7r terminates, cj) holds after
execution of 7r”) and [7r]0 (“7t terminates and 4> holds after execution of 7r”).
 The following formula expresses the property that SUCC and PRED are inverse
operations, if the condition nlz (“no leading zeroes”) is valid for the input:
nlz(a) h (SUCC(a : 6); PRED(6 : c))c = a
 The main strength of the Kiv system is the elaborated verification support.
Kiv pursues an evolutionary verification model that aids the development of a
software module from the first erroneous version to a correct module. Changes
made to either specifications or programs are analyzed for the effects to previous
verification attempts. The failed proofs are reused in the construction of the new
proof in the next development step. If this is not possible, the proof has to be
completed interactively.
The Kiv system has been used in several case studies and projects. A list of some
recent applications is contained in [RSS97].
3 Asl is a kernel specification language. See [Wir90, Section 9.3] for a short description andfurther references.
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9.2.3 Isabelle/HOL
Isabelle is a ML-based meta-tool for the development of provers that allows
to implement one’s own syntax for the object language and to define the rule
system of the logic to be used in the proofs. Isabelle has been widely used to
provide a proof environment for particular object logics. We have already dis
cussed in Section 6.4.4.2 the role of Isabelle as a reference implementation for
the theorem-prover component of Opal/J. The Isabelle system has also been
used for test-case generation in the Espress project [HNS97],
In this section, we do not want to discuss the generic theorem-prover Isabelle,
we rather want to introduce Isabelle/HOL [Nip98], which is one of several
object-logics distributed with the Isabelle environment (other logics are e. g.
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory or constructive type theory).
Isabelle/HOL implements higher-order logic that can be used as an environ
ment for specifying functional programs and verifying properties of these. The
language of Isabelle/HOL is similar to ML or Haskell; it supports polymor
phic types, data-type definitions and the usual constructions for expressions. As
example, we present the definition of lists (see [Nip98]):
datatype 1 a list = Nil (" □ ")
1 Cons ’a (’a list) (infixr "#" 65)
cousts app : ’a list => J a list => ’a list (infixr "®" 65)
primrec
" □ ® ys = ys"
"(x # xs) @ ys = x # (xs ® ys)"
A proof of associativity is short thanks to the sophisticated tactics supplied with
the system. The user has to issue the following three commands:
Goal "(xs ® ys) ® zs = xs ® (ys ® zs)”;
by(induct_tac "xs" 1 );
by(Auto_tac);
It is possible to turn these commands into a single ML function that may be
evaluated again, if the definition changes. There is no possibility, however, to
automate this process. There are some syntactic (priority of if-then-else)
and semantic properties (functions must be total) that make the unreflected
use of Isabelle/HOL for proving properties of programs problematic. Because
Isabelle/HOL can be changed and extended within the Isabelle environment,
it should be possible to derive an object-logic for a specific programming language
on the basis of Isabelle/HOL.
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9.2.4 Coq
The Coq system [BBC + 00a] is a proof assistant for the Calculus of Inductive
Constructions. This proof assistant allows to extract programs from proofs via a
strong extraction function, which forgets the non-computational parts of a proof.
The result is a functional program in an ML dialect.
In [Par95a, Par95b] this approach is (almost) reversed to synthesize proofs from
programs. The strong extraction function is non-reversible, but it is possible to
define a weak extraction function that keeps enough information in the final
program so that the reconstruction of the corresponding proof term is possible.
The following example shows the result for a division algorithm that returns
quotient and remainder:
let rec div a b =
match a with
0 -> { (0 = 6*0 + 0) A (6 > 0) }
(0,0)
I n+1 -> { 3 q,r(n = b * q + r) A (b > r)3 q,r(n + 1 = b * q + r) A (b > r) }
let (q,r) = div n b in
{ (n + l = b* q + r) A (b > r) }
if b<=(r+l)
then { (n + 1 = b * (q + 1) + 0) A (b > 0) }
(q+ 1 , 0 )
else { (n+l = 6*5 + r + l)A(ft>r + l) }
 (q,r+l); ;
The result resembles a program annotated with axioms in the Floyd-Hoare cal
culus, only this time a functional program is annotated. The similarity goes even
further, e. g. there is a “weakest specification” that roughly corresponds to a
weakest precondition. The approach has been implemented as a tactic in the
Coq system.
9.2.5 STeP
The Stanford Temporal Prover, STeP [MBB + 99], is a tool for the computer-aided
formal verification of reactive systems, including real-time and hybrid systems,
based on their temporal specification.
Figure 9.1 presents an outline of the STeP system. We recognize that the sup
port of various verification systems plays a central role in the design of STeP:
There are algorithmic, deductive-algorithmic and deductive methods available.
According to the STeP tutorial [BBC + 00b], “STeP is best viewed as providing
a toolkit of verification methods [ ... ]. A given system can be analyzed in a
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number of ways. Depending on the system and property to be proved, different
tools will be applicable or appropriate.”
Hardware
Description DiscreteSystem Real-TimeSystem HybridSystem
Transition System Temporal specification
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Algorithmic
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Figure 9.1: An Outline of the STEP System
Many of the components have been implemented as external components. This
allows the use of different implementation languages for these components (C
and ML) as well as the interaction of STeP with third-party theorem-provers.
9.2.6 Haskell
Recently, in [JonOO], a “new kind of program development environment” has been
proposed that will “allow programmers to assert properties of program elements
as part of their source code.” The system is designed in a way that supports a
“wide range of validation options”, from automated testing to formal methods. A
suite of “property management” tools will support the user in the management
and development of validations.
The general objective of the system is quite similar to our approach. The de
scription in [JonOO] is rather terse, a comparison to our approach is therefore
difficult. The existence of separate property management tools suggests that the
environment is formed by the aggregation of several tools, and not by integrating
support for justifications into the compiler.
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9.3 Software Engineering
Software engineering typically defines the activity of verification and validation to
be separate from the activity of producing the code. The following two methods
put more emphasis on the simultaneous development of proofs and programs.
9.3.1 The B Method
The B method [Abr96] is a method for specifying, designing and coding software
systems. The method starts from a non-executable specification that is refined
by one of three refinement techniques into executable code. The refinement tech
niques are removal of non-executable elements from the specification, introduction
of control structure, and transformation of data structures. Each of the steps is
accompanied by correctness proofs. The final result is imperative code, written
for an abstract machine. This code can then be easily translated to an imperative
programming language.
The B method has been used for the industrial development of safety-related
software systems (e. g. by GEC-Alsthom, see the foreword of [Abr96]). Tools for
software development with the B method are commercially available [B95]. The
B-Book [Abr96] contains several examples, e. g. a steam-boiler control system;
unfortunately the only properties used in these examples are typing invariants.
The following piece of source code is part of the steam boiler example:
MACHINE
Service-LA
SEES
CycleJWA, CycleJSA, ConstantsSW-1
VISIBLE-VARIABLES
11m, lrm, lr, lml, lmh, Id, lch, lfm, lok, ltk, eqs
INVARIANT
lim, lrm, lr € BOOL x BOOL x NAT A
lml, lmh, Id, lch 6 NAT x NAT x NAT x NAT A
lim, lrm, lr G BOOL x BOOL x BOOL x BOOL
OPERATIONS
equipment-test A
BEGIN
eqs := bool (ltk = true A stk = true A wtk = true A
(lok = true V sok = true))
END
END
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9.3.2 The Korso Method
In the Korso project a method was developed for the development of correct
software [PW95]. The method is designed to cover all phases of the software de
velopment, starting with requirements engineering to the development and main
tenance of software. Correctness is a relation between two software units. Three
types of units are distinguished: Language units, property units and justification
units. Property units contain additional information (e. g. algebraic properties)
that cannot be expressed within the chosen language. Justification units provide
evidence for the correctness of single units or a relation between units.
Software development is represented in a development graph. The nodes of the
development graph are units, relations between units are edges in the develop
ment graph. The development proceeds in development steps that change the
development graph. Figure 9.2 shows an example. On the left-hand side, a unit
A uses another unit B connected by a used-by relation a. The unit B has been
developed by an development step q to B ’. The unit A shall use this newly de
veloped unit B> instead of B. On the right-hand side we see the result: unit A is
developed by a derived development step q' to a unit A ’, which now is related to
B ’ by a used-by relation a'. Note that the development step o' has a justification
J attached. Further development steps and example developments can be found
in [PBDD95] and [BDDG93],
Figure 9.2: KORSO: The Development Step Change-Import
The Korso method is interesting for two reasons. One is the introduction of
justification units. This indicates that justifications are regarded as an integral
part of a software project (a “first class citizen”), the same as specification and
program. Justification units can be developed in the same way (of course by
different steps) as the other units. The other characteristic feature is the inclusion
of formal, semi-formal and even informal documents in the development process,
which is complemented by the introduction of formal and pre-formal development
steps.
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Further Topics
In this thesis we concentrated on the architecture of a compiler with integrated
support for justifications. So we had to leave out the treatment of some interesting
topics, which are presented briefly in this chapter.
10.1 Language Design
The design of a language always raises arguments about semantic and even more
about syntactic issues. We do not want to anticipate a discussion or present one
possible design, but we would like to only draw attention to some specific points.
The difficulty of defining a language like Opal/J originates from the need to
support specification, programming and justification. For the design of a specifi
cation and - to a lesser extent - also for the design of a justification language,
we can reuse existing examples, but the integration with a functional language
poses new challenges.
Opal/J does not augment the functional language Opal, it merely adds a speci
fication and a justification language and defines the specification and justification
semantics for the existing language. So we have to define the specification part of
the semantics for the “worst-case” situation. Unfortunately this leads sometimes
to awkward situations.
We describe one problem in more detail, namely the declaration of free types.
Some other areas are only briefly discussed.
Declaration of Free Types To illustrate this example, we compare the free
types of heaps and Boolean values. Free-type constructors are not necessarily
total functions. The free-type constructor for heaps is indeed partial: the top
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value and the left and right sub heap must together form a valid heap again 1 .
Hence, we cannot generate definedness axioms for free types automatically. The
appropriate definedness axioms have to be added explicitly by the user. This is to
be expected for the heap type - where it is fine - but we cannot generate axioms
DFD true or dfd false for bool either, which is very annoying.
Program 10.1 Definedness Axioms and Free Types
type bool == true
false
LAW Dfdftrue] == DFD true
LAW Dfd[false] == dfd false
type heap == empty
node (top: a, left: heap, right: heap)
LAW Dfd[empty] == DFD empty
LAW Dfd[node] ==
ALL d L R. ((node?(L) =4> t < top(L)) AND (node?(R) =$■ t < top(R)))
=>• DFD node(t,L, R)
Since most free types do have total constructors, the obligation to add these
definedness laws explicitly can be become very tiresome. So it would be nice to
have total constructors as the default, with a new keyword to designate partial
constructors (with explicit definedness conditions).
Program 10.2 Total and Partial Free Types
type bool == true
false
partial type heap == empty
node(top : a, left: heap, right: heap)
 LAW Dfdjempty] == DFD empty
LAW Df d[node] ==
ALL d L R. ((node?(L) => t < top(L)) AND (node?(R) => t < top(R)))
=> DFD node(t,L, R)
Declaration of Functions Modern specification languages like Z or B intro
duce a lot of notations for the declaration of functions (different arrows) that
allow to specify at the same time other properties of the declared function, such
as partiality, surjectivity, etc. In functional programming (or other specification
languages) these distinctions are not made. Proving might be easier, though, if
a function is known to be total, so it might be worth to introduce additional
syntax.
1 Obviously, the constructor is of limited use for this type. But the free type declaration
 allows the use of selectors, discriminators and pattern matching.
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Axiom vs. Theorem In specifications, the role of formulas for proving is not
important. Models have to satisfy all these formulas and it does not matter
whether some formulas are consequences of others. For proving, the difference
between axioms and theorems is important, however. Axioms must be proven
to be non-contradictory, which is a difficult task, and often deferred. If finally a
model of the axioms is developed, the proof that the model does fulfil the axioms
has as a corollary the consistency of the axioms.
There is some controversy whether formulas should be designated as axioms or
as theorems. Often there is more than one possible set of axioms for a given set
of formulas, and there is the opinion that the specifier should not restrict the
choice for the later verification. However, if the justification is part of the unit,
the choice should be recorded in the source code.
Pathological Cases There are some pathological cases that must be handled
by the language definition. Empty sorts are a well-known example. If a bound
variable ranges over an empty sort, the whole formula is true, which can lead
to counterintuitive results. Another pecularity concerns the bottom completion
of types to handle undefinedness. Consider the function space (t± —> tf±)± of
functions that map values of type t± to values of type t'± . There is a subtle
difference between the bottom element of the function space T t± ->t' ± and the
everywhere undefined function U defined by U(x) i—> _L t > for all x.
These pathological cases can be circumvented by additional context conditions.
Isabelle/HOL solves the problem of empty sorts this way: the user is required
to provide a witness for every sort. For Opal/J this is not an option, because
empty sorts are not forbidden now in Opal. If we add such a context condition
to Opal/J, it would no longer be a proper extension of Opal.
10.2 Justification Support
10.2.1 Proof Obligations for Data-Type Implementation
From the examples presented in Chapter 7 we can conclude that the automatic
check of the correctness of data-type implementations is an important advantage
of a correctness-aware compiler. Unfortunately, there are a lot of proof obligations
generated to check the congruence and the closedness properties. The compiler
should be able to recognize important special cases, so that only the necessary
proof obligations are constructed.
Let T be the type declaration from the interface and T' the type implementation.
Then some special cases are:
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• T and T' are identical. No proof obligations are neces s ary.
 • T is a free type. The visibility predicate can be generated by the compiler.
• There is an isomorphism i:T <^T'. The user must prove the isomorphism
property, but no other proof obligations are necessary.
• T is a free type and T' is an extension of T by additional constructors. The
congruence properties need not be proven.
It remains to be seen which special cases are important for practical software
development.
10.2.2 Test Heuristics for Functional Programs
Testing imperative programs is well-studied, but the notions, algorithms and
heuristics do not always carry over to the area of functional programming. Of
course, black-box testing is independent of the implementation and the pro
gramming language used and techniques developed for black-box testing are
directly applicable. However, black-box testing should be complemented by
implementation-dependent white-box testing. White-box testing functional pro
grams requires a re-examination of the notions developed for testing imperative
programs.
Higher-order functions pose another challenge to the testing of functional pro
grams. First, it is not clear how the heuristics used for flat data types carry over
to function spaces; so the definition of test cases is difficult. Second, the gener
ation of functions as test data for higher-order arguments is non-trivial. Finally,
the check whether functions fulfill certain properties, e. g. during test evaluation
or an automatic check of test data with respect to the test-case predicates, is in
general undecidable.
Parameterization and polymorphism introduce an additional problem. Polymor
phic functions are not executable and hence, not testable. Before testing poly
morphic functions, one has to choose an instance, but this instance has to be
chosen with care. We have seen in Section 9.1.2 that the validity of a formula
may depend on the instance chosen. So one instance will in general not suffice.
For parameterization the same considerations hold, with the added complexity
that also functions may be parameters.
10.2.3 Tacticals for Batch Proofs
The tacticals found in existing theorem-provers are often not suited for the con
struction of batch proofs. Information about the origin of formulas is not pre
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served. This is not important for interactive proofs, where the user knows about
the significance of the various formulas. But batch proofs and interactive proofs
have different requirements.
For illustration, consider the nested induction proof for the commutativity of +:
LAW commu == all xy. x + y = y-fx. The basic tactical allows only for
induction on a single variable, which results in the following proof state:
targets: <§0 (ALL y. 0 + y === y + 0) AND
(ALL pred_4_c. ALL y. succ (pred_4_c + y) === y + succ (pred_4_c) )>
premises: <§0 ALL Y_6. 0 + Y_6 === Y_6,
§1 ALL pred_4_a0 Y_6. succ(pred_4_a0) + Y_6 === succ (pred_4_a0 + Y_6)>
The premises are the definitional equation of +, the targets are the result of
induction after the first variable x. For the nested induction, we must apply the
induction tactic for both occurrences of y, but not for the variable pred_4_c. This
is easily achieved in an interactive proof, because the user has the knowledge
which variable the induction should be carried out. But in a batch proof all
variables are treated equally, and it is not possible to restrict the application of
the induction rule to the proper places.
In the tactics library for Opal/J, we introduced a tactic (mlnduct) that applies
simultaneous induction to all variables at once. The resulting formula is long and
very complicated and not suited for interactive proofs, but in batch proofs this
is no obstacle.
10.2.4 Debugging Proof States
The example proof states shown in Chapters 6 and 7 do exhibit the reasons for
the mistakes made, but on the other hand one recognizes that a lot of skill is
needed in the interpretation of the formulas. Consider the proof state shown in
Figure 6.14 on Page 99. It is important not to be intimidated by the number
of formulas, and to be able to classify formulas: some are given explicitly, some
result from definitional equations, and others represent the induction hypotheses
and induction targets.
Some requirements for a user interface of a debugger turned up during the devel
opment of the example justifications.
• Navigation through the formal proof is a basic requirement for debugging
proof states.
• We need to have two representations for a formula: First, the low-level
representation, i. e. the exact structure of the formula, but second, also a
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higher-level description is needed that describes the “meaning” of a formula,
e. g. “induction base case #2”.
• Another important piece of information is the “history” of a formula, i. e.
the sequence of tactics that introduced the formula into the proof state.
• Some kind of selective display of sequents is needed, because the textual
representation of a full proof state is very long 2 .
• Highlighting the redex of a tactical and the changed formulas in the follow
ing proof state helps understanding how the theorem-prover works.
Opal/ J uses the Em ACS editor with a dedicated mode and achieves some of the
above goals. The mode differentiates with different colours between formulas that
were part of the goal (like law ascending_0 and the formulas that are derived
from the free type property), and those formulas that were introduced during
the proof. Opal/J supports higher-level representations at least for the initial
formulas of a proof.
A more sophisticated graphical user interface has additional possibilities. We
might change the representation of a formula on a mouse click, and might also get
 more information about the history of a formula. Very important is the possibility
of a graphical representation of a proof; the user interface of Kiv can serve as
an example. The textual representation of a formal proof is necessarily linear, a
graphical user interface could reconstruct the tree structure of a proof and thus
facilitate the understanding of the proof.
10.3 Miscellaneous
10.3.1 Semi-Formal Specifications
The justification methods presented in Section 6 consist of formal, semi-formal
and informal methods. This classification carries over to specifications. Most often
specification implicitly means formal specification, but of course semi-formal and
informal specifications have a place in software development, too.
The support of semi- and informal specifications is difficult for several rea
sons. These kinds of specifications are often centred around graphical notations,
whereas formal specifications and programs are linear text. The handling of
graphical notations is not standard in usual compilers, the combination of linear
text and graphical notations requires different editors.
2 The full representation of a formal proof can easily exceed several thousand lines.
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Another difficulty is the integration of semi-formal and informal specification
techniques into the semantics of the programming language 3 and to handle the
development of informal and semi-formal software units (see also [Hufi95, Hu697]).
Typical issues concern the development of semi-formal specifications, the imple
mentation of programs with respect to a semi-formal specification, and, most
important, the justification that an implementation conforms to a semi-formal
specification.
10.3.2 Optimization
Up to now our only concern was ensuring the correctness of the final software
product, but “Specifications Can Make Programs Run Faster” [Van93], i.e. spec
ifications can also be useful to enhance the efficiency of the generated programs.
In functional programming, the most important optimizations concern transfor
mation of recursion to tail recursion that can be translated to iterative loops
in the compilation process. [BW82] and [Par90] contain transformations like the
one in Figure 10.1, which have algebraic application conditions. If these applica
tion conditions are available - e. g. because the programmer included appropriate
justifications - the compiler is able to generate more efficient code.
DEF f (x) == IF b(x) THEN h(x) ELSE k(x) o f (k'(x)) FI
Application condition: o is associative and has a neutral element 0
def f (x) ==f'(0,x)
DEF f'(y, x) == IF b(x) THEN y o H(x) ELSE f'(y o k(x), k'(x)) FI
Figure 10.1: The Simplification Rule of Linear Recursion
These considerations also hold for imperative programs. [Van93] describes a pro
totype compiler for a small imperative language that uses specifications to help in
side effect analysis, constant subexpression elimination and other optimizations.
3 We do not want to give a formal semantics to graphical specifications (though that would
be an interesting topic, too), because that would not be a semi-formal specification anymore.
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Conclusion
We have presented an approach for the integration of correctness checks into the
compilation process. The integration of correctness checks encourages a develop
ment style that views correctness checks as a natural part of software develop
ment. If correctness checks are performed by separate tools, there is always the
danger that these tools are not fully compatible to the compiler, and the tempta
tion to omit the correctness check because the software product must be finished
fast is often irresistible.
We summarize the most important features:
• We support different methods of justification, most notably formal testing
and formal proofs. Often only a single method is used during the devel
opment of correct software. In our view, different justification methods are
not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. The support for different
justification methods allows the user to choose the appropriate justification
method for different situations.
• Justification support is integrated into the compilation process. In the de
velopment of compilers, more and more correctness checks have been au
tomated and integrated into the compiler, from the check for unreachable
code to parameter type mismatches. We see the integration of justification
support as a natural extension of a compiler’s tasks.
• Our approach advocates literate justification , i. e. the justification is em
bedded in the source code. Related information is kept together. The devel
opment of specification, implementation and justification can be performed
in parallel. Since the user develops the justification, the compiler need only
check the justification. This makes the approach feasible; an automated
computation of justifications is too expensive.
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• The semantics of a unit is an algebraic specification S = ( S , OP, F). A pro
gramming unit is correct, iff its semantics is a consistent algebraic specifica
tion. Correctness can be proven by constructing a model or by an algebraic
relation. The first method is chosen for units that are translated to object
code, the latter is used to prove correctness for interface units.
• The most important relation is the implementation relation. The algebraic
definition suggests that formulas from the implementation are inserted as
theorems into the interface. We propose instead to add the lifted formulas
of the interface to the implementation.
• The user declares for each proof obligation separately the axioms that are
used to prove it. These proof declarations are part of the source code.
• Units are developed independently. Our notion of relative correctness trans
lates this principle to the semantic level.
• The justification component is an analysis phase and should be inserted
between the context checker and the optimizer. Phases of the justification
component are: collection of formulas, unit correctness check, and justifica
tion correctness check.
• The implementation of the testing component requires the integration of
an interpreter. The interpreter enables the compiler to perform the test
execution before the object code has been generated.
• The implementation of the formal-proof component can use a third-party
theorem-prover or a specialized theorem-prover. We suggest to implement
the theorem-prover as a library in the compiled language. This allows the
implementation of a theorem-prover that can be controlled by the user in the
same language that is used for the implementation. Our experience shows
that the cost for the implementation is similar to that for the adaptation
of an existing theorem-prover.
The approach does not depend on the compiled language being a functional pro
gramming language, but it does favour the functional paradigm. The algebraic
semantics is close to the programming language, literate justification is easier to
integrate and security concerns raised by the integration of an interpreter espe
cially for test execution are not so serious for a (pure) functional programming
language. However, these considerations do not prohibit the transfer of our ap
proach to other languages. Java, with its security model, might be a suitable
candidate.
A compiler with integrated justification support cannot replace thorough treat
ment of verification and validation throughout the software development pro
cess. Still, the integrated justification support aids software engineers. Experi
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ence shows that support for justification checks helps us to avoid some nasty and
cryptic errors. Two of the examples in Chapter 1 were inspired by real-life bugs
that it took several days to track down.
A compiler that checks algebraic context conditions extends the options for lan
guage developers and software programmers. Currently, algebraic specifications
are rarely used. Opal’s support for data-type implementation with junk ele
ments and multiple representations is still an exception. Because the violation of
the application conditions is not checked but can lead to cryptic errors, algebraic
context conditions must be used with caution. A compiler with integrated sup
port for justification checks makes the use of algebraic conditions more agreeable,
because errors are checked at compile time and we can benefit from the enhanced
possibilities.
150
Bibliography
[Abr96] Jean-Raymond Abrial. The B-Book. Cambridge University Press,
1996.
[AH77] Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken. The Solution of the Four-
Color-Map Problem. Scientific American, 237(4):108-121, October
1977.
[B95] B-Core (UK). The B-Toolkit Demonstration. In Peter D.
Mosses, Morgan Nielsen, and Michael I. Schwartzbach, editors, TAP-
SOFT ’95 Proceedings, LNCS, pages 805-806. Springer, 1995.
[BBC + 00a] Bruno Barras, Samuel Boutin, Cristina Cornes, Judicaël Courant,
Yann Coscoy, David Delahaye, Daniel de Rauglaudre, Jean-
Christophe Filliâtre, Eduardo Giméneza, Hugo Herbelin, Gérard
Huet, Henri Laulhère, César Muñoz, Chetan Murthy, Cather
ine Parent-Vigouroux, Patrick Loiseleur, Christine Paulin-Mohring,
Amokrane Saïbi, and Benjamin Werner. The Coq Proof Assistant,
Reference Manual, Version 6.3.11. Technical report, INRIA Rocqen-
court, May 2000.
[BBC + 00b] Nikolaj Bjorner, Anca Browne, Michael Colon, Bernd Finkbeiner,
Zohar Manna, Henny Sipma, and Tomas Uribe. Verifying Temporal
Properties of Reactive Systems: A STeP Tutorial. Formal Methods
in System Design, 2000.
[BDDG93] Ralph Betschko, Sabine Dick, Klaus Didrich, and Wolfgang
Grieskamp. Formal Development of an Efficient Implementation of
a Lexical Scanner within the KorSo Methodology Framework. Tech
nical Report 93-30, TU Berlin, October 1993.
[BG99] Robert M. Balzer and Neil M. Goldman. Mediating Connectors:
A Non-By Passable Process Wrapping Technology. In Information
Survivability 99, 1999.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
[BH96]
[BH98]
[BW82]
[CEW93]
[Cla91]
[COR+95]
[DF94]
[DFG+94]
[Did92]
[Did99]
[DK96]
[EEC85]
Michel Bidoit and Rolf Hennicker. Behavioural Theories and the
Proof of Behavioural Properties. Theoretical Computer Science
165(l):3-55, 1996.
Michel Bidoit and Rolf Hennicker. Modular Correctness Proofs of
Behavioural Implementations. Acta Informatica, 1998.
F.L. Bauer and H. Wossner. Algorithmic Language and Program
Development. Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, Berlin,
1982.
Ingo Clafien, Hartmut Ehrig, and Dietmar Wolz. Algebraic Specifi
cation Techniques and Tools For Software Devleopment - The ACT
Approach. AMAST Series in Computing. World Scientific, 1993.
Ingo Clafien. Revision of ACT ONE in LOTOS. Lotosphere Report
Lo/WPl/T1.4/TUB/N0001/Vl, 1991.
Judy Crow, Sam Owre, John Rushby, Natarajan Shankar, and Man-
adayarn Srivas. A Tutorial Introduction to PVS. Computer Science
Laboratory, SRI International, 1995. Presented at WIFT ’95 (Work
shop on Industrial-Strength Formal Specification Techniques).
Klaus Didrich and Andreas Fett. Verifying OPAL — Part I: Verifying
in the Small. Technical Report 94-23, TU Berlin, December 1994.
Klaus Didrich, Andreas Fett, Carola Gerke, Wolfgang Grieskamp,
and Peter Pepper. OPAL: Design and Implementation of an Alge
braic Programming Language. In Jiirg Gutknecht, editor, Program
ming Languages and System Architectures , LNCS 782, pages 228-
244. Springer, March 1994.
Klaus Didrich. ACT ONE-C: Eine Erweiterung der Spezifikations-
sprache ACT ONE im Hinblick auf kompakte Darstellungen von
Spezifikationen. Diplomarbeit, TU Berlin, 1992.
Klaus Didrich. Compiler Support for Specification and Justification
- Description of a Case Study. Technical Report 99-18, TU Berlin,
November 1999.
Klaus Didrich and Torsten Klein. A Pragmatic Approach to Software
Documentation. Technical Report 96-4, TU Berlin, June 1996.
EEC. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approx
imation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the
Member States concerning liability for defective products. Official
Journal L 210, 1985. pages 0029-0033.
152 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[EM85]
[EM90]
[FSFOO]
[Gau95]
[GG75]
[Gib94]
[Gri81]
[Gri95]
[Gri96j
[Gün93]
[HNS97]
[How87]
Hartmut Ehrig and Bernd Mahr. Fundamentals of Algebraic Spec
ifications 1: Equations and Initial Semantics, volume 6 of EATCS
Monographs on Theoretical Computer Science. Springer, 1985.
Hartmut Ehrig and Bernd Mahr. Fundamentals of Algebraic Specifi
cation 2: Module Specifications and Constraints, volume 21 of EATCS
Monographs on Theoretical Computer Science. Springer, Berlin,
1990.
The Free Software Foundation. The GNU Privacy Guard.
http://www.gnupg.org/, 2000.
Marie-Claude Gaudel. Testing can be formal, too. In Proceedings
of the 6th International Joint Conference CAAP/FASE (TAPSOFT
’95), LNCS 915, pages 82-96, 1995.
J. B. Goodenough and S. Gerhart. Towards a Theory of Test Data
Selection. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 1(2), June
1975.
Jeremy Gibbons. An Introduction to the Bird-Meertens Formalism.
In New Zealand Formal Program Development Colloquium Seminar,
Hamilton, 1994.
David Gries. The Science of Programming. Texts and Monographs
in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, 1981.
Klaus Grimm. Systematisches Testen von Software - Eine neue Me
thode und eine effektive Teststrategie. Number 251 in GMD-Berichte.
R. Oldenbourg, 1995.
E. Pascal Gribomont. Preprocessing for Invariant Validation. In Mar
tin Wirsing and Maurice Nivat, editors, Proceedings of the 5th Inter
national Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Tech
nology, AMAST’96, LNCS 1101, pages 256-270. Springer, 1996.
Andreas Günther. Produkthaftung für Software - Ein obiter dictum
aus den USA. Computer und Recht, pages 544-546, 9 1993.
Steffen Heike, Thomas Neustupny, and Thomas Santen. Automating
Test Case Generation from Z Specifications with Isabelle. In Pro
ceedings of the 10th International Conference of Z Users (ZUM’97),
1997.
William E. Howden. Functional Program Testing & Analysis. Mc-
GrawHill, 1987.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
[Hud98]
[Hue95]
[Huß95]
[Huß97]
[JonOO]
[JSB+95]
[Knu83]
[KS91]
[KS98]
[KST94]
[KST97]
[LGH+78]
Paul Hudak. Modular domain specific languages and tools. In Pro
ceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Software Reuse,
pages 134-142, June 1998.
Gérard Huet. Type Theory, Specification Languages and Program
Verification. International Summer School on Logic of Computation,
Marktoberdorf, 1995.
Heinrich Hußmann. Formal Foundations for SSADM. Habilitation,
TU München, März 1995.
Heinrich Hußmann. Formal Foundations for Software Engineering
Methods. LNCS 1322. Springer, 1997.
Mark P. Jones. Integrating Programming, Properties and Validation.
In Roland Backhouse and José Nuno Oliveira, editors, Mathematics
of Progam Construction, 5th International Conference, MPC 2000,
LNCS 1837, page 1 [sic!], 2000.
Richard Jüllig, Y. V. Srinivas, Lee Blaine, Li-Mei Gilham, Allen
Goldberg, Cordell Green, Jim McDonald, and Richard Waldunger.
Specware Language Manual, 1995.
Donald E. Knuth. The Web System of Structured Documenta
tion. Stanford Computer Science Report CS980, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, 1983.
Frank A. Koch and Peter Schnupp. Software-Recht, volume 1.
Springer, 1991. Chapter 3.6.
Stefan Kahrs and Donald Sannella. Reflections on the Design
of a Specification Language. In Proceedings of the International
Colloquium on Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering,
ETA PS’98, LNCS 1382. Springer, 1998.
Stefan Kahrs, Donald Sannella, and Andrzej Tarlecki. The Definition
of Extended ML. Technical Report ECS-LFCS-94-300, University of
Edinburgh, LFCS, August 1994.
Stefan Kahrs, Donald Sannella, and Andrzej Tarlecki. The Defini
tion of Extended ML: a Gentle Introduction. Theoretical Computer
Science, 173:445-484, 1997.
Ralph L. London, John V. Guttag, James J. Horning, Butler W.
Lampson, J. G. Mitchell, and Gerald J. Popek. Proof Rules for the
Programming Language Euclid. Acta Informatica, 10.1—26, 1978.
154 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[LHL+77]
[LPPU94]
[LY97]
[MBB+99]
[ML84]
[MLP79]
[Nec97]
[Nic95]
[Nip98]
[NL98a]
[NL98b]
[Pag88]
B. W. Lampson, J. J. Horning, R. L. London, J. G. Mitchell, and
G. L. Popek. Report On The Programming Language Euclid. Sigplan
Notices , 12(2), February 1977.
Michael Lowry, Andrew Philpot, Thomas Pressburger, and Ian Un
derwood. Amphion: Automatic Programming for Scientific Subrou
tine Libraries. In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium
on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems , LNCS 869, pages 326-335.
Springer, 1994.
Tim Lindholm and Frank Yellin. The Java Virtual Machine Specifi
cation. Addison-Wesley, 1997.
Zohar Manna, Nikolaj Bjorner, Anca Browne, Michael Colon, Bernd
Finkbeiner, Mark Pichora, Henny B. Sipma, and Tomas Uribe.
Tool Support for System Specification, Development and Verification,
chapter An Update on STeP: Deductive-Algorithmic Verification of
Reactive Systems, pages 174-188. Advances in Computing Science.
Springer, 1999.
Per Martin-Löf. Intuitonistic Type Theory. Bibliopolis, 1984.
Richard A. De Millo, Richard J. Lipton, and Alan J. Perlis. Social
Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs. Communications
of the ACM, 22(5):271-280, May 1979.
George C. Necula. Proof-Carrying Code. In Proceedings of the 2fth
Annual ACM SIGPLAN SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Pro
gramming Languages (POPL '91), 1997.
Jan Nicklisch. Higher Order Partial Algebras in View of the Seman
tics of Functional Programs. Master’s thesis, TU Berlin, July 1995.
Tobias Nipkow. Isabelle/HOL - The Tutorial. TU München, 1998.
George C. Necula and Peter Lee. Efficient Representation and Vali
dation of Proofs. In IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
(LICS ’98), 1998.
George C. Necula and Peter Lee. The Design and Implementation of
a Certifying Compiler. In Proceedings of the 1998 ACM SIGPLAN
Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
(PLDI ’98), 1998.
Clive G. Page. Professional Programmer’s Guide to Fortranll. Pit
man, 1988.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 155
[Par90]
[Par95a]
[Par 95 b]
[Pau87]
[PBDD95]
[Pep91]
[PH99]
[PHL+77]
[Pop72]
[Pus94]
[PW95]
[Rei95]
Helmut Partsch. Specification and Transformation of Programs - a
Formal Approach to Software Development. Springer Verlag, Berlin,
Heidelberg, New York, Berlin, 1990.
Catherine Parent. Synthèse de preuves de programmes dans le calcul
des constructions inductives. PhD thesis, École normale supérieure
de Lyon, 1995.
Catherine Parent. Synthesizing proofs from programs in the Calculus
of Inductive Constructions. In Mathematics for Program Construc
tion ’95, LNCS 947. Springer, 1995.
Lawrence C. Paulson. Logic and Computation. Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
Peter Pepper, Ralph Betschko, Sabine Dick, and Klaus Didrich. Re
alizing Sets by Hash Tables. In Manfred Broy and Stefan Jàhnichen,
editors, KORSO: Methods, Languages, and Tools for the Construc
tion of Correct Software, LNCS 1009, pages 58-73. Springer, 1995.
Peter Pepper. Transforming Algebraic Specifications - Lessons
Learnt from an Example. In B. Môller, editor, Proceedings of the
IFIP TC 2 Conference on Constructing Programs from Specifica
tions, pages 1-27. Elsevier, 1991.
Simon Peyton Jones and John Hughes (editors). Report on the Pro
gramming Language Haskell 98. Technical report, Yale University,
1999.
G. J. Popek, J. J. Horning, B. W. Lampson, J. G. Mitchell, and R. L.
London. Notes on the Design of Euclid. ACM SIGPLAN Notices,
12(3):11—18, March 1977.
 Karl R. Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson of
London, seventh impression edition, 1972.
Cornelia Pusch. Verifikation einer Entwicklung von AVL-Baumen in
Isabelle. Diplomarbeit, TU München, 1994.
Peter Pepper and Martin Wirsing. A Method for the Development
of Correct Software. In Manfred Broy and Stefan Jàhnichen, edi
 tors, KORSO: Methods, Languages, and Tools for the Construction
of Correct Software, LNCS 1009, pages 27-57. Springer, 1995.
Wolfgang Reif. The KIV-Approach to Software Verification. In Man
fred Broy and Stefan Jàhnichen, editors, KORSO: Methods, Lan
 guages, and Tools for the Construction of Correct Software, LNCS
1009, pages 338-368. Springer, 1995.
BIBLIOGRAPHY156
[Riv90] Ronald L. Rivest. Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, vol
ume A, chapter 13: Cryptography, pages 717-756. Elsevier, 1990.
[RS97] Wolfgang Reif and Gerhard Schellhorn. Theorem Proving in Large
Theories. In Automated Theorem Proving in Software Engineering
(CADE-14 workshop), 1997.
[RSS97] Wolfgang Reif, Gerhard Schellhorn, and Kurt Stenzel. Proving Sys
tem Correctness with KIV 3.0. In William McCune, editor, Auto
mated Deduction - CADE-14, LNAI 1249, pages 69-72. Springer,
1997.
[SC96] Phil Stocks and David Carrington. A Framework for Specification-
Based Testing. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,
22(11):777—793, November 1996.
[Sha97] Stuart Shapiro. Splitting the Difference: The Historical Necessity of
Synthesis in Software Engineering. IEEE Annals of the History of
Computing, 19(l):20-54, 1997.
[Som92] Ian Sommerville. Software Engineering. Addison-Wesley, 4th edition,
1992.
[SP93] Douglas R. Smith and Eduardo A. Parra. Transformational Ap
proach to Transportation Scheduling. In Proceedings of the 8th
Knowledge-based Software Engineering Conference, pages 60-68.
IEEE Computer Society Press, 1993.
[ST89] Donald Sannella and Andrzej Tarlecki. Toward Formal Development
of ML Programs: Foundations and Methodology. Technical Report
ECS-LFCS-89-71, Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science,
University of Edinburgh, 1989.
[Str87] Bjarne Stroustrup. The C++ Programming Language. ANSI Based
Document; AT&T Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill. Addi
son Wesley, Mass., 1987.
[SW98] Ute Schmid and Fritz Wysotzki. Induction of Recursive Program
Schemes. In Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Machine
Learning ECML-98, LNAI 1398, pages 214-225. Springer, 1998.
[Tho98] Robin Thomas. An Update on the Four-Color Theorem. Notices of
the AMS, 45(7):848-859, August 1998.
[Van93] Mark T. Vandevoorde. Specifications Can Make Programs Run
Faster. In M.-C. Gaudel and J.-P. Jouannaud, editors, TAPSOFT’93:
Theory and Practice of Software Development, Proceedings, LNCS
668, pages 215-229. Springer, April 1993.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 157
[Van96]
[vL90]
[VW90]
[WB89]
[WDC+95]
[Wei97]
[Wir90]
Glenn Vanderburg. Tricks of the Java Programming Gurus , chapter
23: Pushing the Limits of Java Security. SAMS.net Publishing, 1996.
Jan van Leeuwen. Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science , vol
ume A, chapter 10: Graph Algorithms, pages 525-632. Elsevier, 1990.
Christopher J. Van Wyk. Literate Programming - an Assessment.
Communications of the ACM, 33(3):361—365, March 1990.
Philip Wadler and Stephen Blott. How to make ad-hoc polymor
phism less ad hoc. In 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Pro
gramming Languages , pages 60-76, 1989.
Uwe Wolter, Klaus Didrich, Felix Cornelius, Markus Klar, Roland
Wessäly, and Hartmut Ehrig. How to Cope with the Spectrum
of SPECTRUM. In Manfred Broy and Stefan Jähnichen, editors,
KORSO: Methods, Languages, and Tools for the Construction of
Correct Software , LNCS 1009, pages 173-189. Springer, 1995.
Thiemo Weiß. Testfallgenerierung auf der Basis von Z-Spezifi-
kationen mit Hilfe der Klassifikationsbaum-Methode. Diplomarbeit,
TU Berlin, April 1997.
Martin Wirsing. Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, vol
ume B, chapter 13: Algebraic Specification, pages 675-788. North-
Holland, 1990.
